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English summary
English summary
During the last ten years there has been a rigorous debate on how to im-
prove anti-cartel enforcement in Europe. Introducing private enforcements
systems, like in the US, was early in the process regarded as one of the
most important steps for signiﬁcant improvements. In contrast to public
enforcement, private enforcement relies on adequate compensation to cus-
tomers harmed by a cartel. But cartel damages are hard to calculate and
the European Commission has therefore presented a draft guideline on how
to quantify harm to assist courts and claimants.
The focus in the guidance is on price eﬀects, but cartels are also likely to cause
other types of damage, such as eﬃciency eﬀects. For example, a Swedish
committee investigating cartels in the 1950’s stated that
”A monopolist or a cartel can charge too high prices in relation to its costs. A
cartel determines prices after the least eﬃcient ﬁrm in the cartel, and hence
protects it” (SOU 1951:27).
This statement reﬂects an early awareness that pricing and eﬃciency eﬀects
from cartels are deeply related, and jointly determines the harm for con-
sumers. This thesis aims at re-joining the discussion of cartel prices and
eﬃciencies for the purpose of determining cartel damages. It will focus on
the issue outlined above, i.e. cartel behaviour and the harm caused by car-
tels when a cartel consists of members that are not symmetric in costs. Cost
asymmetries can be both exogenous and endogenous to cartel formation, but
rather than discussing why asymmetries arise, I will in the four chapters fo-
cus on the eﬀect the asymmetries have on cartel prices and hence consumer
harm.
The ﬁrst chapter asks if and how the perception of cartel harm changed the
cartel legislation. I use the case of Sweden which was ﬁrst country in Europe
to fully incorporate the European Community competition law into national
legislation. In the beginning of the 20th century, little was known about car-
tels and their eﬀects. Economists argued that while they sometimes increased
prices, cartels also generated eﬃciencies. During the 1930’s depression, car-
tels were seen as positive in Europe and were even promoted by governments
as a way to cut costs, promote recovery and avoid bankruptcy. The posi-
tive view continued during the Second world war when cartels were used as
part of the war machinery. After the war attitudes changed in Europe and
iii
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Sweden, and after a period of monitoring the extent of cartelisation, the ﬁrst
cartel laws were introduced in the 1950’s. Since no evidence of high prices
caused by cartels had been found, the legislation focused on improving mar-
ket eﬃciency. Cartels themselves were generally not prohibited, but the state
had the right to negotiate with cartels that charged too high prices. During
most of the later part of the century, cartel legislation was complemented
with price control. In the early 1980’s it was clear that cartels could in-
crease prices and cartel prohibition was suggested. The proposal caused big
controversy in both the legal system and industry, therefore eﬀect-analysis
remained the basis of the law. It was not until 1993 when Sweden copied
the EC competition law that cartels became prohibited irrespective of their
eﬀects. Despite the prohibition, eﬀect-arguments were used in court until
the beginning of the 2000’s. This chapter illustrates that trying to assess
cartel eﬀects is nothing new. If further shows that there are both price and
eﬃciency eﬀects to be expected from a cartel. The rest of the chapters aim
at joining these eﬀects.
The second chapter explores the relation between ﬁrm eﬃciency and car-
tel pricing mechanism. I derive how cartel prices are determined when cartel
members are asymmetric in costs and show how cost changes aﬀect both car-
tel prices and sustainability. Cartel models are often designed as duopolies.
This model illustrates that when it comes to understanding cartel behaviour
by asymmetric ﬁrms, restricting the analysis to a duopoly aﬀects the result.
If there are two eﬃcient ﬁrms and one ineﬃcient ﬁrm in a cartel, the eﬃcient
ﬁrms can deviate either alone or together. If they deviate together they form
a new smaller cartel. When the cost asymmetries are suﬃciently large, it is
tempting for the eﬃcient ﬁrms to deviate together and form their own car-
tel. This makes the large cartel more unstable. The members are assumed
to bargain about the cartel price, where the eﬃcient ﬁrms want lower prices
than the ineﬃcient one. When the best outside option to being in the large
cartel is forming a smaller cartel, prices are set closer to the eﬃcient ﬁrms’
monopoly price, to induce them to stay. In some cases bargaining does not
lead to incentive compatible solutions, but there is still a possibility to form
a cartel that would make all members better of than competing. In these
cases, price is set at the eﬃcient ﬁrms’ monopoly price and the division of
proﬁts is carried out through market share allocation.
The third chapter departs further from standard cartel models with symmet-
ric ﬁrms and homogenous products by assuming that the cartel sells diﬀeren-
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tiated products. The asymmetry allows the cartel to charge a diﬀerent price
for every product. Using a two-ﬁrm model I explore how prices and con-
sumer welfare are aﬀected by cost asymmetries and product diﬀerentiation.
Prices in the model are determined by the eﬃcient ﬁrm giving the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm a take-it or leave-it oﬀer. Just as in the second chapter, the counter-
factual or outside option plays an important role, not only in determining
prices, but also damages. While cartel prices are fairly constant over diﬀerent
degrees of product diﬀerentiation, the counterfactual varies a considerably.
The price diﬀerence between the cartel and the competitive situation, i.e.
the overcharge, decreases with product diﬀerentiation since diﬀerentiation
allows ﬁrms to unilaterally exert market power also in the non-competitive
situation. Standard models assume symmetric costs and homogeneous prod-
ucts. This model illustrates that these assumptions lead to an extreme case
in which welfare losses are maximal and restitution of damages undercom-
pensates consumers the most. When products are diﬀerentiated, damages
are lower. The degree of competition if there was no cartel is hence crucial
for determining cartel damages.
The fourth chapter centres around the discussion of why cost asymmetries
arise and makes the asymmetries endogenous to the model. More importantly
it investigates if the diﬀerences will prevail. In Europe anticompetitive agree-
ments, such as cartels, can be exempted from prohibition if they generate ef-
ﬁciencies - for example through knowledge sharing. Eﬃciency arguments are
therefore often invoked as a defence for the cartels, a.k.a. eﬃciency defence.
But should we expect cartel members to share information with each other?
The section presents two possible explanations as to why they would want to
share information; i) to save the cartel when it is unstable, and ii) to align
the pricing preferences for the cartel. Using a two-ﬁrm model where ﬁrms
ex ante have the same costs I refute the two above hypothesis - a ﬁrm that
gains a cost advantage has no incentive to share its knowledge even of the
ﬁrms form a cartel. The chapter also shows that an eﬃcient ﬁrm has larger
incentives to invest in cost reducing technology. The diﬀerence between the
eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms will therefore increase over time.
v
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Gennem de seneste 10 a˚r har der været en omfattende debat om, hvordan
man kan forbedre h˚andhævelsen af anti-kartel foranstaltninger i Europa. In-
troduktion af private h˚andhævelsessystemer, blev i processens begyndelse
anset som et af de vigtigste skridt mod egentlig forandring. Til forskel fra
oﬀentlig retsh˚andhævelse afhænger privat h˚andhævelse af tilstrækkelig kom-
pensation til kunder, der bliver skadet af et kartel. Men skadevirkningen
er svær at beregne, og Europa-Kommissionen har s˚aledes fremstillet et ud-
kast til retningslinjer, for hvordan skadesvirkningen kan kvantiﬁceres, for at
hjælpe domstolene og den skadelidte.
Vejledningen har fokus p˚a priseﬀekter, men karteller er ogs˚a tilbøjelige til
skabe andre skadesvirkninger, s˚asom eﬀektivitetseﬀekter. For eksempel har
en svensk komite´ til undersøgelse af karteller udtalt følgende:
”En monopolhaver eller et kartel kan kræve for høje priser i forhold til
omkostningerne. Et kartel fastsætter prisen efter den mindst eﬀektive virk-
somhed og beskytter den herigennem.” (SOU 1951:27)
Denne udtalelse afspejler en tidlig bevidsthed om, at pris- og eﬀektivitetsef-
fekter fra karteller er tæt forbundne, og at de tilsammen er afgørende for
skaden for forbrugerne. Denne afhandling sigter mod at genforene diskus-
sionen af kartelpriser og -eﬀektivitet for at kunne fastsl˚a kartellers skade-
virkning. Afhandlingen vil fokusere p˚a de ovenfor nævnte problemstillinger,
dvs. kartellers opførsel samt deres skadevirkning, n˚ar et kartel best˚ar af
medlemmer, der ikke har symmetriske omkostninger. Omkostningsasym-
metri kan b˚ade være exogen og endogen for karteldannelsen, men i stedet for
at diskutere hvorfor asymmetrien opst˚ar, vil jeg i de ﬁre kapitler fokusere p˚a,
den eﬀekt asymmetri har p˚a kartelpriserne og s˚aledes ogs˚a p˚a skadevirknin-
gen for forbrugerne.
Det første kapitel undersøger om, og hvordan opfattelsen af kartellers skade-
virkning har ændret lovgivningen om karteller. Jeg anvender Sverige som
case, hvilket var det første land i Europa til at indarbejde Det Europæiske
Fællesskabs konkurrenceregler i sin nationale lovgivning. I starten af det 20
a˚rhundrede vidste man kun lidt om karteller og deres eﬀekter. økonomer
hævdede, at selvom de nogle gange hævede priserne, skabte kartellerne ogs˚a
eﬀektivitet. I løbet af depressionen i 1930’erne blev karteller anset som no-
get positivt i Europa og blev endda støttet af regeringer som en ma˚de at
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reducere omkostninger, fremme opsving og undg˚a konkurs. Denne positive
anseelse fortsatte gennem anden verdenskrig, hvor karteller blev brugt som
en del af krigsmaskineriet. Efter krigen ændredes holdningen i Europa og
Sverige, og efter en periode med kontrol af karteldannelsens udbredelse blev
de første love introduceret i 1950’erne. Siden der ikke var fundet bevis for,
at højere priser skyldtes kartellerne, fokuserede lovgivningen p˚a at forbedre
markedseﬀektiviteten. Kartellerne selv var generelt ikke forbudte, men staten
havde ret til at forhandle med karteller der forlangte for høje priser. Gennem
størstedelen af a˚rhundredet blev kartellovgivningen suppleret med priskon-
trol. I starten af 1980’erne stod det klart, at karteller kunne forhøje priser,
og forbud mod karteller blev foresl˚aet. Forslaget skabte stor uenighed i b˚ade
retssystemet og industrien, hvorfor eﬀektanalyse vedblev med at være basis
for lovgivningen. Det var ikke før 1993, hvor Sverige kopierede EF’s konkur-
renceregler, at kartellerne blev forbudt uafhængigt af deres virkninger. P˚a
trods af forbuddet blev eﬀekt-argumenterne brugt i retten frem til starten af
nullerne. Dette kapitel illustrerer, at forsøget p˚a at vurdere kartellers virkn-
ing ikke er noget nyt. Derudover viser det, at der b˚ade kan forventes pris-
og eﬃktivitetseﬀekter af karteller. De følgende kapitler sigter mod at forene
disse eﬀekter.
Andet kapitel udforsker relationen mellem virksomheders eﬀektivitet og kart-
ellers prisdannelsesmekanisme. Jeg udreder, hvordan kartelpriser bliver fast-
sat, n˚ar kartelmedlemmerne er asymmetriske med hensyn til omkostninger
samt hvordan ændringer p˚avirker b˚ade kartelpriser og bæredygtighed. Kartel-
modeller er ofte designet som et duopol. Denne model illustrerer at, n˚ar det
kommer til at forst˚a kartelopførsel med asymmetriske ﬁrmaer, vil begræn-
sningen af modellen til et duopol p˚avirke resultatet. Hvis der er to eﬀektive
virksomheder og en ineﬀektiv virksomhed i et kartel, kan de eﬀektive virk-
somheder afvige enten alene eller sammen. Hvis de afviger sammen, danner
de et nyt mindre kartel. N˚ar omkostningsasymmetrien er tilstrækkelig stor,
er det fristende for de eﬀektive virksomheder at afvige sammen og danne
deres eget kartel. Dette gør det store kartel mere ustabilt. Medlemmerne
formodes at købsl˚a om kartelprisen, hvor de eﬀektive virksomheder ønsker
en lavere prise end den ueﬀektive. N˚ar den bedste valgmulighed alternativt
til at være i et stort kartel er at danne et mindre kartel, bliver priserne sat
nærmere de eﬀektive virksomheders monopolpris, for at tilskynde dem til at
blive. I nogle tilfælde vil forhandling om ikke føre til motivationsfremmende
kompatible løsninger, men der er stadig mulighed for at danne et kartel, der
vii
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gavner alle medlemmer bedre, end konkurrence ville. I disse tilfælde sættes
prisen p˚a denne eﬀektive virksomheds monopolpris og opdelingen af overskud
bliver gennemført via fordeling af markedsandele.
Tredje kapitel adskiller sig yderligere fra standard kartelmodeller med sym-
metriske virksomheder og homogene produkter ved at antage, at kartellet
sælger diﬀerentierede produkter. Asymmetrien tillader kartellet at opkræve
en forskellig pris for hvert produkt. Gennem en model med to virksomheder
udforsker jeg, hvordan priser og forbrugervelfærd bliver p˚avirket af omkost-
ningsasymmetri og produktdiﬀerentiering. Priserne i modellen er bestemt
ved, at den eﬀektive virksomhed giver den ineﬀektive virksomhed et ulti-
mativt tilbud. Lige som i andet kapitel spiller kontrafakta eller den al-
ternative valgmulighed en vigtig rolle, ikke alene for fastsættelse af priser,
men ogs˚a for skadevirkningen. Mens kartelpriser er rimelig konstante over
forskellige grader af produktﬁnansiering varierer kontrafakta betydeligt. Pris-
forskellen mellem kartellet og konkurrencesituationen, dvs. overprisen, falder
med produktdiﬀerentiering, eftersom diﬀerentieringen tillader virksomheder
til at udøve selvstændig indﬂydelse p˚a markedet selv i situationen med ikke-
konkurrence. Standardmodellerne antager omkostningssymmetri og homo-
gene produkter. Denne model illustrerer, at disse antagelser viser en ekstrem
case, hvor velfærdstabene er maksimale, og hvor skadeserstatningen under-
kompenserer forbrugerne mest. N˚ar produkter er diﬀerentierede, er skaderne
mindre. Graden af konkurrence, hvis der ikke var noget kartel, er s˚aledes
afgørende for at bestemme kartellers skadevirkning.
Fjerde kapitel er centreret omkring diskussionen af, hvorfor omkostningsasym-
metri opst˚ar, og gør asymmetri endogen til modellen. Hvad der er nok s˚a
vigtigt, undersøger det om forskellen vil være fremherskende. I Europa kan
anti-konkurrencemæssige aftaler, s˚asom karteller, være undtaget for forbud,
hvis det producerer eﬀektivitet - f.eks. via videndeling. Eﬀektivitetsargu-
menter tages s˚aledes ofte i brug som forsvar for karteller, med andre ord
’eﬀektivitetsforsvar’. Men bør vi forvente, at kartelmedlemmerne deler in-
formation med hinanden? Denne sektion præsenterer to mulige forklaringer
p˚a, hvorfor de skulle ønske at dele information; i) for at redde kartellet, hvis
det er ustabilt, og ii) for at justere prisen til fordel for kartellet. Gennem
en model med to virksomheder, hvor virksomhederne ex ante har de samme
omkostninger, modbeviser jeg de to ovenst˚aende hypoteser - et ﬁrma, der
f˚ar en omkostningsfordel, har intet incitament til at dele dets viden selv
med andre ﬁrmaer i kartellet. Dette kapitel viser ydermere, at en eﬀektiv
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virksomhed har større incitament til at investere i omkostningsreducerende
teknologi. Forskellen mellem de eﬀektive og de ineﬀektive virksomheder vil
derfor øges med tiden.
ix
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Introduction
During the last ten years there has been a rigorous debate on how to im-
prove anti-cartel enforcement in Europe. Introducing private enforcements
systems, like in the US, was early in the process regarded as one of the most
important steps for signiﬁcant improvements.1 Together they are considered
to improve cartel deterrence. In contrast to public enforcement, private en-
forcement relies on adequate compensation to customers harmed by a cartel.
But damages are hard to calculate and the legal systems in Europe are not
used to these type of processes2. This makes private litigation less of an
option for customers and a weaker cartel deterrent.
In the US the incentives for private claimants are solved with a trebling
of the damages3 but this route is not envisaged for Europe.4 To facilitate
private litigation the European Commission instead initiated wide-spread
discussion on how to estimate damages in a consistent way5, and published
draft guidelines on how to quantify harm.6 The guidance is non-binding but
aims at providing insights into the harm caused by cartels and on the main
methods and techniques to quantify such harm.
This move towards a more economic analysis and focus on eﬀects in privately
enforced cartel cases stand in stark contrast to the development of the public
anti-cartel enforcement. In the publicly enforced cases the transition has
instead been in the opposite direction and cartels have from the late 1990’s
been considered prohibited per se.7 But, throughout most of the the 20th
century cartels in Europe were subject to eﬀect-based legislation where only
the harmful cartels were controlled in one way or another. Eﬀect analysis and
quantiﬁcation of harm in cartel legislation is therefore not new in Europe.
The theory of the harm caused by cartels has shifted over time. During the
1E.g. Mario Monti, Speach at 8th Annual IBA conference (2004), ”Private litigation
as a key complement to public enforcement of competition rules and the ﬁrst conclusions
on the implementation of the new Merger Regulation”.
2The Ashurst (2004) study referred to the European situation as one ”of astonishing
diversity and total underdevelopment.”
3American Bar Association (1986)
4European Commission (2008) refers to the principle of full compensation.
5E.g. Ashurst (2004), CEPS (2007), Oxera (2009) and European Commission (2008)
6European Commission (2011)
7E.g. Harding and Joshua (2010)
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1930’s cartels were seen as a good market mechanism for eﬃciency and to
ensure stability. But after the Second World War cartels started to become
monitored more closely and several European states introduced formal car-
tel registers (e.g. in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark,
Norway). Further, in some states cartel prices were subject to control or
general price regulation. Contrary to the current discussion where the entire
focus is on prices, eﬃciency arguments were previously raised in relation to
cartels. Eﬃciency arguments were used both to defend the cartels and to
illustrate harm not covered by price analysis. A Swedish committee investi-
gating cartels in the 1950’s stated that
”A monopolist or a cartel can charge too high prices in relation to its costs. A
cartel determines prices after the least eﬃcient ﬁrm in the cartel, and hence
protects it”.8
This statement reﬂects an early awareness that pricing and eﬃciency eﬀects
from cartels are deeply related, and jointly determines the harm for con-
sumers.
This thesis aims at re-joining the discussion of cartel prices and eﬃciencies
for the purpose of determining cartel damages. It will focus on the problem
outlined above, when a cartel consists of members that are not symmetric in
costs. These asymmetries can be both exogenous and endogenous to cartel
formation, but rather than discussing why the asymmetries arise, I will focus
on the eﬀect they have on cartel prices and hence consumer harm.
The ﬁrst chapter describes how changes in the perceived harm by cartels
aﬀected the development of the Swedish cartel legislation. The chapter illus-
trates how an unclear theory of harm and high requirements of measurable
eﬀects made the legislation fairly weak. Despite the Swedish law prohibiting
restraints of restricting competition (instead of controlling eﬀects) in 1993,
eﬀect-arguments were used in court until the beginning of the 2000s.
Aiming at the issues presented in the quote from the Swedish committee,
the second chapter investigates how cartel prices are determined when the
members are asymmetric and how changes in costs aﬀect prices and cartel
stability. In the chapter I show that prices are increased when there are cost
diﬀerences, but the level of the prices are determined by the best outside
option to being in a cartel. If ﬁrms with lower costs have better outside
options, the cartel price will be lower.
8(SOU, 1951:27, p. 13).
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The third chapter departs further from standard models with symmetric
ﬁrms and homogenous products. It analyses how cartel prices and consumer
welfare are aﬀected when ﬁrms have diﬀerent costs and the products are
diﬀerentiated. The chapter ﬁnds that the standard model, with symmetric
costs and homogeneous products is an extreme case in which welfare losses are
maximal and restitution of damages undercompensates consumers the most.
When products are diﬀerentiated, damages are lower. The counterfactual
competitive situation is crucial for determining cartel damages.
The fourth chapter discusses why cost asymmetries arise, and more impor-
tantly, it analyses if they will they prevail. Anticompetitive agreements such
as cartels can be exempted from prohibition if they generate eﬃciencies -
for example through knowledge sharing. This would result in no or reduced
cost asymmetries. However it turns out that eﬃcient cartel members have no
incentives to share knowledge with ineﬃcient members. Since eﬃcient ﬁrms
have larger incentives to invest in cost reducing technology, the diﬀerences
will increase over time.
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Abstract
Cartels are today believed to be harmful to society and are there-
fore prohibited and subject to large ﬁnes in most parts of the in-
dustrialised world. But the strong stance against cartels only dates
back to the 1990s in Europe and in the 1930s cartels were regarded
as beneﬁcial and promoted both in Europe and in the US. This paper
investigates how the perception of harm inﬂuenced cartel legislation.
Using the case of Sweden, the paper argues that until the mid 1960s,
the weak legislation and enforcement can be explained by economists
being uncertain about the theory of harm. From the 1970s to the
1990s, the theory of harm was established but cartel legislation re-
mained inadequate largely due to industry lobbying and reluctance to
legal change. As a result cartels were under-enforced.
Keywords: Antitrust, cartels, damage.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: K21, K42, N24
aCopenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelænshaven 16 A, DK-
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1 Introduction
In 1998, during an era where competition enforcement was strong, the OECD
concluded that ”Hard core cartels are the most egregious violations of com-
petition law. They injure consumers in many countries by raising prices and
restricting supply, thus making goods and services completely unavailable to
some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive for others”(OECD, 1998). But
the insight that cartels are bad for society is old and dates back to at least
Adam Smith. In the Wealth of Nations (1776) he discussed the harm cause
by cartels and some of the problems designing a suitable legislation1.
Despite the beliefs that cartels are bad for society, the ﬁrst important na-
tional antitrust legislation was not introduced until 1890 with the passage of
the Sherman Act in the US that prohibited contracts and conspiracies that
restricted trade. The law was a reaction to exploitative practices by the early
capitalists (Peters, 1996, p. 40), but enforcement was relatively weak during
the two ﬁrst decades (Kovacic and Shapiro, 1999). When it was introduced
21 US states already had own antitrust legislations and the Sherman act was
something of a codiﬁcation of the common law (Engerman and Gallman,
2000, p. 537). Antitrust legislation had also been introduced in Canada in
1889, but it was weak and of more symbolic importance since its impact until
the mid 1980s was insigniﬁcant (Doern, 1996, p. 9). The following year, the
Sherman Act was introduced in the US, prohibiting contracts and conspir-
acies that restricted trade. The law was a reaction to exploitative practices
by the early capitalists (Peters, 1996, p. 40), but enforcement was relatively
weak during the two ﬁrst decades (Kovacic and Shapiro, 1999).
The attitude towards cartels in Europe was the opposite. Even though
France and Belgium was the starting point for industrial cartels in Europe,
Germany became the center for the European cartel development from the
1870s (Schro¨ter, 1996). As a response to the Great Depression the industries
started to organise themselves to stabilise the markets and avoid bankrupt-
cies. These structures became even more important in the 1890s when cartel
contracts became enforceable in German courts.
Europe did not introduce cartel legislation until half a century later and there
1”People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.”(Smith, 1776)
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was no cartel prohibition, national or supranational, before the Second World
War (Schro¨ter, 1996). In 1951 the ﬁrst step was taken towards a common car-
tel policy with the competition provisions in the Treaty of Paris, establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)2. The competition legisla-
tion in the ECSC became the basis for the European Community competition
legislation in the Treaty of Rome from 1957, but early enforcement was weak
and cartel members were not ﬁned until 1969. Many notiﬁed cartels actually
received negative clearances, whereas arguably the arrangements would have
raised suspicion today (Schinkel, 2007). At a national level, cartel prohi-
bition in Europe was slow, and many European countries didn’t introduce
strict cartel prohibition until the mid 1990s, i.e. over a century later than in
the US.
As described by Harding and Joshua (2003) an important diﬀerence in the en-
forcement between US and Europe was the notion of cartels. In the Sherman
Act, cartels are described as planned under-cover conspiracies which in their
nature are bad for society. In Europe however, cartels were regarded as an
economic institution, with the possibility of inﬂicting harm. This diﬀerence
in conception has had large consequences on the cartel enforcement.
This paper traces the development of the theory of harm over time and
investigates if and how changing beliefs about cartel eﬀects had an impact on
the competition legislation. It focuses on Sweden, a small export dependent
nation that was the ﬁrst country to fully adopt the European Community
competition legislation. The paper argues that until the mid 1960s, the weak
legislation and enforcement can be explained by an unclear theory of harm.
Since harm was not established, the law was largely eﬀects based. From the
mid 1970s cartels were understood to be harmful, but they were still under-
enforced since the law was weak. In the 1990s Sweden switched gear and
prohibited cartels. The new legislation, boardering on per se prohibition of
cartels, was radically diﬀerent from the previous case by case economic abuse
assessment. But eﬀects arguments were still used in courts. I argue that
the economic theory of harm has had an important inﬂuence on the cartel
legislation, but reluctance to legal changes and industry lobbying slowed
down the development. The development in Sweden closely resembles the
development in the northern part of Europe.
2Treaty of Paris, Chapter VI - Agreements and concentrations, Art. 65.
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Figure 1: Theory of harm and legal changes in Sweden
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Mixed Ineﬃciency Prices
None Monitoring Abuse ”Per se”
Theory of harm
Legal principle
This paper consists of three parts where section 2 discusses the development
of cartel legislation in the US, in Europe and Sweden from the beginning
of the last century until now. The focus is on the theory of harm and how
changes in the understanding of cartel eﬀects transformed into legislation.
Section 3 concludes the ﬁndings.
2 Development of the cartel legislation in Swe-
den
This section traces the development of US, European and Swedish cartel leg-
islation over time, with a special focus on the economics motivating the laws.
The purpose of the Swedish legislation and its pros and cons is mainly de-
rived from a series of committee reports, motivations in legislative proposals
and other public documents.
2.1 Before the Second World War: Exploring
In the ﬁrst two decades of the 20th century there was little information on
the extent of cartels and their eﬀects on society. Cartel enforcement had just
begun in the US but did not exist in Europe. The ﬁrst step was to explore the
extent of cartels in the industry and to learn about their behaviour. Germany
was ﬁrst among European countries to pass a cartel law, which was intended
to gather and disseminate information on cartels. But the law never became
operational due to the start of the First World War (Gerber, 2001, p. 109).
A similar step was taken in Sweden when the government in 1911 appointed
a commission3 to analyse the extent of cartels and trusts and their eﬀect on
3The Cartel and Trust Commission (Kartell- och trustutredningen).
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the Swedish economy.4 The commission was especially instructed to analyse
price formation (SOU, 1951:27). Partly due to the outbreak of the First
World War, the ﬁndings were few and the main part of the report was made
up of a study of the sugar market and the taxation of sugar in Sweden,
Denmark and Germany (Wetter, 1961).
The commission however triggered discussions about cartels in Sweden and
the report was followed by a book written by an economist, analysing cartels
and their eﬀects (Ljunggren, 1912). The introduction to the book declared
that limiting cartels reduced eﬃciency and thereby also welfare. Cartelisation
was to be increased, especially in the export industries where cartels were
not common (Ljunggren, 1912, p. 11). The book concluded that cartels and
trusts were common in the Swedish industry, especially in the food and bev-
erage industries. Despite possible cost reductions from cooperation, it was
found that cartels often increased prices above the competitive level. The
author however regarded it to be unfeasible to prohibit, and ineﬃcient to na-
tionalise, cartels and therefore proposed publication of the cartel agreements
to induce self regulation (Ljunggren, 1912, p. 129). Since cartel registration
was not introduced until 1946, the book was ahead of its time but had no
contemporary eﬀect on legislation, except for keeping the cartel discussion
alive.
Hyper inﬂation in Europe during the 1920s increased the incentives for ﬁrms
to join cartels since the cartels could protect the members from inﬂation
by passing the cost increases over to customers (Gerber, 2001). Despite a
growing concern in Europe that cartels were a problem, there was little hard
evidence to support the claims, both regarding the scope and the magnitude
of the problem. Cartels were not seen as inherently negative for society. This
was reﬂected in the European cartel legislation of the 1920s, where cartels
were not prohibited, but abusive conduct was regulated or prohibited. Unlike
the US Sherman act, the early cartel legislations in Europe were eﬀects based
and economists played an important role in drafting the laws.
More like an experiment, the UK introduced the Proﬁteering Act in 1919
to control excessive prices following the ﬁrst World War, but the act was
discontinued already in 1921 (Prop, 1925:110). Germany introduced a law
based on the principle of abuse in 1923 requiring cartel agreements to be in
4In a cartel decisions are made by independent ﬁrms, whereas a trust has a joint
administration that directly or indirectly disposes of the joint assets.
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writing and to be registered with an authority (Schwartz, 1957). Norway
passed a competition law in 1920 that was aimed at controlling cartels, dom-
inant companies and monopolies, followed by a more comprehensive law in
19265 based on the principle of abuse which required cartels to register.
Sweden experienced high inﬂation during the First World War, peaking at
47 percent in 1918. The hefty price increases renewed the interest in cartels
and their eﬀects on prices since it was believed the the inﬂation was partly
caused by the cartels. To assess these claims, the government appointed a
committee6 in 1919, to analyse the extent and eﬀects of monopolistic organi-
sations (SOU, 1924:37). The committee concluded that all important sectors
in the Swedish industry were aﬀected by trusts or cartels. Despite consid-
erable variations in the cartel agreements among industries, ranging from a
complete trust in the sugar industry to agreements on sales conditions in the
clothing industry, cartels were seen to charge high prices. Although foreign
competition was found to reduce prices, the committee found examples of
prices above the world market price (plus tariﬀs and transportations costs),
caused by agreements between the cartels and ﬁrms exporting to Sweden.
The committee was however not instructed to propose new legislation.
During the same time the economists were trying to understand the cartel
dynamics and Ljunggren (1920) wrote a report discussing the eﬀect of dif-
ferent types of cartels. According to the report, the least organised type of
cartel was the condition cartel, where members did not agree on prices, but
on auxiliary conditions such as credits, rebates and freight. Since members in
such cartels still disposed of many means of competition, this type of cartel
was regarded as fairly unproblematic.
Price cartels were seen as the most common type of cartel and were present
on all levels of industry. They were however not seen as harmful since these
cartels were regarded to be a temporary phenomenon that could only exist
in a positive economic climate. In a negative climate it was believed to be
too tempting for the ﬁrms to deviate from the agreement and produce and
sell at full capacity. Production cartels on the other hand were believed
to be enduring, since it would be harder to deviate from a pre-determined
production level than a pre-determined price. These cartels were therefore
potentially harmful, but the study deemed it to be so complicated to assign
5Trustloven
6The Duty and Treaty Committee (Tull- och traktatkommitte´n).
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production quotas, that there should be few production cartels. Hence there
was no need to worry about these cartels neither. Territorial cartels on the
other hand were believed to be problematic and easily enforced, especially
when transportation costs were high.
The Government appointed a commission7 in 1920 to propose provisional
legislation to investigate and control trusts and other monopolistic associa-
tions. Inﬂuenced by Ljungrens work it declared in 1921 that the existence of
monopolistic associations, and their inﬂuences on prices and turnover, was
of such importance that the state needed to take action. The commission
hence suggested that a permanent authority should be instated to investigate
the scope and eﬀects of these associations and if needed, propose legislation.
It also suggested that the new authority should inform the government if it
found that or associations that used their position in a way that resulted in
unreasonable prices (Trustlagstiftningskommitte´n, 1921).
Despite the concerns of high prices due to cartelisation, the commission also
emphasised several positive economic features with cartels such as: eﬃciency
caused by specialisation, diﬀusion of technology, standardisation and pro-
duction planning. The overall eﬀects on society were hence unclear and this
was a main reason why no stricter legislation was proposed.
The industry opposed the commission’s proposal since in their view, it con-
demned legitimate business practices in favour of an undeﬁned consumer
interest. The National Board of Trade was also critical and argued that
cartelisation was caused by the industries’ drive to improve productivity. As
cartels were seen as natural and eﬃcient institutions, the board claimed that
ﬁghting the development was inappropriate and futile (Prop, 1925:110). This
reﬂects the belief that cartels were beneﬁcial and that their power were to
be used by society.
The law on investigation of monopolistic ﬁrms and associations8 was a watered-
down version of the commission’s proposal due to uncertainties whether car-
tels were negative for society. Further, the scope of the cartel problem was
unclear. The law only gave the government possibility to, on an ad hoc basis,
investigate eﬀects on prices or turnover from monopolistic ﬁrms or associa-
tions. Thus, the law had no sanctions. If the authority detected harmful
7The Trust Legislation Commission (Trustlagstiftningskommitte´n).
8Lag om underso¨kning ang˚aende monopolistiska fo¨retag och sammanslutningar (SFS
1925:223)
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practices it was to suggest measures to alleviate the encountered problem.
These measures included direct contact with the ﬁrms, making the report
public, suspending or reducing duty rates or proposing new legislation, i.e.
measures that were already at the disposal of the government. The general
idea with the law was that control should prevent abuse. The legislation
was intentionally weak since the positive and negative aspects of a law were
still debated. The law was primarily seen as a ﬁrst step to learn more about
cartels (Prop, 1925:110).
The investigation law was no break-through for the ﬁght against cartels in
Sweden. It was instead a big failure and almost had negative eﬀects on
competition since proposals for new legislation could be countered with the
argument that there already existed a law (Bernitz, 1969). In practice the
law was only used to make a few industry studies: ﬂour mills, yeast, sugar,
porcelain, fuel and lubrication oil (SOU, 1951:27), and the studies did not
result in any changes (Wallander, 1952).
With the Great Depression in the late 1920s the tolerance for cartels grew
internationally and the World Economic Conference in Geneva 1927 stated
that it was not possible to generally state if cartel agreements were good
or bad (League of Nations, 1927). As a consequence of the lenient attitude
and even state intervention to promote cartelisation, cartels in Europe in-
creased in numbers and spread from raw materials and agricultural products
to manufactured goods (Koch, 1945).
Germany introduced a new cartel law in 1933 according to which the gov-
ernment did not only have administrative controls over the cartels, but could
also establish compulsory cartels or force outsiders to join already existing
ones (Schwartz, 1957). Similar legislations to force outsiders into cartels were
also enacted in Norway (1932), Italy (1932), the Netherlands (1935), Belgium
(1935) and Denmark (1937).
The pro-cartel attitudes also spread to the US where cartels were made legal
with the National Industrial Recovery Act9, which was established to pro-
mote industrial recovery by reducing the ﬁerce competition that was seen as
the cause of the depression (Taylor and Klein, 2008). The Supreme Court
had however already prior to the law found that joint sales agreements were
not illegal.10 To avoid bankruptcies and unemployment crisis cartels were
9Lasting between June 1933 and May 1935.
10Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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formed, several of them lasting until the 1940’s (Buch-Hansen and Wigger,
2011).
There were no legal changes in Sweden due to the depression, but it was
discussed whether the government should take a neutral stand or actively
promote cartelisation, for example by legislating that non-cartel members
could be forced into an industry cartel (Bernitz, 1969). An oﬃcial report
from 1935 stated that there should be more cartel activity than the ﬁrms had
taken initiative to themselves, and that the state should assist in achieving
this objective (SOU, 1935:65). The purpose was to increase the productive
eﬃciency and reduce costs by concentrating production, promoting speciali-
sation and using wide regulations. Cartels were also seen as a way to control
supply and demand. The main arguments for compulsory cartels were hence
economic.
In 1939 the Swedish government proposed legislation on compulsory cartels
and prohibition of new establishments (Prop, 1939:58) but the parliament
and the industry turned against it, and the proposal was rejected.
In order to understand more about the cartels and their eﬀects, a committee11
was appointed to analyse the extent of organised cooperation between private
ﬁrms and assess how cooperation aﬀected prices, production and distribution
policies. The comprehensive report on organised cooperation in the Swedish
industry, published in 1940 (SOU, 1940:35), found that 39 percent of all
production for the Swedish market was covered by cartels.
In an attempt to measure the eﬀect of the cartels, the committee analysed
speciﬁc restrictions of competition and compared proﬁtability in cartelised
with proﬁtability in non-cartelised industries12. The analysis was based on a
sample of eight industries where four were considered to be cartelised and four
to be non-cartelised industries13. The committee found that cartelised indus-
tries (margarine, cement and wallpaper) had signiﬁcantly higher proﬁtability
than non-cartelised industries (shoe and furniture industries)14. This was the
ﬁrst quantitative evidence suggesting that cartels had harmful eﬀects. But
11Industry organisation experts (1936 a˚rs na¨ringsorganisationssakkunniga)
12Annex 1 by Sune Carlson
13The cartelised industries were: cement, margarine, wallpaper and ﬁne paper. The
non-cartelised industries were: cotton fabric, tricot, shoes and furniture.
14The proﬁtability was analysed over 10 years to cover all phases in an economic cycle
and make the result less dependent on accounting measures.
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since the report was completed only after the Second World War had started,
the commission did not propose any legislation.
The inter-war interest in cooperative structures was actualised by the hyper-
inﬂation in the 1920s. The cartels were blamed for causing the inﬂation, and
the inﬂation also spurred new cartels to form. But, the theory of harm was
weak, and while it was believed that the cartels had negative price eﬀects,
they were also seen to be eﬃciency inducing. With the mixed messages the
Swedish government dismissed the idea of a permanent authority to inves-
tigate cartels and decided on assessments in individual cases. During the
depression the attitude radically changed and cartels were promoted to sta-
bilise the economy. The benevolent treatment of cartels continued during
the Second World War.
2.2 Post World War II: Change of attitude
After the Second World War competition enforcement intensiﬁed in the west-
ern world. Enforcement had been lenient in the US since the 1930s (Motta,
2004, p. 6) but in a series of decisions the Supreme Court concluded that
not only horizontal price-ﬁxing15 , but also group boycotts16, tying arrange-
ments17, divisions of markets18, minimum19 and maximum20 prices, resale
price maintenance and territorial exclusivity21 was to be considered per se
illegal.
There was no common competition policy in Europe, but following the allied
victory, the US was promoting a tougher stance on cartels also in Europe.
This was facilitated by the economic boom in the 1950s-1960s that reduced
the need for cartels. Since German cartels had been central in the Nazi war
machinery the US wanted to dismantle them, an objective stated already in
the Potsdam agreement.22 A provisional prohibition of cartels was therefore
15United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
16Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
17International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
18United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
19United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
20Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
21United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
22”At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the
purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exem-
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in place in 1947. The UK was also inﬂuenced by the harder stance on cartels,
but prohibition legislation was rejected in favour of a control of abuse system
under the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act (1948). The reason for
the softer approach was that although cartels could exploit their position, it
was unclear if they in practice were exploitative (Harding and Joshua, 2003).
The focus on economic eﬀects hence suspended tougher legislation.
In Sweden the question of cartel legislation was given to a commission ap-
pointed to forecast and develop the post-war economy23. Their report was
brief and suggested that the ﬁrst step should be registration of cartels in a
public register (SOU, 1945:42) to further understand the scope of the car-
tel problem. Their suggestion was codiﬁed into the law on monitoring of
restraints of competition,24 passed in 1946. Despite previous evidence that
cartels were important and potentially had harmful eﬀects there was no call
for prohibition. Monitoring seemed like a good option since the eﬀects of
cartels was not clear and no other European country had introduced cartel
legislation.
The purpose of the register was to map the extent of anticompetitive agree-
ments, but more importantly, to act as a deterrence mechanism by making
the cartel agreements public. The general idea was that with a public register
ﬁrms would enter into fewer new agreements and they would cancel existing
agreements. The cartel problem was hence to be solved with self-regulation.
The monitoring law only gave the authorities power to run the register and
to perform investigations, hence there was no possibility to ban a speciﬁc
behaviour or agreement. Anticompetitive agreements were not seen to merit
intervention by themselves. But if agreements were abused, general public
measures such as forced re-negotiation of agreements, should be taken. As a
last resort, the government could increase or decrease duty tariﬀs, start com-
peting public ﬁrms or simply take over one or several ﬁrms. The commission
did however not expect any form of government intervention to be common
(SOU, 1951:27). In fact there are no reports of the measures being used.
The idea of monitoring cartels was not unique to Sweden and several coun-
tries had introduced similar registers almost two decades earlier for example
pliﬁed in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.”
Article II B 12 of the Potsdam agreement.
23Kommissionen fo¨r ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering.
24Lag om o¨vervakning av konkurrensbegra¨nsning inom na¨ringslivet (SFS 1946:448).
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Norway (1926) and Denmark (1937), and the UK (1956) and Finland (1957)
followed (Berg, 2011). The registers were largely aimed at making the car-
tel agreements known and publicity remained an important feature of the
Western European antitrust legislation for many years (Thorelli, 1959).
According to the Swedish monitoring law, all ﬁrms, or associations of ﬁrms,
were obliged to, upon request by the registry, notify if they had entered into
any anticompetitive agreements. Mandatory registration, as was later the
case in Finland (Fellman, 2010), was discussed but dismissed since that it
was believed that the authority would be buried in notiﬁcations and inquiries
(SOU, 1945:42). If ﬁrms did not notify an agreement, they could be punished
with ﬁnes, or in considerable aggravating circumstances, by imprisonment up
to six months.
The legislation did not deﬁne what constituted an anticompetitive agreement
and no assessment was made of individual agreements before they were reg-
istered. This resulted in a register that soon consisted of agreements with
very diﬀerent eﬀect on competition (Berg, 2011).
The introduction of the register had at least the intended eﬀect that it started
a debate on the merits and disadvantages of anticompetitive agreements and
cartels. As a response to the critique directed at the industry, the Swedish
Industry Association introduced a cartel oﬃce to advice cartels to cancel or
modify their cooperation (SOU, 1955:45). The oﬃce focused on cartels that
potentially could have important eﬀects on the market price, such as market
sharing and price cartels.
2.3 The 1950s - 1960s: Restricting cartel abuse
During the 1950s and 1960s competition enforcement in the US was very ac-
tive and private suits for cartel damages increased rapidly (Freyer, 2006). The
strict competition enforcement was inﬂuenced by the Harvard School’s eco-
nomic thinking. According to the centrepiece of the ideology, the Structure-
Conduct-Performance paradigm (Mason, 1939), market performance could
be aﬀected by changing the market structure, for example using antitrust
policy and regulation.
Inspired by the same ideology, the foundations to competition enforcement
were being laid also in Europe, with the purpose of strengthening the in-
dustry by eliminating cartels and reducing concentration. The ﬁrst common
14
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cartel legislation came into force with the Treaty of Rome establishing the
European Economic Community, eﬀective in 1958, and its predecessor the
Treaty of Paris25 from 1951. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibited all
cartels and restrictive practices with the object or eﬀect to prevent, restrict
or distort competition within the common market. These treaties were a ma-
jor departure from previous national legislation since they prohibited cartels
with the possibility of sanctions where the national legislations in practice
only prohibited abuse. Further, the Treaty of Rome transferred legal power
to a supranational authority26 (Harding and Joshua, 2003).
Although legally it was suﬃcient to show intent, the European Commissions
early cartel investigations relied on economic analysis of the eﬀects, even in
price ﬁxing agreements.27 The reason for undertaking complex assessments
on eﬀects, rather than relying on the state of mind of the ﬁrms, as in the US,
was the inherent belief that all cartels were not bad, and that only harmful
conduct should be banned.
Despite appearing like a per se prohibition, the European legislation con-
tained exemptions for agreements that contributed towards improving the
production or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic progress
and where the consumers would receive a fair share of the beneﬁts (Art.
85.3).28 Thus a complex balancing process was instituted also for cartels,
following a rule of reason approach (Scherer, 1994, p. 35).
Cartel enforcement in Europe was weak in the 1960s and the European Com-
mission investigated a handful of cartel cases in the 1960s without ﬁning any
of the members. In fact several of the cartels received negative clearance.
The ﬁrst real hard-core cartels were Quinine and Dyestuﬀs cases, both from
1969 (Schinkel, 2007).
Contrary to the principle of prohibition and the common European competi-
tion legislation (ECSC and EEC)29, most European national legislations were
based on the principle of abuse. For example, the UK introduced the Re-
stricted Trade Practices Act in 1956 that required all restrictive agreements
to be registered, irrespective of their eﬀects. Even though restrictive agree-
25Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome was modelled after Art. 65 in the Treaty of Paris.
26Enforcement was based on Regulation 17/62 which assigned the European Commission
as supranational competition authority.
27For example se Manufacturers of Glass Containers (IFTRA), 74/292/EEC OJ L 160/1.
28Now article 101.3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
29European Coal and Steal Community and European Economic Community
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ments were not prohibited but subject to a harm analysis, the majority of the
agreements were cancelled in the 1960s by the Restrictive Practices Court
(Symeonidis, 2002). As such, the national legislations focused on the eﬀect
rather than the intent, and this made enforcement hard (Thorelli, 1959).
Germany was the exemption and cartels were prohibited in 1957, but could
be exempted by the Federal Cartel Agency.
Swedish industry was heavily regulated and especially the governmental price
control was seen as an obstacle for competition and price reductions. The in-
dustry called for reforms and wanted the price control to be reformed or abol-
ished and proposed that inﬂation should be fought with competition rather
than with price controls (SOU, 1951:27). As a further beneﬁt competition
would in the long run also assure that Swedish companies were prepared for
international competition (Martenius, 1965).
To promote competition a committee30 was appointed to analyse restrictions
on establishment, speciﬁc inappropriate practices (such as boycott, exclusive
dealing and price diﬀerentiation) and propose new legislation. The com-
mission found that the extent of the private restraints on competition was
worrying, based on a number of case studies (SOU, 1951:27)31. Despite a
reduction in the number of active anticompetitive agreements following the
cartel register, it was uncertain if the trend of fewer cartels was going to
continue. According to the committee, it was unlikely that even half of
the harmful restraints were removed. It concluded that the government was
obliged to protect the society against harmful practices.
There was a debate on the need for cartel legislation as all industries were
subject to price regulation. The committee stated not only that price reg-
ulations were ineﬀective, but also that cartels caused costs to inﬂate - a
problem not caught with price regulation (SOU, 1951:27). Since it had not
been proven that cartels generally increased prices, the focus on costs and
ineﬃciencies became the main theory of harm.
The committee’s proposal was radical and rested on two innovations. First,
there should be a presumption of harm from cartel agreements regarding
prices, bids or market shares. The assumption rested heavily on ineﬃcient
production. The presumption was to be able to be refuted (hence it shifted
the burden of proof) or revoked if the cartel generated savings that came to
30New establishments experts (Nyetableringssakkunniga).
31SOU 1951:28 contained many of the cases.
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the beneﬁt of consumers (SOU, 1951:27, p. 547). Second, an independent
authority that could impose binding measures was proposed. Violations of
the measures should be settled in civil court.
The committee was heavily criticised on almost all grounds and the critique
came from business organisations as well as public authorities and the justice
system. The National Board of Trade32 and the Board of Price Controls33
were in favour of a stricter cartel legislation, but preferred individual assess-
ment (Prop, 1953:103, p. 80). The court of appeal34 was very critical, both
to the structure and the content of the proposal. It stated that the freedom
of contract was normally given priority over freedom of trade, implying that
all agreements should be respected by the courts. It also claimed that the
eﬀects of free competition, where ﬁrms face cut-throat competition, would
be unfavourable for the industry (Prop, 1953:103, p. 84).
Also economists were critical to the proposal and six of them wrote a re-
port focusing on the cost side. They argued that most cartel agreements,
including price agreements, were positive for society since they resulted in
cost reductions and hence lower prices. If the cartels increased prices, the
members would be able to undertake technical or economical development to
reduce costs, that they otherwise would not have been able to do (Brems and
Wallander, 1951, p. 44). Market sharing and territorial allocation were, at
least in the short run, seen as positive since it reduced sales and transporta-
tion costs. In the long run, production restrictions were however believed
to hinder the expansion of eﬃcient ﬁrms, and to keep ineﬃcient ﬁrms alive
(Brems and Wallander, 1951, p. 92). The authors were therefore more sym-
pathetic to strict regulation on this type of agreements. But they concluded
that, rather than relying on general prohibition, there should be an individ-
ual assessment of the eﬀects of an agreement. The authors did however not
touch upon the issues raised by the committee, that cartel members became
ineﬃcient.
The legislators were in a diﬃcult position with on the one hand, more than
1,100 registered cartel agreements in 1953, of which more than half were
operational (Modin and Sandberg, 1958) and a commission proposing cartel
prohibition. On the other hand, industry, public authorities, economists
and the legal system claiming that the proposal was too far-reaching. New
32Kommerskollegium
33Statens Priskontrollna¨mnd
34Svea Hovra¨tt
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legislation was needed and in 1953 the law against restraints on competition35
was passed.
The general prohibition principle was rejected with reference to the fact that
there were no examples of well functioning cartel prohibition in Europe (Prop,
1953:103, p. 97). As most national cartel legislations in Europe, the law
was based on an abuse principle where enforcers should intervene ﬁrst when
restrictive practises were abusive, i.e. a weak form of rule of reason. The law
deﬁned two distinct cases in which an authority should intervene;
• cartel cases: agreements between independent ﬁrms on a speciﬁc con-
duct, and
• monopoly cases: behaviour by a ﬁrm that had a large share of the
market.
The two most important concepts in the law were ”restriction of competi-
tion” and ”harmful to society”. The law did not deﬁne what constituted a
restriction of competition as it was deemed impossible to give a fully cover-
ing deﬁnition. Any deﬁnition would therefore be so weak that it would not
provide any guidance (Bernitz, 1969, p. 156).
According to the new law, increased concentration or restriction of competi-
tion was by itself not regarded as negative since there were examples where
concentration or strong restraints had led to rationalization to the beneﬁt
of consumers. This was a result of the economists being inﬂuential in the
drafting. This had the result that the legal status of agreements therefore
depended solely on their eﬀects (Gerber, 2001) and little regard was given to
purpose or intent.
Due to the focus on economic eﬀects, the concept of harmful to society was
central. It referred to a restriction of competition that: 1) aﬀected pricing
in an abusive manner, 2) restricted operations within the industry, for ex-
ample by hindering technical of economic development or, 3) hindered or
discouraged other ﬁrms’ operations.
Since the new law was heavily inﬂuenced by economics, all three criteria for
harm had an economic foundation. Whereas the ﬁrst criteria focused on the
35Lagen om motverkande i vissa fall av konkurrensbegra¨nsning inom na¨ringslivet (SFS
1953:603)
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lack of static competition (the price argument), the purpose of the two follow-
ing ones was to improve dynamic competition, i.e. to improve the competitive
environment. The second criteria aimed at improving market eﬃciency by
encouraging improved production and distribution methods (Gerber, 2001).
With more innovation, competition would increase. The third criterion was
intended to facilitate market entry, i.e. the competitive process. By allow-
ing more eﬃcient ﬁrms to enter on equal terms competition would increase.
The main targets were practices such as group boycotts, exclusive dealing
and discrimination, primarily by a dominant ﬁrm (Prop, 1953:103, p. 119).
Long-run eﬀects were hence given a lot of weight in the enforcement (Gerber,
2001, p. 81). This suggests that the theory of harm shifted from the belief
that cartels made large proﬁts due to high prices, which had not been empir-
ically veriﬁed, to their negative eﬀects on the cost side. It was believed that
neglect of rationalisations and keeping ineﬃcient plants alive were causing
the most severe harm to society (Wallander, 1952).
In the preparations of the law there was an intense debate on how to measure
harm, or even more diﬃcult, a risk of harm, on prices and eﬃciency. Due
to the complexities in assessing costs the discussion still focused on prices.
Several of the consulted institutions maintained that it was practically im-
possible to assess what the prices would have been without a cartel. But the
government proposal declared that eﬀects should be measured by comparing
if prices, from an accounting perspective, were high compared to the costs in
an eﬃcient operation. If there were both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient members of
a cartel, comparisons should be made with the eﬃcient ﬁrms. It was how-
ever also important to incorporate the business risk in the analysis and allow
a proﬁt margin for mergers, rationalizations and research and development
in the calculations (Prop, 1953:103). In practice price/cost comparisons be-
came the tool to asses harm (SOU, 1978:9, p. 96) and the enforcement relied
on a highly pragmatic use of the Harvard school theory. If the authority
found restrictive practices where the harm outweighed the beneﬁts, it was to
eliminate the negative eﬀects by negotiation .
Two new authorities were created to handle the abuse cases; the Competition
Ombudsman36 and the Free Trade Council37 (that later became the Market
Council and ﬁnally the Market Court). The Ombudsman was the investiga-
tive authority that competition called for negotiations after ﬁnding harmful
36Na¨ringsfrihetsombudsmannen
37Na¨ringsfrihetsr˚adet, later Marknadsr˚adet and Marknadsdomstolen
19
Swedish cartel legislation and the theory of harm
- a tale of 1001 committees.
restrictions of competition. The role of the Free Trade Council was to decide
if the restriction of competition was actually harmful to society. Since the
Council consisted of lawyers, economists and representatives for consumers
and the industry, its assessments were respected in the industry and half of
all cases were settled with negotiations (Trolle, 1963). If a restriction was
found to be harmful it was the Ombudsman’s task to try to eliminate the
harm through negotiation (the negotiation principle).
The ombudsman had no enforcement power but if negotiation failed in an
important case, this was to be reported to the government. However the gov-
ernment had no authority to intervene in individual cases and could therefore
only use its general powers, i.e. to change customs duties, start public en-
terprises or legislate.
The law did however also contain two prohibitions. Resale price mainte-
nance and tender cartels were outright banned since these practices were
seen (in general) to have a harmful eﬀect on competition. For resale price
maintenance the logic was that competition between retailers would soften
if suppliers were free to set retail prices and tendering cartels were presumed
to increase prices. The prohibition against tendering cartels was geared to-
wards bidding rings that were common mainly in the construction industry.
The rings were known to secretly negotiate bids prior to the tender and the
prohibition principle was hence derived from a strong presumption of harm.
Those who violated the prohibitions against resale price maintenance or ten-
der cartels could be punished with ﬁnes, or if the crime was serious, with
incarceration up to a year.
Firms could however apply for exemption from the prohibitions. Exemptions
could be approved if the restriction of competition was presumed to reduce
costs, and the consumers could be expected to receive a fair share of the
resulting beneﬁts or the agreement contributed to the good of the society,
or if there were other speciﬁc reasons to allow an exemption. The purpose
of the exemption procedure was to verify that the presumption was holding
in individual cases. In most occasions the assumption was found valid, and
only in a few cases was exemption granted (Prop, 1981/82:165). Most of the
exemptions during the ﬁrst 10-years regarded resale price maintenance (most
of them denied) and in two cases the prohibition of tendering cartels which
were both approved (Na¨ringsfrihetsr˚adet, 1965).
Since the industry was both subject to price control and competition legis-
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lation prohibiting abusive behaviour, a commission was appointed to assess
whether public price control was still necessary.38 It found that competition
was a more eﬃcient price regulator than any form of public price control.
The economy was considered to be too complex for an authority to fully
understand and while the government should not totally refrain from price
regulation, it should under normal circumstances rely on competition (SOU,
1955:45).
The commissions work resulted in set of new laws39 extending the law against
restriction of competition so that negotiation for contract changes could be
initiated for all forms of restrictive practices, not only cartel and monopolist
cases. At the same time a new provision was introduced that allowed the
government to temporarily determine a maximum price on a good. This
provision could be used when a restrictive practice had been found to lead
to too high prices.40
The purpose of the reforms was to eliminate the price control by 1) mon-
itoring the prices to evaluate if competition was a suﬃciently strong price
regulator, 2) acquire information on prices to increase consumers price aware-
ness and 3) get more power to intervene against anticompetitive agreements.
With the legislation in place, the government was overall pleased with the
competition in the private sector despite the cartel register containing more
than 1 700 agreements in 1957 (Modin and Sandberg, 1958), and no new
laws were proposed during the 1960s (SOU, 1961:3).
During the 1950’s and 1960’s cartels were common in the industry. Since
large price increases had not been found, the theory of harm shifted over
to the cost side. Economists favouring individual assessment of harm were
inﬂuential and the law was eﬀect based. There was a strong belief in the
precision of economic analysis and the comparisons needed to measure harm
required an advanced methodology. But in practice it proved diﬃcult to
measure eﬀects.
38Price control investigation (Priskontrollutredningen).
39SFS 1956:244-246
40The monitoring law was replaced with the reporting law (lag om uppgiftsskyldighet
ro¨rande pris- och konkurrensfo¨rh˚allande, SFS 1956:245) and the price regulation law was
changed to the general price regulation law (Allma¨nna prisregleringslagen, SFS 1956:236).
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2.4 The 1970s - 1980s: Transition period
As a reaction to the interventionist Harvard School, the US competition en-
forcement in the late 1970s and 1980s was inﬂuenced by the Chicago School
(van Cayseele and van den Bergh, 2000). The Chicago school focused on
eﬃciency and the market structure itself was irrelevant. Even a monopoly
was regarded as eﬃcient since it must be more eﬃcient than other ﬁrms to
keep the position (Voigt and Schmidt, 2005). If a ﬁrm could increase prices,
the Chicago School argued, the eﬀect would usually only be temporary since
high proﬁts would attract new entrants and the competitive response would
restrain market power faster than would antitrust intervention. The Chicago
School did however not want to abolish competition policy altogether but
argued that horizontal agreements should be prohibited (Voigt and Schmidt,
2005). The Chicago School questioned the many rules of per se illegality and
argued that many of them were harmless or even pro-competitive. Despite
the Chicago School the number of cartels prosecuted in the US increased dur-
ing the 1980s. By the end of the decade a leniency program was introduced
in the US with the purpose of destabilising cartels by providing an incentive
to leave the cartel.
In Europe, inﬂation and unemployment was rising in the 1970s and compe-
tition policy was given less priority at a national level. As a result the cartel
legislation was not strictly enforced in for example France and Germany
(Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011). At the Community level the development
was two-fold. From the mid 1970s the European Commission increased the
number of cartel decisions to roughly four cases a year (Schinkel, 2007).
But, at the same time it allowed for more lenient treatment of cartels, espe-
cially in the case of crisis cartels. These were cartels to reduce competition
by restricting overcapacity in crisis industries. Despite these cartels being
relatively few, the Commission developed conditions for when the exemp-
tion should apply (European Commission, 1982). Economic arguments were
hence used to deﬁne when cartels were legal. The lenient stance against car-
tels was overturned in the mid 1980s and the cartel prosecution became more
stringent (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011).
In the 1970s litigation in the European cartel cases was limited, but this was
to change. With a growing number of cartels prosecuted by the European
Commission in the 1980s, the cartels started to appeal the Commissions’
decisions. In many of the appealed cases there was no doubt to the question of
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collusion - the appeals were based on procedural issues (Harding and Joshua,
2010). These appeals led to major reversals for the Commission during the
late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. As a result the European Commission
changed enforcement strategy (see next section).
In the 1970s Sweden, both inﬂation and industry concentration were raising
rapidly. This motivated the government to establish several commissions to
study the eﬀects of concentration (Holmberg, 1981, p. 46). Contrary to the
approach in the 1920s and the motivation in the competition law from 1956,
Sweden decided to counter inﬂation using extensive price regulation instead of
competition. Hence the Price and Cartel Board41 was instructed to intensify
the monitoring of prices and margins. By resorting to price regulation, there
was less need for active cartel enforcement and price controls remained an
important tool to ﬁght inﬂation until the 1990s (OECD, 2006).
In 1978 a commission42 directed to review the eﬀectiveness of the competition
statutes proposed a new law (SOU, 1978:9). Although the structure of the
proposal was similar to the law against restraints on competition, with few
deﬁned prohibited practices and an abuse principle for all other practices,
the proposal included strong reinforcements of the law.
The commission proposed to prohibit price and market sharing cartels (be-
sides the already prohibited tender cartels) and to increase the deﬁnition
of tender cartels43. Strong revisions were also proposed for the abuse cases
where the commission suggested that the negotiation principle be replaced
with prohibition and a system of ﬁnes and injunctions to improve speed and
eﬃciency of the enforcement.
The main motivation to the proposed changes was to prevent the harmful
eﬀects of cartels. Despite the strong price control cartels were believed to
increase prices. In fact, several cartels were set up with the purpose of
inﬂuencing the price control board (Berg, 2011). The theory of harm was
a combination of price and ineﬃciency eﬀects. Cartels were seen to protect
ineﬃcient ﬁrms by establishing high prices, and as giving rise to large proﬁts
for eﬃcient ﬁrms. Reduced competition was also seen to hinder much needed
structural reforms.
The report created substantial controversy in both government and industry.
41Statens pris- och Kartellna¨mnd
42Competition investigation (Konkurrensutredningen).
43Non-binding consultations between the ﬁrms was proposed to be illegal.
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The Swedish bar association claimed that prohibiting price cartels would
not guarantee suﬃcient legal certainty and the industry argued that the law
would be unpredictable and that exchange of price information was in fact
pro-competitive. The industry also asserted that prohibiting market sharing
could reduce eﬃciency-inducing cooperation that enabled the members to
rationalise production, avoid over-investment and reduce distribution and
marketing costs (Prop, 1981/82:165).
Due to the objections, many of the novelties were rejected in the legislative
proposal with the motivation that it would be impossible for ﬁrms to know if
a speciﬁc practice was illegal or not. The scope of the proposed prohibitions
and exemptions were not precise enough to fulﬁl adequate requirements on
legal certainty (Prop, 1981/82:165). The legislators feared that ﬁrms would
either apply for exemption for many agreements or refrain from a practice
that could have positive eﬀects on competition. The exemption applica-
tions would burden the administrative system and reduce the possibilities of
fast and eﬃcient intervention against restrictive practices that generated real
harm. Instead of discussions on the scope of cartels and their harm, focus
was hence shifted to legal certainty, administrative burdens and problems
with identiﬁcation or restrictive agreements.
The ﬁrst competition law44 was therefore, just like its predecessor, based on
the principle of abuse. The previous deﬁnitions of harm were transferred into
the new law, and economic analysis was still an important part of the enforce-
ment. Harmful restrictive practices were to be eliminated by negotiation but
an important change was that the Market Court was given authority to ban
practices, and order injunctions if negotiations failed (SOU, 1991:59). The
new law made negligence criminal under certain conditions and increased
the punishment for tender cartels to up to two years incarceration since the
purchaser would not realise that competition was eliminated. In practice, no
one was ever convicted to jail, but there were in total as around ten cases
where ﬁnes were imposed (SOU, 2004:131).
At the end of the 1980s inﬂation was increasing again. But, instead of resort-
ing to price control as had been the case a decade earlier, the focus was on
increasing competition especially in protected sectors. Competition was to
be improved by lowering lowering entry barriers and deregulation therefore
44SFS 1982:729
24
Swedish cartel legislation and the theory of harm
- a tale of 1001 committees.
became one of the top priorities45.
In the beginning of the 1970s the industry was price controlled, and the
eﬀects of cartels were therefore believed to be small. But by the end of
the century cartels were found to increase prices and the theory of harm
was based both on price and eﬃciency eﬀects. A legal proposal prohibiting
cartels was rejected and the eﬀects-based legislation continued into the 1990s.
It was no longer questions of the eﬀects of cartels that halted the legislative
development, but legal doubts.
2.5 1990-2010: ’Per se’ prohibition of cartels
The 1990s and the beginning of the century marks an active era in com-
petition enforcement. From the 1990s to the turn of the century the US
led the ﬁght against cartels but radical changes were going on in Europe.
The European Commission increased ﬁnes for cartels who as a result started
challenging the Commissions decisions (Rodger and MacCulloch, 2009). As
a response, the Commission started to rely more heavily on the intent of a
cartel agreement, rather than performing complex and refutable economic
assessments of the eﬀects.46 In doing so it approached the US enforcement
practice of per se prohibition.47 The Commission declared that for exam-
ple price ﬁxing48 and market sharing49 cartels had anticompetitive objects,
so it was not necessary to demonstrate eﬀects on competition. The change
in enforcement, from eﬀect to object based, rendered economic arguments
that could justify cartel behaviour invalid. As a result, economic testimony
on eﬀects lost relevance (Harding and Joshua, 2010). The Commission also
introduced a US style leniency program in 1996 to improve the anti-cartel
enforcement.50
The changes on EU level were transferred to the national legislations since
most European countries replaced the national competition legislation based
45From the directive to the committee on stronger competition policy
46E.g. Polypropylene, Commission decision 86/398/EEC (1988) OJ L 230/1
47In 2001 the European Commission declared that it can be presumed that price ﬁx-
ing and output limitation have negative market eﬀects and are therefore almost always
prohibited
48Vitamins, Commission decision 2003/2/EC (2003) OJ L 6/1
49Seamless steel tubes, Commission decision 3003/383/EC (2003) OJ L 140/1
50Revised in 2002 and 2006
25
Swedish cartel legislation and the theory of harm
- a tale of 1001 committees.
on the abuse principle with cartel prohibition by resembling Art. 85 in the
Treaty of Rome, during the mid 1990s.
Sweden applied for membership in the European Union in 1991 and in the
accession procedure OECD and the European Commission commented on the
lack of competition and the need for stronger competition legislation. Such
changes were however already on the way. In 1989 a committee was appointed
to assess how the competition had changed during the last decade and the
importance of competition on general economical and political objectives
(SOU, 1991:59).
The committee stated, just like a contemporaneous committee focusing on
productivity,51 that lack of competition was an important factor explaining
the low productivity growth in Sweden during the preceding two decades.
On behalf of the committee, the Price and Competition Authority analysed
61 industries and found that competition was weak in most of them (SOU,
1991:28). While the committee declared that the competition law had not
been able to stop anticompetitive agreements, it still proposed legislation
based on the principle of abuse but added prohibition of price and market
sharing cartels. Legislations with this structure were at the time introduced
in Finland, Denmark and Norway.
Due to the critique of the proposal and Sweden’s coming accession to the
EU, the department of industry rejected the proposal and presented a new
proposal, based on the European competition rules (DS, 1992:18).52 By fully
incorporating the European competition law, Sweden went further than any
other European country in the process of integrating competition legislations
across Europe (Gerber, 2001).
In the new competition law53 all anticompetitive agreements were prohib-
ited.54 This was a shift towards legalistic treatment of cartels from the eco-
nomic assessments that had been in place from the 1950s. Since the ﬁnes in
the previous legislation had been small and were found to have a negligible
eﬀect on cartel behaviour, breaches against the new law were going to result
in higher ﬁnes to increase deterrence. At the same time imprisonment was
removed since it was not seen as appropriate (Prop, 1992/93:56). Despite
51Produktivitetsdelegationen (SOU, 1991:82).
52There was however no requirement on harmonised legislation.
53SFS 1993:20
54There were however possibilities for exemption from the prohibition, just like under
the EC legislation.
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the important change from abuse to prohibition principle, the Market Court
stated that the application of the law, would to a large extent, remain the
same (Prop, 1992/93:56). With the new competition law, the cartel register
was closed down in 1993, containing 1,250 active agreements.55 Almost half
of these cartels were active in the industrial sector and most of them were
located in the food and drinks, metal and chemical industries (Berg, 2011).
The transition to prohibition was not easy and critics claimed that it was
inappropriate to import EU legislation, that the law was unpredictable and
that the legal development would be in the hand of the competition authority
(SOU, 1997:20). The competition authority was also criticised for being over-
ambitious. A committee56 was therefore instated to assess the eﬀect of the
law, already after two years. It concluded that there were no good economic
instruments to evaluate the competition law and that any evaluation had
to be done in the long-term perspective (SOU, 1997:20). While questioning
whether it had been a wise move to implement the European competition
rules, the committee only proposed some administrative changes to improve
enforcement.
This was however not the end of the scepticism, and in the beginning of
the 2000s another committee was appointed to assess the eﬃciency of the
competition legislation in Sweden57. They found that the Competition Au-
thority had only ﬁled for ﬁnes in 13 cases and the majority of these were not
cartels. The outcome was a result of the deliberate choice by the Competi-
tion Authority to focus on the cases of clearance and exemption ﬁled at the
Authority with the introduction of the law (SOU, 2001:74).58 By the end
of 1993 the competition authority had received 900 applications for negative
clearance or exemption and the authority was using these to set precedence.
Most of the exemption cases from 1993 had been handled by 1995 (SOU,
1997:20, p. 430) but enforcement was limited throughout the 1990s. The
competition authority suddenly intensiﬁed the cartel enforcement and pro-
duced six cartel decisions between 2000 and 2004 . However, an OECD report
55Most of these were however not cartel agreement but other types of agreements re-
stricting competition, such as exclusivity contracts and non-competition clauses ancillary
to mergers.
56The Competition law investigation (Konkurrenslagsutredningen).
57Kartellbeka¨mpningsutredningen
58By the end of 1993, 900 cases of negative clearance/exemption, was ﬁled at the com-
petition authority SOU 1997:20).
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in 2004 still concluded that the cartel enforcement in Sweden was ineﬀective.
To deter cartels, the competition authority and the courts needed to improve
cartel detection and prosecution and ﬁnes needed to be higher (OECD, 2004).
The authority’s litigation was regarded a major source of ineﬃciency and an
external evaluation stated that the authority’s full or partial success rate of
54 percent, compared to the European Commission’s rate of 75-85 percent,
was insuﬃcient to ensure an eﬃcient anti-cartel enforcement. In more than
50 percent of the lost cases, the court did not agree with the authority’s
interpretation of the law and in 30 percent the facts and market conditions
were insuﬃciently investigated (Simonsson, 2005).
While the new law prohibited cartels per se, the competition authority partly
still operated under an abuse principle where it sought to illustrate the eﬀects
of the cartels it prosecuted. This had been the main legal approach since
1953. In its ﬁrst large hard-core cartel case (petroleum), the competition
authority therefore partly relied on the eﬀect of the cartel, instead of on
intent. The strategy was unsuccessful due to the diﬃculties of prove actual
eﬀects from a cartel. In the appeal to the Market Court, the Competition
Authority dropped the claims of actual price eﬀects and relied on the intent
to ﬁx price.
Eﬀects analysis continued to be an important issue in the Asphalt and Volvo
retailer cartel cases where defendants presented economic and econometric
evidence that prices had not increased due to the cartel. In the Volvo case
Stockholm City Court concluded that the scope for competition between
the accused ﬁrms was so small that the practice was seen not to have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on competition and the case was dismissed. The economic
arguments were however refuted by the Market Court upon appeal by the
competition authority. The Market Court concluded that the case was based
on an anticompetitive purpose, not eﬀect and ﬁndings that the behaviour
had no eﬀect on prices should not reduce ﬁnes.59 The same conclusion was
reached in the Asphalt case where the Market Court rejected arguments that
ﬁnes should be reduced if no harm had occurred.60 These decisions marked
a new era in Swedish antitrust enforcement. From focusing on the eﬀects
for 50 years, the enforcement had become legalistic and eﬀects arguments
were dismissed. The role of economics in the legal process has therefore
decreased. Economic arguments are however still important and the courts
59Marknadsdomstolen, Dnr 2008:12
60Marknadsdomstolen, Dnr 2009:11
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employ economists to work on the cartel cases.
During the 2000s, there were continuous legal reforms to ensure that Swedish
competition law was in line with EU development. In 2001 the competition
authority was authorised, and in 2004 obliged, to apply the competition
articles in the European Treat. A national leniency program was instated in
2002 to improve the eﬀectiveness of the enforcement.
In 2004 a committee was appointed to analyse the eﬃciency of the enforce-
ment of the Swedish competition legislation and to focus especially on cartels
(SOU, 2006:99). The report concluded that overall the enforcement system
was well functioning and therefore only proposed minor amendments. Inter-
estingly the 744 page long report does not mention the negative cartel eﬀects
that the legislation is aiming to stop. The theory of harm hence seems to be
lost.
The new competition law was introduced in 200861 and contained two nov-
elties regarding cartel enforcement. First, the Competition Authority can
issue ﬁne orders. If cartel members consent to the order, no further formal
proceedings are undertaken. Second, the Authority can issue trading prohibi-
tions against individuals in a cartel ﬁrm, prohibiting them from for example
founding a ﬁrm or acting as a chief executive oﬃcer.62
The 1990s were a transitional period for Swedish cartel enforcement. The
abuse principle that had been used for 40 years was replaced with prohibi-
tion. During the ﬁrst years of the 21th century the Market Court concluded
that economic analysis that had traditionally been a crucial aspect of the
evaluation of harm under the old legislation, had little or no place under the
object based prohibition legislation.
3 Discussion
In the period leading up to the Second World War, the theory of cartel
harm was weak. Cartels were believed to increase prices but also to generate
cost reducing eﬃciencies, the net eﬀect was therefore unknown. During the
depression cartels were seen as positive stabilising factors. During the inter-
war period, the extent of cartelisation in the industry was unknown and
61Konkurrenslag (2008:579).
62Lag (1986:436) om na¨ringsfo¨rbud
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active legislation was not introduced. After the war, cartel legislations that
banned abusive behaviour started to appear in Europe. In Sweden the laws
were based on economic foundations and required advanced assessment of
cartel harm using counterfactual analysis. The law was therefore diﬃcult to
apply. Since cartels had not proven to lead to higher prices, the theory of
harm was shifted over to losses in eﬃciency. This inﬂuenced the legislation
introduced in the 1950s that focused on achieving eﬃciency, both static and
dynamic.
In the mid 1970s cartels were again accused of causing inﬂation. The the-
ory of harm was again that cartels increased prices. Despite proposals to
prohibit cartels, the main provisions of the law were kept unchanged. The
main argument against prohibition was that the law would not ensure legal
certainty. The doctrinal change came with cartel prohibition in 1993. Swe-
den copied the provisions in the Treaty of Rome and hence got a legislation
where cartels were prohibited by objective, not by eﬀect. However, still ten
years into the new law, both the competition authority and ﬁrms argued ac-
cording to eﬀects of the cartel. The Market Court, which is the court of last
instance, ﬁnally declared that eﬀects analysis was irrelevant in cases where
the behaviour is prohibited by object.
From having shaped the cartel legislation during half a decade, eﬀects analy-
sis was largely excluded in the cartel enforcement. The reason for this change
was that economists identiﬁed large price eﬀects from collusion and cartels
can therefore be presumed to have adverse eﬀects on competition, without
requiring a case by case analysis. The harm cartels cause are therefore no
longer part of legislative proposals. The fact that the presumption cannot
be lifted if proven invalid, suggests that the basis for the Swedish cartel leg-
islation has changed fundamentally. The view of cartels is now much more
related to the US treatment, where cartels by nature are bad for society. This
is a visible contrast to the previous legislations when cartels were viewed as
economic institutions, possible of causing harm.
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Abstract
An important standard assumption in traditional collusion mod-
els is that ﬁrms have symmetric costs. Harrington (1991), using a
two-ﬁrm model, relaxed this assumption and investigated how cartel
stability and prices are aﬀected by cost asymmetry. With more than
two members the strategies become more complex since in addition
to standard unilateral deviation, the asymmetries allow eﬃcient ﬁrms
to deviate jointly into subcartels. Any cartel needs to be stable to
both kinds of deviation. For large cost diﬀerences, it is tempting for
eﬃcient ﬁrms to form a subcartel, which makes a larger cartel harder
to sustain. Cartel prices are lower when the most proﬁtable alterna-
tive to the grand cartel is to deviate to a subcartel, rather than to the
Bertrand equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The eﬀect of cartels has since long been an important research topic, but even
more so the last 10 years with the increased importance of private litigation.
This model brings new insights to pricing strategies implemented by cartels
and hence the damage they cause. The cartel price does not only depend on
demand, but also on the relative strength of the cartel members, and on the
members’ best alternatives to being in the cartel. This helps to explain why
overcharges diﬀer signiﬁcantly between diﬀerent cartels1.
The damage is normally estimated by litigators as the diﬀerence between the
cartel price and the counterfactual. This model illustrates that the coun-
terfactual plays an important role also within cartels since it will determine
price and sustainability, as long as there are cost asymmetries between the
members.
Traditional models of collusion2 assume that all ﬁrms in an industry have
the same production costs. One reason for this assumption is that without
common costs, no one focal price is optimal for all ﬁrms. Instead, ﬁrms
with higher costs prefer higher prices than ﬁrms with lower costs. Bain
(1948) noted that solving the cartel pricing problem with standard joint proﬁt
maximization when ﬁrms have diﬀerent costs, may require the ineﬃcient
cartel members to refrain from producing or to quit the cartel. The problems
for ineﬃcient ﬁrms to remain in cartels may indeed explain why eﬃcient
cartels acquire fringe ﬁrms (Martin, 2010, p. 189). Without sidepayments,
there are no incentives for ineﬃcient ﬁrms to join the cartel, and the market
remains competitive (Scherer and Ross, 1980).
Since ﬁrms do not always have symmetric costs3 this paper investigates how
cartel stability and prices are aﬀected by the asymmetry. Contrary to previ-
ous models I investigate how the introduction of additional members aﬀect
1OECD (2003) investigated 16 large cartels and found that the price eﬀects varied
between 3% to 65%.
2Without binding agreements, ﬁrms are said to be colluding tacitly whereas if they
enter into agreements they form a cartel. Both in the US and the EU, tacit collusion is
regarded as normal business practice, while cartels are illegal and can give rise to high
ﬁnes, damages and even imprisonment (e.g. US Supreme Court in Brooke Group v Brown
& Williamson Tobacco (1993) and Motta (2004).) Despite the sharp legal distinction
between tacit collusion and cartels, the economic rationale for the behaviour is the same.
3For example in the pre-insulated pipe cartel (European Commission, 1998), the cost
diﬀerences between the members were 15-20 %.
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the cartel.
In a competitive market ineﬃcient ﬁrms producing homogenous products
would be forced to shut down. Hence, cost asymmetries are more likely to be
found in collusive markets where the ﬁrms are protected from competition. In
fact, even symmetric ﬁrms joining a cartel may end up with asymmetric costs
due to diﬀerent managerial preferences. Managerial slack (X-ineﬃciency)
can arise since there are no outside ﬁrms that can discipline managers in
the cartel ﬁrms (Hart, 1983)4 or because the owners have bad benchmarks
for designing incentive schemes (Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz, 1983). Both Scherer
(1975) and more recently Symeonidis (2008) provide empirical evidence that
labour productivity is indeed lower in industries with many cartels, compared
to those without. Cost diﬀerences among cartel members can therefore either
be endogenous or exogenous to cartel formation. Rather than modelling the
process leading up to cost asymmetries, this paper assumes that some ﬁrms
in a cartel are eﬃcient and some are not.
This paper is based on a setting with one ineﬃcient and two eﬃcient ﬁrms.
They determine prices using Nash bargaining and the cartel is supported by
grim trigger strategies. I ﬁnd that cost asymmetries increase collusive prices
and make collusion harder to sustain. But, by introducing a second eﬃcient
ﬁrm, the eﬃcient ﬁrms can threaten to form a subcartel which makes com-
prehensive collusion more unstable when cost diﬀerences are large. Such a
threat also reduces the collusive prices. The collusive price therefore depends
both on the cost asymmetry but also on the deviation strategy.
A small but growing literature exists on collusion among ﬁrms with cost
asymmetries. The current framework of Bertrand models with homogenous
products was ﬁrst introduced by Bae (1987) who ﬁnds that asymmetries make
a cartel unstable and that a cartel price is non-monotonically increasing in
the asymmetries. Harrington (1991) reﬁned the model by identifying the
collusive solution through a bargaining process instead of by joint proﬁt
maximization and found similar results, but higher cartel prices. Miklos-Thal
(2011) uses a model similar to that of Harrington but rather than discussing
how ﬁrms select a speciﬁc equilibrium, she focuses on the sustainability of
collusion. As in the models by Bae and Harrington, she ﬁnds that cost
asymmetry makes collusion harder to sustain, but when sidepayments are
4Scharfstein (1988) criticises Harts’ results since they crucially depend on the assump-
tions on managerial preferences.
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possible, cost asymmetry actually facilitates collusion.
Rothschild (1999), Collie (2006) and Vasconcelos (2005) look at homoge-
nous and diﬀerentiated Cournot models in which price is set by joint proﬁt
maximization. They ﬁnd that even when the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is active, it
will receive a lower market share than the eﬃcient ﬁrm and therefore have
larger incentives for deviating. Furthermore, if a cartel is formed and one
ﬁrm deviates, the eﬃcient ﬁrm will be penalized proportionately more and
therefore will want to deviate from the punishment strategy. Schmalensee
(1987) also investigates Cournot models and states that joint proﬁt max-
imization is not a plausible mechanism for determining the collusive price
when costs are asymmetric, unless the ﬁrms use sidepayment schemes. Us-
ing four diﬀerent bargaining solutions, he ﬁnds that low cost ﬁrms may have
little to gain from collusion. Thus, the standard ﬁnding is that without side
payments, cost asymmetries make collusion less sustainable. In contrast to
this, Ganslandt et al. (2008) ﬁnd that when collusion carries indivisible costs,
some asymmetry will make cartels more stable, since it enables the leader to
recoup its costs. (Roberts, 1985) ﬁnds that not only is tacit collusion harder
when there are cost asymmetries, but this is also the case when the ﬁrms
have access to binding agreements.
Most of the literature is based on a duopoly setting, with one eﬃcient and one
ineﬃcient ﬁrm.5 I argue that the restriction to two players has a signiﬁcant
impact on the outcome and that allowing for one additional eﬃcient player
will change the results.6 This paper thus relaxes two standard assumptions
in collusion models by allowing for asymmetric costs and for more than two
ﬁrms on the market.
Section 2 in this paper introduces the basic framework and general deﬁni-
tions. It also solves the non-collusive Bertrand equilibrium. Section 3 deﬁnes
the conditions under which collusion is rational for individual ﬁrms, i.e., the
combinations of market share and price for which a cartel is sustainable.
When there are three ﬁrms the members can form subcartels and the con-
ditions for a stable cartel is diﬀerent depending on whether ﬁrms prefer to
deviate alone (unilateral deviation) or deviate by forming a subcartel (coor-
5Miklos-Thal (2011) introduces notation for a n-player game, but the model is solved
for two players. Schmalensee (1987) models one eﬃcient and n ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
6If additional ineﬃcient ﬁrms are introduced, the eﬃcient ﬁrm will still as only ﬁrm
make proﬁts in a non-cooperative situation. This results in bargaining leverage that does
not exist when there are two eﬃcient ﬁrms.
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dinated deviation). The section derives the sustainability conditions for both
cases and deﬁnes which of these two deviation strategies that most easily can
sustain collusion. The cartel members are assumed to decide on the outcome
using Nash bargaining. Section 4 deﬁnes the Nash bargaining problem and
performs some comparative statistics. It further compares the ﬁndings to
those made by Harrington (1991). Section 5 is an extension of the model
to a n-ﬁrm setting. The results are discussed in section 6. All proofs are
provided in the appendix.
2 Model
I expand the model developed by Harrington (1991) by extending it to a
three-ﬁrm game, where two ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient and one ﬁrm is inef-
ﬁcient. The ﬁrms interact repeatedly in a homogeneous products industry
and decide whether to compete in prices or collude. The model is assumed
to satisfy the following ﬁve conditions:
A1: There exists a P¯ > max {cE1, cE2, cI} such that market demand,D(P ) =
0 if P ≥ P¯ where cEi is the marginal cost of an eﬃcient ﬁrm i ∈ {1, 2}
and cI is the marginal cost of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
A2: D(P ) is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable.
A3: πi(P ) = (p− ci)D(P ) is strictly concave in P for all P ∈
(
0, P¯
)
, i.e.
there exists a unique monopoly price for each ﬁrm.
A4: D′(P ) < 0 for all P ∈ (0, P¯) .
A5: cE1 = cE2 = cE < cI < P
m
E where P
m
E = argmax πE (P ) , i.e. the
eﬃcient ﬁrms’ monopoly price. This assumption implies that one ﬁrm is
ineﬃcient but the cost diﬀerence is not drastic and hence the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm can be active when the eﬃcient ﬁrms set monopoly price. From
this assumption also follows that PmE < P
m
I .
Firms simultaneously set prices and I assume that no ﬁrm will set prices
outside
[
0, P¯
]
. Market demand is allocated to the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest
price. If several ﬁrms oﬀer the same price, the ﬁrms decide how to allocate
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demand between them. In equilibrium no ﬁrm wants to deviate from the
agreed market shares since they are all incentive compatible. This gives the
demand function
Di(Pi) =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if Pi > min{Pj, Pk}
siD(Pi) if Pi = Pj < Pk
D(Pi) if Pi < min{Pj, Pk}
(1)
where si ∈ [0, 1] is the market share of ﬁrm i. I further assume that all ﬁrms
have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Since the two eﬃcient ﬁrms are
totally symmetric, they are assumed to have equal market share when their
prices are the same.
According to this simple set-up, the only non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in
the one-period game is that the eﬃcient ﬁrms charge price P = cE, while the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm does not produce anything. Hence, contrary to the models by
Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991), the eﬃcient ﬁrms in our non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium earn zero proﬁt. The non-cooperative inﬁnite horizon game
is a repetition of the one-stage game and total proﬁts are therefore zero for
all ﬁrms.
Turning to the collusive equilibria, the cartel faces two problems; to decide
on a collusive price and to allocate market shares (or production quotas)
among the members. The collusive outcome is thus deﬁned by a collusive
price and market shares (P, sE, sI). Since we do not allow for sidepayments
and the products are homogenous, the ﬁrms set one joint collusive price.
Another modelling approach could have been to use the ﬁrms’ output deci-
sions rather than their share of the market as choice variable. This would
require a two-stage setting. If the ﬁrms ﬁrst decide on the cartel price, then
on quantities, the result is identical to the current set-up. If the ﬁrms instead
ﬁrst decide on quantity and then on price, the pricing decision is eﬀected by
the agreed production constraints. In such a situation the ﬁrms can charge
diﬀerent prices, but the exact pricing crucially depends on the choice of ra-
tioning rule. Since I do not want to make any assumptions regarding the
rationing rule, and to facilitate comparison with previous ﬁndings, the ﬁrms
are assumed to make a simultaneous price and market share decision.
For all ﬁrms to be active, the cartel price must fall in the interval P ∈ [cI , pmI ].
If the collusive price falls below cI the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will no longer be active
on the market. Prices above the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price, pmI , will
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not be proﬁt maximizing for any member of the cartel (from A.5) and hence
neither for the cartel.
Per period proﬁts under collusion are si (P − ci)D (P ) which in this paper
also is denoted siπ
c
i . The individual ﬁrms’ share of the market si, must satisfy∑3
1 si = 1. Since the eﬃcient ﬁrms are symmetric, I will in the following refer
to the market share of an eﬃcient ﬁrm as s and therefore to the market share
of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm as (1− 2s).
3 Sustainability
Collusion is inherently unstable since there will always be an incentive for
members to cheat on the agreement and undercut the collusive price to serve
the entire market alone. To assure that collusion is sustainable there has
to be some kind of punishment mechanism and the possibility for collusion
therefore increases if the punishments for deviation becomes harder. In this
paper I assume, just like Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991), that collusion
is supported by standard grim trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971)7. Hence
ﬁrms set collusive prices until they detect that someone has deviated, and
if deviation is detected, ﬁrms play non-cooperative Nash forever after. The
punishment implies that after deviation is detected, only the two eﬃcient
ﬁrms are active and that all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts.
For a cartel to be sustainable, the discounted collusive proﬁts have to be
higher than discounted proﬁts from deviating and the ensuing Nash proﬁts.
The incentive constraint for a cartel to be sustainable is
1
1− δπ
c
i si ≥ πdi (P, ci) +
δ
1− δπ
n
i (ci) , i ∈ {E1, E2, I} (2)
where siπ
c
i , π
d
i and π
n
i are collusive, deviation and non-cooperative Nash prof-
its respectively. This constraint is often re-arranged in terms of minimum
required discount factor, δ˜i ≥ π
d
i −πci si
πdi −πni
.
7There are other punishment schemes that may entail lower prices in the punishment
period, such as optimal punishments, (Abreu, 1986) and (Abreu, 1988), or minmax pun-
ishments (Miklos-Thal, 2011). These schemes however, rely on below cost pricing in the
punishment phase and are hence weakly dominated by pricing at cost.
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In standard two-ﬁrm collusion models, deviation is a unilateral decision.
However, in a model with more ﬁrms, the best strategy may not be to deviate
unilaterally but to coordinate deviation with another ﬁrm, so called partial
cartels. We therefore need to assess the sustainability based on diﬀerent as-
sumptions regarding coordination between the cartel members. The idea is
inspired by the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) allowing ﬁrms to form new
coalitions if it can make them better oﬀ. For the grand coalition to be sus-
tainable, the proﬁts to all ﬁrms must be higher than proﬁts from unilateral
deviation or deviation to a new smaller coalition. With three ﬁrms on the
market, there are ﬁve possible coalitional structures.
Table 1: Possible coalitions
Coalition Members
A {E1}, {E2}, {I}
B {E1, E2}, {I}
C1 {E1, I}, {E2}
C2 {E2, I}, {E1}
D {E1,E2, I}
Structure A is the normal non-cooperative solution where all ﬁrms are in-
dependent and play Bertrand. In B, the two eﬃcient ﬁrms form a coalition
and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is fringe. In the two C coalitions the ineﬃcient ﬁrm
forms a coalition with one of the eﬃcient ﬁrms. Situation D is the grand
cartel with all ﬁrms included.
Proposition 1. Coordinated deviation is only a proﬁtable strategy for eﬃ-
cient ﬁrms.
If one eﬃcient and one ineﬃcient ﬁrm jointly decide to deviate, they will make
one period of deviation proﬁts (that they split). This will trigger reversion
to non-cooperative Nash prices and since the fringe ﬁrm is eﬃcient, retalia-
tion will lead to marginal cost pricing for the eﬃcient ﬁrms, and exclusion of
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. As the two deviating ﬁrms will split the deviation prof-
its, coordinated deviation by one eﬃcient and one ineﬃcient ﬁrm is weakly
dominated by unilateral deviation where the deviating ﬁrm gets the entire
deviation proﬁt.
If the two eﬃcient ﬁrms decide to deviate jointly, coalition B, they will also
split the deviation proﬁts. But since their costs are lower than the fringe
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ﬁrms’ costs, they can still make proﬁt in the punishment phase by lowering
the collusive price to (just below) cI . Since I have assumed non-drastic cost
diﬀerences (PmE > cI) this will be the only equilibrium. For suﬃciently high
discount factors, it is hence more proﬁtable for the eﬃcient ﬁrms to coor-
dinate deviation and split deviation and punishment proﬁts than to deviate
unilaterally.
As stated in proposition 1 the C coalitions are not subgame perfect since
the eﬃcient ﬁrm is weakly better oﬀ by deviating unilaterally. Coalition
B can however be more proﬁtable than unilateral deviation and it is hence
the only possible sub-cartel. We will in section 3.1 assess the conditions for
when the grand cartel is sustainable to standard unilateral deviation, i.e.
when the proﬁts from coalition D is larger than the proﬁts from coalition A.
These conditions ensure that the cartel is stable also to partial collusion. In
section 3.2 we will investigate the case of coordinated deviation, i.e. under
what conditions the proﬁts from coalition D is larger than the proﬁts from
coalition B. The three-ﬁrm cartel has to be sustainable to both kinds of
deviation, and in section 3.3 we elicit which deviation strategy that is most
proﬁtable, i.e. which one that binds the cartel.
3.1 Unilateral deviation
I here compare the proﬁts from the grand coalition D to the non-cooperative
Nash (Bertrand) outcome A and thereby rely on the one-stage deviation prin-
ciple (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). If cartel prices are high, P ∈ (pmE , pmI ], the
best deviation strategy for an eﬃcient ﬁrm is to lower price to its monopoly
price and charge pmE . The ineﬃcient ﬁrm on the other hand, will deviate by
setting a price just below the cartel price. If the cartel instead sets a low
price, P ∈ [cI , pmE ], any deviator will just slightly undercut the cartel. Due to
the use of grim trigger strategies, prices in all periods following the deviation
will be determined by the Bertrand equilibrium and all ﬁrms will make zero
proﬁts. This simpliﬁes expression (2) to
1
1− δπ
c
i si ≥ πdi (P ) (3)
Proposition 2. With unilateral deviation, cost diﬀerences don’t aﬀect the
minimum required market share.
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By inserting the eﬃcient ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts in equation (3) and re-
arranging, we express the incentive constraints in terms of the minimum
required market share, s. For the eﬃcient ﬁrms it holds that
s ≥ suni = (1− δ) if P ∈ [cI , pmE ]
s ≥ suni = (1− δ) πmE
(P−cE)D(P ) if P ∈ (pmE , pmI ]
(4)
The minimum required market share is the minimum share that an eﬃcient
ﬁrms must receive to ﬁnd collusion to be the most proﬁtable option. When
the cartel sets a price above the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price, an eﬃcient
ﬁrm can deviate and charge the monopoly price. For this not to be proﬁtable,
the eﬃcient ﬁrms needs to be compensated by a higher market share in
the cartel. The market share required therefore increases with the distance
from the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price. The incentive constraints for the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm can in the same way be expressed as the minimum share the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm requires, or the maximum that it will allow the eﬃcient ﬁrms
to have. It solves for
s ≤ s = δ
2
(5)
where s caps the market share of the eﬃcient ﬁrms. For any larger share,
the ineﬃcient would be better oﬀ deviating instead of participating in the
cartel. When the discount factor increases, so does the market share that the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm is willing to give up to the eﬃcient ﬁrms. Since the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm cannot deviate to its monopoly price, s does not depend on the collusive
price.
The incentive constraints (4) and (5) together determine the set of allocations
of P and s that assure that the cartel is sustainable, i.e. where s > s. Since
the eﬃcient ﬁrms needs to be compensated with extra market shares for not
deviating when P > pmE , the maximum collusive price is determined by the
intersection of the incentive constraints for the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
The minimum price on the other hand is given by cI which is the lowest
price were all ﬁrms are active. Plotting the constraints gives the following
ﬁgure where the area Δuni (δ) is the set containing all incentive compatible
combinations of P and s.
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Figure 1: Unilateral deviation
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From the incentive constraints it is clear that the discount factor aﬀects the
set of sustainable cartels. I ﬁnd that ∂s
∂δ
< 0 and ∂s
∂δ
> 0 for any P since future
cartel gains becomes more valuable. Thus the set expands with the discount
factor. Cost asymmetries do not aﬀect the minimum required share, but
the cost levels still aﬀect the size of the set since they deﬁne the boundary
between high and low cartel prices. These eﬀects will be more thoroughly
analysed in section 4.2.
The set of outcomes (P, s) that are subgame perfect to unilateral deviation,
Δuni (δ) is deﬁned by
Δuni (δ) ≡
{
(P, s) | P ∈
[
cI , P (s)
]
s ∈ [1− δ, δ
2
] } (6)
Re-writing the requirement on market share shows that collusion is only
possible when δ ≥ 2
3
, i.e. the standard Bertrand result,8 irrespective of the
level of cost asymmetry. If there is only one eﬃcient ﬁrm, as in the two-ﬁrm
models by Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991), collusion can be supported
with δ ≥ 1
2
if there are no cost asymmetries, but the requirement on discount
factor increases with the degree of cost asymmetry. Hence, by introducing a
8In a n-ﬁrm Bertrand model the required discount factor is δ ≥ n−1n (Motta, 2004,
p. 162).
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second eﬃcient ﬁrm the scope for collusion is decreased, in line with standard
Bertrand results.
3.2 Coordinated deviation
The cartel doesn’t only need to be stable to unilateral deviation, but also
to coordinated deviation when the eﬃcient ﬁrms deviate into a sub-cartel.
In this section I assess the requirements for the grand coalition (D) to be
sustainable to deviation to a sub-cartel between the eﬃcient ﬁrms (B). When
eﬃcient ﬁrms coordinate deviation, they will make a positive proﬁt also in the
punishment phase where they will charge price cI . Since the eﬃcient ﬁrms
are symmetric we assume that they will split the proﬁt equally so proﬁts in
the punishment phase will be (cI−cE)D(cI)
2
.
The incentive constraints are solved for the minimum market share that
the eﬃcient ﬁrms require to stay in the cartel. Since coordinated deviation
is never the best deviation strategy for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, the maximum
market share for an eﬃcient ﬁrm remains s = δ
2
.
Proposition 3. With coordinated deviation, cost diﬀerences increase the
minimum required market share.
Just as in the case of unilateral deviation, the eﬃcient ﬁrms’ requirement
on market share is found by inserting equilibrium proﬁts in the incentive
constraints (2) and solving for the minimum required market share.
s ≥ scoord = (1−δ)
2
+ δ(cI−cE)D(cI)
2(P−cE)D(P ) if P ∈
[
cI , p
M
E
]
s ≥ scoord = (1−δ)
2
πME
(P−cE)D(P ) +
δ(cI−cE)D(cI)
2(P−cE)D(P ) if P ∈ (pME , pMI ]
(7)
Like the unilateral case, it follows that ∂s
∂δ
< 0 and ∂s
∂δ
> 0, i.e. increasing the
discount factor expands the set of subgame perfect outcomes. The require-
ments on minimum market share for the eﬃcient ﬁrms under coordinated
deviation are diﬀerent from the unilateral case as they depend on the level
of cost asymmetry. In the unilateral case, costs only determine the pricing
regions, but when deviation is coordinated, cost diﬀerences aﬀect the mar-
ket share requirement directly. The eﬀect of the costs are more thoroughly
analysed in section 4.2. Figure 2 depicts the two incentive constraints and
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the area Δcoord (δ) is all the outcomes (P, s) that can support collusion when
coordinated deviation is possible.
Figure 2: Coordinated deviation
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Unlike the case of unilateral deviation, the combinations of price and market
share that can sustain coordinated deviation is U-shaped, with the incentive
constraint of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm again being the upper limit. The eﬃcient
ﬁrms require the least market share when prices are set at their monopoly
price and the further away from this the cartel sets its price, the larger market
share will they require as compensation. The reason for the U-shape is that
the eﬃcient ﬁrms can make proﬁt also in the punishment phase, and when
there are cost diﬀerences and prices are far from their optimum, it is tempting
to deviate and rely on punishment proﬁts instead.
I denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes supported by co-
ordinated deviation by Δc (s), it is deﬁned by
Δcoord (δ) ≡
{
(P, s) |
P ∈ [P (s) , P (s)]
s ∈
[
(1−δ)
2
+ δ(cI−cE)D(cI)
2(P−cE)D(P ) ,
δ
2
] } (8)
When the ﬁrms can coordinate their deviations, collusion is only a subgame
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equilibrium when
δ ≥ (P − cE)D (P )
2 (P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI) (9)
Hence, when deviation is coordinated and there are no cost diﬀerences, the
grand cartel is proﬁtable if δ ≥ 1
2
. This is lower than in the standard model
where a three-ﬁrm cartel needs δ ≥ 2
3
to be sustainable (Motta, 2004, p. 162)
and essentially reﬂects the fact that two ﬁrms act as one. The required
discount factor increases with the degree of cost asymmetry since ∂δ
∂(cI−cE) >
0.9
3.3 Deviation for most sustainable collusion
Above it was shown that a cartel with more than two eﬃcient ﬁrms is vul-
nerable to both unilateral and coordinated deviation. For the cartel to be
sustainable, the ﬁrms’ discount factor needs to be larger than both the dis-
count factor needed to sustain unilateral deviation and coordinated deviation.
This section determines which of the two deviation possibilities that will bind
the grand cartel. For the ineﬃcient ﬁrm we know that unilateral deviation
weakly dominates coordinated deviation, hence there is no need for further
analysis. Thus the following section only concerns eﬃcient ﬁrms.
The incentive constraints inform us that the grand cartel will not be sustain-
able with any deviation mechanism if δ < 1
2
. For discount factors larger than
this, collusion may be stable depending on the deviation possibility and the
level of cost asymmetry. With unilateral deviation the minimum discount
factor is constant at δ < 2
3
. The requirements for the grand cartel to be
stable are given by
Three-ﬁrm collusion not possible if δ < min[2
3
,
πcE
2πcE−π ]
Possible w. coordinated dev. if δ ≥ πcE
2πcE−π
Possible w. unilateral dev. if δ ≥ 2
3
(10)
where π = (cI − cE)D(cI). The maximum of these three constraints deﬁnes
the minimum discount factor for cartel sustainability.
9This as ∂δ∂cE < 0 and
∂δ
∂cI
> 0.
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Proposition 4. For suﬃciently large cost asymmetries, the minimum re-
quired discount factor increases with cost asymmetries.
From the incentive constraints it is clear that unilateral deviation binds the
collusion if
(P − cE)D (P )
2 (P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI) ≤
2
3
. (11)
which simpliﬁes to
πcE ≥ 2π (12)
The inequality in equation (12) only holds for small cost asymmetries. In
these cases unilateral deviation binds the cartel and the required discount
factor is independent of the cost asymmetries (see Figure 3). If instead
πcE < 2π, i.e. for suﬃciently large cost asymmetries, coordinated deviation
binds the cartel. In these cases the minimum discount factor increases with
the level of cost asymmetry. The minimum discount factor is hence weakly
increasing in the level of cost asymmetry.
Figure 3: Minimum δ for sustainable collusion
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When coordinated deviation is binding the cartel, the members could make
collusion more sustainable if they could contract on not coordinating devia-
tion. But as will be illustrated in the coming section, this would require the
eﬃcient ﬁrms to forgo cartel proﬁts.
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In the models of unilateral and coordinated deviation I deﬁned two sets of
subgame perfect equilibrium. For the grand cartel to be sustainable the
solution must be in both sets. The set of subgame perfect equilibria to the
grand cartel is therefore Δ (δ) = Δuni (δ) ∩ Δcoord (δ) and no ﬁrm has an
incentives to deviate from any price-market share combination in this set.
By taking the intersect of the equilibrium sets I deﬁne the set of subgame
perfect equilibrium outcomes as
Δ(δ) ≡
⎧⎨⎩(P, s) | P ∈ [P (s) , P (s)] , s ∈
[
1− δ, δ2
]
if
πcE
2πcE−π ≥ δ ≥
2
3
s ∈
[
(1−δ)
2 +
δπ
2πcE
, δ2
]
if δ ≥ πcE2πcE−π
⎫⎬⎭
Figure 3 illustrates that ﬁndings concluding that cost asymmetries make
collusion harder to sustain (e.g. Bae (1987), Harrington (1991) and Miklos-
Thal (2011)), rest on the existence of non-cooperative proﬁts for the eﬃcient
ﬁrm. This assumption is inherent to two-ﬁrm models but e.g. with two
eﬃcient ﬁrms deviating unilaterally, the assumption does not hold and cost
asymmetries have no eﬀect on cartel stability.
4 Collusive bargaining
In the previous sections we categorized the outcomes Δ (δ) that support
collusion. A central question is which combination of price and market share
allocation the cartel will choose. To answer this I must deﬁne the mechanism
ﬁrms use to reach their decision.
Even though sidepayments sometimes are part of a cartel’s contractual agree-
ment, most modern theories of collusion do not recognize these contracts10
as they; i) are illegal and cannot by enforced in court (Kihlstrom and Vives,
1989), ii) increase both the risk of detection and conviction (Pesendorfer,
2000), and iii) over time reduce the non-producing ﬁrms’ ability to act com-
petitively in the market (Friedman, 1977). This is also supported empirically.
In a study of 81 international cartels convicted of colluding in either the
United States or the European Union (or both) since 1990 Levenstein and
10For exceptions see Miklos-Thal (2011).
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Suslow (2010) ﬁnd that ”direct compensation raises the risk of detection by
competition authorities and is not observed in the current legal environment.”
If sidepayments are allowed and products are homogenous, a cartel would
commission the ﬁrm with the lowest costs to produce market demand at the
monopoly price and allocate the proﬁts among the members. But this was
not the case in the Norwegian cement cartel (1955-1968) which, ﬁrst after
a merger among the members, reduced capacity and lowered costs to the
extent that creating a monopoly was actually welfare enhancing (Ro¨ller and
Steen, 2006).
When sidepayments are not allowed, all ﬁrms need to be active to receive a
share of the collusive proﬁts. When ﬁrms are symmetric, there is no coordi-
nation problem and all ﬁrms will make the same proﬁt. But when ﬁrms are
asymmetric, the cartel needs to set prices so that all members make a proﬁt
and also allocate market share among the members to compensate ﬁrms for
a price that is not their optimal price to prevent them from leaving the car-
tel. This paper, instead of relying on sidepayment contracts, deﬁnes collision
to be stable if the proﬁt from membership without explicit agreements on
transfers is higher than that from deviation. This is in essence the economic
meaning of collusion.11
In standard models of collusion, the cartel is assumed to set prices by joint
proﬁt maximization. When ﬁrms are symmetric this is a reasonable assump-
tion since they all prefer the same price (the monopoly price). But with
cost asymmetries, joint proﬁt maximization will propose that the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm should exit the market (Bain, 1948). Hence, by not allowing for side-
payments, only eﬃcient ﬁrms will make positive cartel proﬁts which is not an
equilibrium. When ﬁrms are asymmetric, joint proﬁt maximization is there-
fore not a reasonable mechanism for deciding allocation of price and market
share (Schmalensee, 1987). With cost asymmetries the cartel members have
to solve a non-trivial pricing problem, and the larger asymmetries, the more
trouble the ﬁrms will have deciding on a common price since the preferred
prices diﬀer (Vasconcelos, 2005).
11Not allowing for sidepayments also facilitates comparisons with related literature since
the same restriction on collusive strategies is also imposed by Bae (1987) and Harrington
(1991). Within the model collusion with sidepayments is however the parteto eﬃcient
outcome for the members.
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Proposition 5. Without sidepayments, joint proﬁt maximization is not a
subgame perfect equilibrium when costs are asymmetric.
The most proﬁtable conduct for a cartel with asymmetric members producing
homogenous products is to only let the eﬃcient ﬁrms produce, i.e. produce
at minimum cost, sell at monopoly prices and distribute total proﬁts among
all members.
This is veriﬁed by the fact that the ﬁrst order condition of the joint maxi-
mization problem with respect to s is πE−πI > 0. The result is hence a corner
solution and the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s market share should be at its maximum, i.e.
ŝ = 1
2
. Consequently, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm does not produce anything in the
joint proﬁt maximization solution. Since only eﬃcient ﬁrms produce, price
is set at PmE . Distributing cartel proﬁts requires side-payments that we do
not allow for and without re-distribution the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will deviate and
the game therefore ends in the Bertrand solution. Hence, any solution to
the pricing problem relying on joint proﬁt maximization needs some speciﬁc
assumptions about the market share of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, since it otherwise
would be zero.
Bae (1987) proposed that when ﬁrms had diﬀerent costs, price and market
share should be allocated using the balanced temptation equilibrium (Fried-
man (1971). This implies that the set of sustainable outcomes is constrained
so that all ﬁrms in equilibrium are equally tempted to deviate from the cartel.
This is achieved by assuming that the ratio cartel proﬁts/deviation proﬁts is
restricted to be the same for all members, hence the term balanced tempta-
tion. This assumption forces the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s market share to be positive
and prices can be determined using joint proﬁt maximization. Restricting the
equilibrium set however implies that there can be situations where there is no
solution in the balanced temptation equilibria, even though the combination
of price and market share fulﬁls the incentive constraints.
Harrington (1991) points out that it is unclear why the ﬁrms should settle
on the balanced temptation equilibrium and why all ﬁrms would agree to
use joint proﬁt maximization to ﬁnd the outcome. He further concludes that
the allocation mechanism does not specify both a price and market sharing
rule, nor does it always exist. Finally he also criticizes Bae’s model for
containing an ad hoc assumption.12 In the light of this criticism Harrington
12When δ is low, the joint proﬁt maximizing solution is not part of the collusive set.
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instead treats the allocation question as a bargaining problem. The solution
is deﬁned by Nash bargaining where the utility vector is the collusive proﬁts
and the threat is reversion to the single-period Nash equilibrium.
I ﬁnd Harrington’s approach natural and want to continue in this path. How-
ever, Nash bargaining games are normally not used when there are n > 2
players since such games ignore the possibilities for collusion among sub-
groups of the grand coalition. From our previous analysis we know that the
eﬃcient ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate from the grand coalition and
form a smaller cartel. Hence the n-ﬁrm Nash bargaining can only be a rel-
evant solution if we assume that the ﬁrms only can negotiate eﬀectively in
the grand coalition (Myerson, 1997). This could be the case if there is a high
risk that the fringe ﬁrm receives indications about collusion behind its back
and contacts the competition authorities. Any deviation will then result in
Bertrand competition. But, I introduce the possibility of eﬀective negotia-
tion also between a subset of the members. This allows for the creation of
subcartels.
The solution concept in this paper is based on a modiﬁed Nash bargaining
approach, that allows us to take into account the possibility for coordinated
deviation, further it simpliﬁes comparisons with Harrington’s original model.
Nash’s bargaining problem consists of a point in the utility set, here deﬁned
by the subgame perfect outcomes, and a threat point which comes to play
if the parties fail to come to an agreement or if the agreement exogenously
breaks down. It is therefore natural to think of the threat point as the
outcome of the punishment phase, i.e. the best outside option to being in the
cartel. There are of course several other possible solutions such as the Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975) solution where the gains from collusion is the same
fraction of maximum gains for all members or Roth’s equal gains solution
(Roth, 1979) where absolute gains are equal for the members. Despite these
solutions being subgame perfect equilibria, it is unclear why eﬃcient ﬁrms
would want to settle on these solutions. Another approach is Rubinstein
(1982) bargaining with alternating oﬀers, but those results will equal the
Nash bargaining solution as the time between oﬀers approaches zero.
Recall from equation (10) that if 2
3
≤ δ ≤ πcE
2πcE−π , the grand coalition is threat-
ened by unilateral deviation that would result in deviation to the Bertrand
Bae then assumes that the collusive outcome is the one that maximizes the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s
market share.
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equilibrium and hence zero proﬁts. When on the other hand 2
3
≥ δ ≥ πcE
2πcE−π ,
the coalition faces the threat of coordinated deviation where the two eﬃcient
ﬁrms form a sub-cartel. The threat point in this case is positive as the eﬃ-
cient ﬁrms can make proﬁts in the punishment phase. To solve the optimal
price and market share allocation for the cartel we therefore only need to
consider the two possible deviation cases. Which solution is applicable in the
individual case depends on the discount factor and level of cost asymmetry.
Since the two eﬃcient ﬁrms are symmetric and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm has no
proﬁtable outside option, the cartel faces following the bargaining problem
max
(P,s)∈Δ(δ)
(sπE −OE)2 πI (1− 2s) s.t. sπcE ≥ OE (13)
where OE is the threat point or outside option for the eﬃcient ﬁrms. It is
typically assumed that δ is suﬃciently large so that the solution to equation
(13) is in the collusive set. This is however not always the case and in section
4.1 I investigate the some properties of the solution when the bargaining
solution is not in the collusive set. The important comparative statics on
price in sections 4.2 and 4.3 will be performed both when δ ≥ δ̂E and when
δ ∈ (δ, δ̂E), i.e when price is set by unconstrained and constrained bargaining.
The only factor that separates the bargaining problem for unilateral devi-
ation from coordinated deviation is the size of the outside option for the
eﬃcient ﬁrms. With unilateral deviation the outside option is the Bertrand
equilibrium whereas it with coordinated deviation is a subcartel. Regarding
the proﬁts in these two cases we know that
OE =
{
0 if Bertrand eq.
(cI−cE)D(cI)
2
if Subcartel
}
(14)
I denote the solution to the unconstrained bargaining problem by P̂ and ŝ.
Harrington (2001) shows that since the utility set U (δ) 13 is compact, the
solution to (13) is the only solution that satisﬁes Nash’s axioms. But since
it is not generally convex when ﬁrms have diﬀerent unit costs we are not
assured that the solution is unique.
13U (δ) ≡ (2s (P − cE)D(P ), (P − cI) (1− 2s)D(P ))  (P, s) ∈ (δ)
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From the bargaining problem in equation (13) it can be seen that costs have
two distinct eﬀects on the bargaining surplus. First they determine optimal
prices for the ineﬃcient and eﬃcient ﬁrms where higher costs call for higher
prices. Second, with coordinated deviation, it determines the value of the
outside option for the eﬃcient ﬁrms. When the cost diﬀerence is large the
bargaining surplus for the eﬃcient ﬁrms is smaller.
Solving the bargaining problem for optimal market share gives
ŝ =
{
1
3
if Bertrand eq.
1
3
+ π
6πE
if Subcartel
}
(15)
When the outside option is the Bertrand equilibrium no ﬁrm has bargaining
leverage and it is hence optimal that the ﬁrms share the market equally,
independent of their level of eﬃciency. When the outside option is a subcartel
the eﬃcient ﬁrms have a bargaining advantage which translates into higher
market shares. The shares increase with the degree of ineﬃciency.
Substituting the optimal market share into the bargaining problem in equa-
tion (13) enables us to solve for the optimal cartel prices.
4.1 Constrained Nash bargaining
The optimal market shares in equation (15) were derived without constraints
on the collusive outcome. But, the unconstrained Nash Bargaining solution
is not always in the set and in these cases the members need to adjust price
and market share to reach a sustainable solution.
For δ ∈ [δ, δ̂E), where δ is the minimum discount factor for collusion to be
sustainable14 and δ̂E is the minimum required discount factor for the eﬃcient
ﬁrms15 when price and market shares are determined by Nash bargaining,
collusion is possible but the unconstrained Nash bargaining solution is not
part of the collusive set. In these cases the members have to adjust the
bargaining solution (price and market share) to make collusion sustainable,
i.e. choose a solution in the collusive set.
Proposition 6. When δ ∈ (δ, δ̂E), the ﬁrms will decide on the lowest market
share possible and set the cartel price at PmE .
14From equations (6) and (9).
15The requirement on discount factor is higher for the eﬃcient ﬁrms.
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The lowest discount factor sustainable for the eﬃcient ﬁrms is δ˜E. When this
is binding, the solution to the bargaining problem in equation (13) is subject
to δ = δ˜E.
16 By substituting the constraint into the objective function and
taking the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to s, I ﬁnd that the optimum
market share is a corner solution where the share is set as low as possible.
The minimum market share is given by setting prices at PmE . The results thus
generalise Harrington’s (1991) ﬁnding that the collusive solution is (PmE , s)
when δ ≈ max(δi). However it is contrary to Bae’s (1987) assumption that
the cartel would chose the outcome that maximized the low-cost ﬁrm’s market
share. In fact I ﬁnd the opposite. Thus in this model only market shares will
be aﬀected from changes in δ when δ < δ̂E.
Cartel prices are constant at PmE . Therefore they only vary with the marginal
costs of the eﬃcient ﬁrm. Since
∂PmE
∂cE
> 0 lower costs leads to lower prices.
As ∂s
∂δ
< 0 in both the unilateral and coordinated case, lower discount factor
results in a higher market share for the eﬃcient ﬁrm. Otherwise the eﬃcient
ﬁrm would be tempted to deviate.
4.2 Collusive price
In the following we investigate the property of the collusive prices and the
solutions to the bargaining problem. We also compare the ﬁndings to Har-
rington’s two-ﬁrm model.
Proposition 7. The grand cartel will set prices in the interval P̂ ∈ (pmE , pmI )
The cartel will always set a price somewhere in between the monopoly prices
of the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms. From assumption A.5 the monopoly price
is higher for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. Thus, starting at the monopoly price for
the eﬃcient ﬁrms, a small increase in price will not change the proﬁtability
for the eﬃcient ﬁrms, but it will increase for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. Starting
from the monopoly price of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, a small reduction of the price
will increase the eﬃcient ﬁrms’ proﬁts but leave the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s proﬁt
unchanged. Setting price between the monopoly proﬁts therefore maximizes
the total bargaining surplus.
16Since δ˜E > δ˜I .
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From the cartel’s incentive constraints it is obvious that a cartel can allow
ineﬃcient ﬁrms to survive even though they could not be active on a com-
petitive market. By including ineﬃcient ﬁrms in the cartel, prices are higher
than they would have been if only eﬃcient ﬁrms were included. Therefore,
both overcharges and the welfare loss caused by the cartel are higher when
ineﬃcient ﬁrms are included. The total eﬀect of including an ineﬃcient ﬁrms
in a cartel is determined by its eﬀect on collusive prices and on its market
share.
Proposition 8. The cartel price is lower when the outside option is a sub-
cartel than if it is the Bertrand equilibrium.
The diﬀerence in cartel price between the two regimes, P̂ sub < P̂ bert arises
from the existence of bargaining leverage. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm has no valu-
able outside option in any of the regimes and hence limited leverage. The
eﬃcient ﬁrms on the other hand have a good outside option if they can co-
ordinate their behaviour, since that will ensure them positive proﬁts in a
punishment period. The leverage is used to negotiate prices closer so their
monopoly price, i.e. lower price. The diﬀerence in prices between the two
regimes increases monotonically with the cost diﬀerence since the eﬃcient
ﬁrm’s leverage increases with the cost diﬀerence. Thus, when it comes to the
eﬀect of cartels, prices are lower when the eﬃcient members can coordinate
their out of equilibrium behaviour.
When pricing is constrained, the constraint aﬀects the two bargaining func-
tions in the same way. Hence the relation between the prices is the same as
when the bargaining is unconstrained.
In a duopoly setting Harrington (1991) found that cartel prices are higher
when set by Nash bargaining than when determined by joint proﬁt maxi-
mization17. He stated that these results also should hold for n-ﬁrm games. I
compare the results from my three-ﬁrm model to his ﬁndings to see the eﬀect
of introducing an additional eﬃcient ﬁrms in the model.
In the following two propositions I show that when the threat of unilateral
deviation binds the cartel, i.e. equation (12) is satisﬁed, the cartel price in
17To compare the two models Harrington assumed that the optimal market share in joint
proﬁt maximization is the same as when determined by Nash Bargaining. As discussed in
proposition 6, this is however not the case in equilibrium.
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my three-ﬁrm model is higher than the price determined by Harrington’s
two-ﬁrm model (Proposition 10). When equation (12) does not hold and
the threat of coordinated deviation binds the cartel, cartel prices are lower
than those calculated by Harrington (Proposition 9). These ﬁndings nuances
Harrington’s results and illustrate the important role of the outside option
in determining the eﬀect of a cartel.
Proposition 9. The price set by a three-ﬁrm cartel when the outside op-
tion is a subcartel, is lower than the price set by a two-ﬁrm cartel with cost
asymmetries.
Proposition 8 stated that P̂ sub < P̂ bert. I ﬁnd that P̂ sub < P̂ two−firm, hence
the introduction of a second eﬃcient ﬁrm leads to lower cartel prices and a
less harmful cartel when the outside option is a subcartel. Increasing the
number of eﬃcient ﬁrms hence decreases prices.
In the two compared equilibria, the eﬃcient ﬁrms make proﬁts in the punish-
ment phase. These proﬁts will be higher when there is only one eﬃcient ﬁrm
since they are then not shared. Proposition 9 implies that increased prof-
its in the punishment phase reduces prices as the eﬃcient ﬁrms’ bargaining
leverage increases. According to this logic the two-ﬁrm model should give
the lowest prices since the punishment proﬁts is higher. There are however
two factors that pull in the opposite direction.
First, an obvious eﬀect is the weighing in the bargaining problem. In the
three-ﬁrm bargaining model the three ﬁrms have equal weights and the bar-
gaining surplus of the eﬃcient ﬁrms is thus squared which brings down the
cartel price.
Second, cartel prices are also a function of optimal market share. The equi-
librium market share for the eﬃcient ﬁrms are
ŝ =
{ 1
3
+ π
6πE
if three-ﬁrms (subcartel)
1
2
+ π
2πE
if two-ﬁrms
}
Thus an eﬃcient ﬁrm gets a higher equilibrium market share in the two-
ﬁrm model. This is natural since we expect market shares to fall with the
number of ﬁrms in the cartel. In both models the eﬀect from an increase in
market share on price is positive, i.e. ∂
∂s
(
∂πE
∂P
)
> 018. This is in line with the
18It also holds that ∂ŝ∂P > 0 since P > P
m.
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ﬁnding that market share is used as a compensation to the eﬃcient ﬁrm for
accepting a price above its monopoly price. Since the market share is larger
in the two-ﬁrm model, it can accept higher prices than when there are three
ﬁrms.
Proposition 10. The price set by a three-ﬁrm cartel where the outside option
is the Bertrand equilibrium, is higher than the price set by a two-ﬁrm cartel
with asymmetric costs.
Since P̂ sub < P̂ bert and P̂ sub < P̂ two−firm I investigate if P̂ two−firm < P̂ bert.
If not, introducing a second eﬃcient ﬁrm always reduces cartel prices, irre-
spective of the deviation strategy. When the outside option is the Bertrand
equilibrium, prices set by a three-ﬁrm cartel, P̂ bert are higher than if there
are only two ﬁrms on the market, P̂ two−firm. The intuition for this is fairly
straight forward. The eﬃcient ﬁrms in the three-ﬁrm model have no outside
option when they deviate unilaterally since this results in the Bertrand equi-
librium. Hence they have no bargaining leverage to demand lower prices,
closer to their monopoly price. On the other hand, if there are only two
ﬁrms, the eﬃcient ﬁrm will be able to make proﬁts in the punishment period
as long as there are cost diﬀerences. This translates into bargaining leverage
and allows the eﬃcient ﬁrm to require lower prices. Therefore, increasing
the number of eﬃcient members in the cartel from one to two reduces their
bargaining power and increases cartel prices.
4.3 Eﬀect of changes in eﬃciency
To understand how cost asymmetries aﬀect the cartel’s pricing I perform
some comparative statics. When the outside option is the Bertrand equilib-
rium the results coincide with those by Harrington (1991).
Proposition 11. Cost reductions for the eﬃcient ﬁrm leads to lower cartel
prices.
When it is most proﬁtable to deviate to the Bertrand equilibrium there is
no valuable outside option. The eﬀect on price from a change in costs is
therefore only determined by how the cost change aﬀects the ﬁrms’ optimal
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prices. A reduction of the eﬃcient ﬁrms’ costs lowers the eﬃcient ﬁrms’
monopoly prices, but does not aﬀect the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price. A
cost reduction therefore reduces the cartel price.
When the most most proﬁtable option is to deviate to a subcartel there are
also proﬁts in the punishment phase. Lower costs increase the value of the
outside option and from proposition 9 we know that a more valuable outside
option reduces price. Both eﬀects hence pull in the same direction and prices
fall faster as a result of cost reductions by the eﬃcient ﬁrms when they would
deviate to a subcartel. Thus, irrespective of the deviation strategy, ∂P
∂cE
> 0
holds.
When δ ∈ (δ, δ̂E) the cartel cannot agree on the Nash bargaining outcome
and therefore agrees on PmE . A reduction of cE reduces P
m
E . Hence the eﬀect
of cost changes is the same as above.
Proposition 12. Cost reductions for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm can either reduce
or increase the cartel price.
When the best outside option is to deviate to the Bertrand equilibrium,
reducing cI has the same eﬀect on price as a reduction in cE, i.e. a reduction
in costs reduces the monopoly price - in this case for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
Lower costs therefore reduces the cartel price. When the best option is to
deviate to a subcartel the relationship is more complicated since changes in
costs, besides changing the optimal price, also inﬂuences the value of the
outside option. The outside option for the eﬃcient ﬁrms is (cI−cE)D(cI)
2
and
reducing cI reduces the value of the outside option which gives the eﬃcient
ﬁrms less leverage and pushes the cartel price upwards. The two eﬀects
work in opposite directions. The eﬀect of the cost reduction on prices hence
depends on which of these two eﬀects are strongest.
When the cost diﬀerences are small the price increasing eﬀect of the outside
option is small and prices fall with cost reductions from the ineﬃcient ﬁrm
∂P
∂cI
> 0. But for suﬃciently large cost diﬀerentials, the price will increase
as the ineﬃcient ﬁrm becomes more eﬃcient because the eﬃcient ﬁrm looses
bargaining leverage, i.e. ∂P
∂cI
< 0. Berg (2011) deﬁnes the critical cost dif-
ference that turns the relation negative in a two player game using a linear
demand function. Without further assumptions on the concavity of demand,
it is not possible to determine the eﬀect when the best outside option is to
deviate to a subcartel.
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In the constrained bargaining situation, when the ﬁrms cannot agree on the
Nash bargaining outcome, the cartel price is set at PmE . In this case changes
in the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s costs do not aﬀect the cartel price.
Proposition 13. Cost reductions only aﬀect the optimal market share when
the most proﬁtable deviation strategy is a subcartel.
When it is most proﬁtable to deviate to the Bertrand equilibrium, the optimal
market share is given by
ŝbert =
1
3
(16)
Hence all ﬁrms will receive the same market share in the cartel, independent
of the ﬁrm level of eﬃciency since there are no proﬁts for the eﬃcient ﬁrms
in the punishment phase. Consequently there is no valuable outside option
that confers bargaining leverage that enables the eﬃcient ﬁrms to require a
higher market share despite being more eﬃcient.
When it is most proﬁtable to deviate to a subcartel the optimal market share
is given by
ŝsub =
1
3
+
(cI − cE)D (cI)
6 (P − cE)D (P ) (17)
When the members are symmetric all ﬁrms get the same market share. But,
this is not the case when there are cost asymmetries. In similarity to Har-
rington (1991) I conjecture that dŝ
sub
dcE
< 0 and dŝ
sub
dcI
> 0 because an eﬃcient
ﬁrm should get a higher market when its outside option improves.19
The direct eﬀect of cE on ŝ, holding P constant, is indeed negative. But as
seen in Proposition 11, the cartel price is aﬀected by cE where
∂P
∂cE
> 0 and
from footnote (18) ∂s
∂P
> 0. There is hence a countervailing eﬀect through
the prices where ∂ŝ
sub
∂cE
> 0. Although I cannot generally determine the total
eﬀect, numerical simulations using linear demand function20 conﬁrms that
the overall eﬀect is negative in that case.
Holding P ﬁxed the partial eﬀect ∂ŝ
sub
∂cI
> 0.21 But from proposition 12 cI
also aﬀects P and the eﬀect depends on the size of the cost diﬀerence. Total
19I have only been able to verify this numerically for a linear demand function.
20Demand function: D (P ) = a− P .
21 ∂s
∂cI
= (cI−cE)D
′(cI)+D(cI)
6(P−cE)D(P ) > 0 since cI < p
m
E .
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diﬀerentiation gives dŝ
sub
dcI
> 0 if ∂P
∂cI
> 0 and this is the case for small cost
diﬀerences. The logic is that increased costs for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm gives a
higher price. Due to higher prices the eﬃcient ﬁrms needs more compensation
with market share to stay in the cartel. The ﬁnding which is consistent with
that of Bae (1987), is conﬁrmed by numerical simulation in the case of linear
demand.
5 Extending the model to N-ﬁrms
So far the model only allowed for three ﬁrms in the market. In this section
I illustrate that the ﬁndings from this model are valid also for settings with
more ﬁrms. The eﬀect on prices from an additional ﬁrm depends on its
eﬃciency. A new ﬁrm can be
1. More eﬃcient than most eﬃcient ﬁrms
2. Just as eﬃcient as most eﬃcient ﬁrms
3. More eﬃcient than ineﬃcient ﬁrm
4. Just as eﬃcient as ineﬃcient ﬁrm
5. More ineﬃcient than ineﬃcient ﬁrm
For tractability we only investigate the eﬀects by adding n eﬃcient ﬁrms,
i.e. all ﬁrms fall into category 2 above, rather than inclusion of ﬁrms with
diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency. But the general framework can be applied to
any degree of eﬃciency.
Increasing the number of eﬃcient ﬁrms to n gives us the following bargaining
problem.
max
p,s
(sπE −OE)n πI (1− ns) s.t. sπcE ≥ OE
where the outside option is given by.
OE =
{
0 if Bertrand eq.
π
n
if Subcartel
}
(18)
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When it is most proﬁtable to deviate unilaterally and end up in the Bertrand
equilibrium the price eﬀect of introducing n eﬃcient ﬁrms comes from two
sources. First, as the number of eﬃcient ﬁrms increase so does their relative
weight in the bargaining problem. Prices are therefore lowered towards their
monopoly price as n increases. Second, the optimal market share is aﬀected
by the number of ﬁrms. The optimal market share for an eﬃcient ﬁrm is
s˜ =
n
2 (1 + n)
and with n = 2 we have s = 1
3
just as before. Naturally, the optimal market
share decrease when the number of ﬁrms increase. The incentive constraints
in equation (4) show that the cartel is sustained by the allocation of market
shares, where the eﬃcient ﬁrms are being compensated with higher market
shares for accepting P̂ > pME . Increasing the number of ﬁrms reduces the
possibility of market share compensation and the set of sustainable outcomes
is reduced when n increases. Since there can be less compensation, prices are
reduced. These two eﬀects result in price reductions when more eﬃcient ﬁrms
are introduced, i.e. dP
dn
< 0. This ﬁnding is natural since the number of ﬁrms
with a preference for a lower price increases and the maximum compensation
to the eﬃcient ﬁrms for accepting P̂ > pME is smaller.
In the case of deviation to a subcartel the optimal market share is
ŝ =
πEn
2 + 2π
2πE (n+ n2)
Hence, without any cost asymmetries and n = 2 the result is s = 1
2
just
as before. Keeping prices ﬁxed, introducing cost asymmetries increases the
market share for the eﬃcient ﬁrms. The eﬀects are hence similar to in the
above case. But, a third countervailing eﬀect enters the model when ﬁrms
can deviate to a subcartel. With more eﬃcient ﬁrms the outside option is
reduced, making it less proﬁtable to deviate jointly as n increases. Since the
value of the outside option is reduced with n, so is their bargaining leverage
and prices are pushed up.
The total eﬀect from increasing n is dP
dn
< 0. Thus the two negative eﬀects are
larger than the loss in bargaining leverage. Irrespective of the size of the cost
asymmetries, increasing the number of eﬃcient ﬁrms reduces the cartel price.
As the number of ﬁrms increases, the prices from the subcartel model will
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converge to the prices in the model where the Bertrand equilibrium model is
the best outside option since the outside option becomes smaller.
6 Discussion
This paper uses a inﬁnitely repeated games framework to analyse the eﬀect of
cost asymmetries on cartel sustainability and prices. With cost asymmetries
and more than two-players, collusion is not only threatened by unilateral
deviation, ﬁrms may also deviate to smaller cartels. Collusion is therefore
more diﬃcult to sustain when the cost diﬀerences are large as the temptation
to deviate to the sub-cartel becomes strong. This provides an explanation as
to why large cartels are not common in industries with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
The main diﬀerence between the models where the eﬃcient ﬁrms deviate
unilaterally (to the Bertrand equilibrium) and coordinatedly (to a subcartel),
is the outside option. In two-ﬁrm models the restriction of players convey
a proﬁtable deviation for the eﬃcient ﬁrm. But, unilateral deviation in a
market with n ≥ 2 eﬃcient ﬁrms leads to the zero proﬁt Bertrand equilibrium
in the punishment phase. Hence only if the eﬃcient ﬁrms can coordinate
their deviation and form a subcartel, is there a valuable outside option. The
outside option enables the eﬃcient ﬁrm to require lower prices than in the
case of unilateral deviation. Thus, to understand a cartel’s pricing scheme
one must not only know the cost levels of the individual ﬁrms, but also ﬁnd
out which is the best deviation strategy. The ﬁndings can explain some of
the diversity in cartel overcharges. In markets with many eﬃcient ﬁrms, and
with possibilities to make partial cartels prices are expected to be close to
the lower. Whereas in markets with many ineﬃcient ﬁrms and where it is not
possible to form partial cartels, prices are higher. Hence, if the competition
enforcement is active such that it hinders the negotiation of partial cartels,
it actually leads to higher cartel prices for the cartels that are formed.
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A Appendix
The detailed appendix is to the beneﬁt of the referees and should be excluded in the ﬁnal
version of the paper.
A.1 Nash bargaining solutions
Outside option is Bertrand competition
When Bertrand competition is the outside option Oi = 0,for all i. This simpliﬁes the
bargaining problem in equation 13 to V (P, s) = maxP,s(s(P−cE)D(P ))2(P−cI)D(P )(1−
2s). This gives the ﬁrst order conditions VP (P, s) : (P − cE)(s − 1)s(D(P )(3P − 2cI −
cE) + 3(P − cI)(P − cE)D′(P )) = 0 and Vs(P, s) : 2(1 − 2s)sD(P )3(P − cI)(P − cE)2 −
2s2D(P )3(P − cI)(P − cE)2 = 0. The Vs(P, s) can be re-arranged to ŝ = 13 . Substituting
the optimal market share in VP (P, s) gives
(P − cE)D(P ) ((3P − cE − 2cI)D[P ] + 3 (P − cE) (P − cI)D′(P )) = 0. (19)
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Outside option is a subcartel
When the eﬃcient ﬁrms can form a subcartel they have a positive outside option. The
bargaining function is then given by V (P, s) = maxp,s
(
s (P − cE)D (P )− (cI−cE)D(cI)2
)2
((P − cI)D (P )) (1− 2s).
The ﬁrst order conditions are VP (P, s) :
2(P−cE)+(cI−cE)D(cI)
(P−ci)D(P )
((P − cE)D(P )− (cI − cE)D(cI)) ((3P − cE − 2cI)D(P ) + 3 (P − cE) (P − cI)D′(P )) =
0 and Vs(P, s) : (P − cI)D(P ) (2 (P − cE)D(P )s− (cI − cE)D(cI))
(2 (P − cE) (3s− 1)D(P )− (cI − cE)D(cI)) = 0. The Vs(P, s) can be solved for ŝ =
2(P−cE)D(P )+(cI−cE)D(cI)
6(P−cE)D(P ) . Substituting the optimal market share in VP (P, s) gives
(P − cE)D(P ) ((3P − cE − 2cI)D(P ) + 3 (P − cE) (P − cI)D′(P )) = 0. (20)
Two-ﬁrm model
If there is only one eﬃcient and one ineﬃcient ﬁrm the bargaining problem is
V (P, s) = maxP,s (s (P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI)) (P − cI)D (P ) (1− s) which gives
the following ﬁrst order conditions. VP (P, s) : (s (P − cE)D′ (P ) +D (P ))
(P − cI)D (P ) (1− s) + ((P − cI)D′ (P ) (1− s) +D (P ) (1− s))
(s (P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI)) = 0 and Vs(P, s) : (P − cE)D (P ) (P − cI)D (P )
(1− s) − (P − cI)D (P ) (s (P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI)) = 0. The Vs(P, s) can be
simpliﬁed to s = 12 +
(cI−cE)D(cI)
2(P−cE)D(P ) . Substituting s in VP (P, s) gives
(P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI)(
(2P − cE − cI)D (P )− (cI − cE)
P − cE
2
D (cI) + 2 (P − cE) (P − cI)D′ (P )
)
= 0
(21)
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5. The objective function for joint proﬁt maximization is Π (P, s) =
2sπE + (1− 2s)πI . Vs(P, s) : 2 ((P − cE)D (P )− (P − cI)D (P )) = 0 and 2 (πE − πI) >
0. The solution is therefore a corner solution where the eﬃcient ﬁrms produce market
demand.
Proof of Proposition 6. Re-arranging the constraint δ = δ̂ gives πcEs = (1− δ)πdE + δπnE .
Substituted into the objective function the bargaining problem becomes
maxP,s(1− δ)(OE − πnE)2(1− 2s)πI s.t. OE > πnE
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Since s only enters in the second part of the problem it is easy to see that Vs(P, s) < 0.
The optimal market share is hence a corner solution where the share should be set as low
as possible. By s this is achieved when the cartel price is set as PmE .
Proof of Proposition 7. By assumption cI > cE and therefore p
m
I > p
m
E .
At P < PmE , π
′
E(P ) > 0 and π
′
I(P ) > 0, hence the bargaining surplus increases with P .
At P = pmE , π
′
E(P ) = 0 and π
′
I(P ) > 0. Thus for a small enough increase in P , the
bargaining surplus is increased.
At P > pmI , π
′
E(P ) < 0 and π
′
I [P ] < 0, hence both ﬁrms would proﬁt from reduced price.
At P = pmI , π
′
E(P ) < 0 and π
′
I [P ] = 0. Thus for a small enough decrease in P , the
bargaining surplus is increased.
Proof of Proposition 8. Maximizing the bargaining function gives VP (P, s) = (2s− 1)
((P − cE) sD (P )−OE) (D (P ) (s (2πI + πE)−OE) + (P − cI) (3πEs−OE)D′ (P )) = 0.
The diﬀerence between the two models is the outside option, OE . The eﬀect of OE on
VP (P, s) is (2s− 1) (−OE) (−OED (P )− (P − cI)OED′ (P )). The last parenthesis can be
re-written as −OE (π′I) and π′I is known to be positive. Therefore all three parenthesis are
negative so increases in OE decreases VP (P, s) and thus P .
Proof of Proposition 9. Both VP (P, s)’s in equations 20 and 21 are equal zero in opti-
mum. For any price higher than the optimal price VP (P, s) < 0. Thus if P
sub <
P two−firm then it should be that VP (P, s)sub < 0 and VP (P, s)two−firm = 0 at P two−firm,
i.e. VP (P, s)
sub < VP (P, s)
two−firm = 0. Re-arranging the terms, the expression can
be stated as (P − cI) ((P − cE)D (P )− (cI − cE)D (cI)) (D (P ) + (P − cE)D′ (P )) < 0,
which simpliﬁes as (P − cI) (πE − π)π′E < 0. Since πE > π and as the proof to proposition
7 states that π′I > 0, the relation holds.
Proof of Proposition 10. Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 9,
it should be that VP (P, s)
Two−firm < VP (P, s)uni = 0, where VP (P, s)Two−firm and
VP (P, s)
uni are given by equations 19 and 21, if PTwo−firm < Puni. By simplifying the
notation the relation can be re-arranged to −πEπI − πE (2π + (P − cE) (P − cI)D′ (P ))
+π
(
cI−cE
P−cE π − 2 (P − cE) (P − cI)D′ (P )
)
< 0. Since πE > π,the expression is true
if the ﬁrst parenthesis is larger than second one. As cI − cE < P − cE it follows
that 0 < cI−cEP−cE < 1 and therefore 2π >
cI−cE
P−cE π. Evaluating at the largest degree
of asymmetry possible, cI−cEP−cE = 1 and dividing the expression by π (P − cE) gives,
− (P−cI)D(P )2(cI−cE)D(cI) − D (P ) − (P − cI)D′ (P ) < 0. The proof to proposition 7 states that
π′I > 0, thus the relation is true. It is also true for any cI ≤ P.
Proof of Proposition 11. The VP (P ) from the bargaining function can be stated as
VP (cE),cE = 0. Applying the chain rule
dV (P (cE),cE)
dcE
can be re-formulated as ∂VP∂P
∂P
∂cE
+
∂VP
∂cE
= 0. Re-arranging gives ∂P∂cE = −
∂VP
∂cE
∂VP
∂P
. Since the collusive price is set at the bargaining
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optimum, VP = 0 and thus
∂VP
∂P < 0. Therefore
∂P
∂cE
is positive if ∂VP∂cE is positive. When
the outside option is the Bertrand equilibrium, dividing equation (19) by (P − cE)2D(P )
gives 1+ 2(P−cI)(P−cE) +
3(P−cI)D′[P ]
D(P ) and
∂V uniP
∂cE
= 2P−2cI
(P−cE)2 > 0. Therefore, decreased cE reduces
P . When the outside option is a subcartel I note that reducing cE increases OE . From
Proposition 7, increases in OE reduces P . Thus the eﬀect is the same also in this case.
Proof of Proposition 12. By analogy with the proof to Proposition 11 it is clear that
∂P
∂cI
is positive if ∂VP∂cI is positive. Using the simpliﬁed V
uni
P from the Proof of Propo-
sition 11
∂V uniP
∂cI
= (P − cE) (−2D(P )− 3 (P − cE)D′[P ]) > 0. This can be re-stated as
(P − cE) (−2π′E − (P − cE)D′(P )) and as π′E < 0 and (P − cE)D′(P ) < 0 it follows that
∂VP
∂cI
> 0 and hence that ∂P∂cI > 0 When cI is reduced so is P . It is not possible to determine
∂P
∂cI
when collusion is supported by coordinated deviation, without further assumptions on
the concavity of demand.
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Abstract
Cartel overcharges and the resultant damages and welfare losses are
typically calculated by subtracting counterfactual prices from cartel
prices. We determine both prices in a repeated game with cost asym-
metries and product diﬀerentiation. Cost asymmetries and product
diﬀerentiation signiﬁcantly aﬀect counterfactual prices, but only have
small eﬀects on collusive prices. We ﬁnd that overcharges and losses
in consumer welfare increase with the degree of cost symmetry and
substitutability of products. The case of symmetric costs and homo-
geneous products makes for the extreme case in which welfare losses
are maximal and restitution of damages undercompensates consumers
the most.
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1 Introduction
The ﬁght against cartels is to a large extent driven by private litigation. This
is especially true in the US where 90 percent of the cartel cases are litigated
through private enforcement (Wils, 2003). Improved private enforcement is
a top priority also in Europe (European Commission, 2008) and in order
to facilitate and promote private enforcement, the European Commission
published an economic report on how to assess cartel damages (Oxera, 2009)
and draft guidelines on how to quantify harm (European Commission, 2011).
As is evident from the economic report, game theoretic collusion models play
an important role in determining the negative eﬀects from cartels and are
considered one of three main methodological approaches to quantifying cartel
damages.1 In this tradition and within a coherent model of collusion, this
paper illustrates how sensitive cartel damages are to product diﬀerentiation
and cost asymmetries. It also investigates how these features aﬀect consumer
welfare.
The overcharge damages caused by cartels is largest when products are homo-
geneous and the member ﬁrms are symmetric. Under these conditions cartels
result in the largest losses of consumer welfare. Competition authorities that
want to focus on the most detrimental cartels should therefore give priority
to cartels in this type of environments. This is true even with active private
enforcement since consumers are most under-compensated in these types of
cartels, even when they are awarded full compensation for the overcharges.
The eﬀect of horizontal diﬀerentiation on collusion has been widely inves-
tigated for many years. There are two strands of models that give some-
what diﬀerent results depending on their assumptions; non-spatial and spa-
tial (Hotelling) models. In the non-spatial framework that we will apply, it
is standard to determine cartel prices through maximization of joint prof-
its. While not generally applicable, this approach, an artifact from Patinkin
(1947), is reasonable when ﬁrms are symmetric. With this approach, cartel
prices are not aﬀected by product diﬀerentiation and the cartel will always
strive to set the monopoly price. Product diﬀerentiation only aﬀects the
ability to sustain collusion, not the collusive outcome itself. Product dif-
ferentiation lowers deviation proﬁts and increases Nash proﬁts. To a large
extent, this literature focuses on the sustainability of collusion as measured
1The other main methods envisaged are comparator based and ﬁnancial analysis based
approaches.
71
The eﬀects of asymmetric costs on cartel damages:
The importance of the counterfactual
by the minimum discount rate that is necessary to sustain collusion by some
punishment strategy.
Deneckere (1983) pioneered a two-ﬁrm diﬀerentiation model with non-spatial
product diﬀerentiation. Collusive prices are set at the monopoly level, grim
trigger strategies are used to sustain collusion, and the minimum discount fac-
tor that can sustain collusion is found for both Bertrand and Cournot cases.
In subgame-perfect equilibrium, collusive prices are unaﬀected by product
diﬀerentiation. Deneckere ﬁnds a U-shaped relationship between the degree
of diﬀerentiation and the discount rate that is required to sustain collusion
when ﬁrms compete in prices. For quantity competition the relationship is
monotonically positive. For highly diﬀerentiated products, collusion is more
stable under quantity than under price competition. However as products
become close substitutes, collusion is more stable under price competition.
These results also hold for diﬀerent demand structures (Albaek and Lamber-
tini, 1998). Wernerfelt (1989) extends Deneckeres Cournot model to allow
for n-ﬁrms and collusion supported by optimal punishment (Abreu, 1986).
Contrary to the standard intuition, he ﬁnds that product diﬀerentiation in-
creases the rewards from cheating and makes punishments harder. The net
eﬀect depends on the parameters. For example, diﬀerentiation increases the
scope for collusion when there are few ﬁrms on the market. Cartel prices
however, are unaﬀected by product diﬀerentiation.
The other strand of models employs spatial diﬀerentiation with heteroge-
nous consumers. In these models, the collusive prices change with the degree
of diﬀerentiation. In a duopoly setting where ﬁrms compete in prices, col-
lusive prices are set by joint proﬁt maximization, and grim strategies are
used to sustain collusion. Chang (1991) shows that the eﬀect from diﬀer-
entiation on the collusive price is non-monotonic: the price increases with
product diﬀerentiation when the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, but
reduces with diﬀerentiation when the products are closer substitutes. Also
in contrast to Deneckeres ﬁndings, there is a monotonic relationship between
the sustainability of collusion and product diﬀerentiation where collusion is
always harder to sustain for products that are closer substitutes. Chang
(1991) shows how the diﬀerence between the models arises from the way in
which diﬀerentiation is modeled. Ha¨ckner (2000) conﬁrms Chang’s results
with optimal punishments. Jehiel (1992) studies whether cartels will produce
diﬀerentiated or homogeneous products in a setting similar to that of Chang
but determines the collusive price by Nash bargaining and allows for sidepay-
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ments. When sidepayments are not possible, there will be no diﬀerentiation
while when sidepayments are allowed, there may be some diﬀerentiation since
own location becomes unimportant for market shares.
The literature on collusion with asymmetric costs is much less developed for
both strategic and computational reasons. Asymmetric ﬁrms no longer agree
on the optimal cartel price and so deciding on cartel prices becomes more
complicated. Extending the price-setting duopoly of Bae (1987), Harrington
(1991) employs Nash bargaining to determine cartel prices. He ﬁnds that
cost asymmetries make the cartel less sustainable and that the cartel price
is increasing in the cost of the eﬃcient ﬁrm but decreasing in the cost of the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm, provided the cost diﬀerence is suﬃciently large. Rothschild
(1999), Collie (2006) and Vasconcelos (2005) look at homogenous and dif-
ferentiated Cournot models in which the cartel price is determined by joint
proﬁt maximization. They ﬁnd that when the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is active, it will
receive a lower market share than the eﬃcient ﬁrm and therefore have larger
incentives to deviate. Further, if a cartel is formed, and one ﬁrm deviates,
the eﬃcient ﬁrm will be disproportionately harmed and therefore wants to
deviate from the punishment strategy.
Contrary to the literatures on collusion with product diﬀerentiation and with
asymmetric costs, we focus mainly on the price eﬀects caused by diﬀerenti-
ation and cost asymmetries and are less concerned with sustainability of
collusion. We ﬁnd that product diﬀerentiation interacts with cost asymme-
tries in surprising ways. In our set-up, the cartel price is determined by
take-it or leave-it bargaining - a version of Nash bargaining that gives all
bargaining power to one of the ﬁrms. In most of the exposition we assume
that it is the eﬃcient ﬁrm that has all the bargaining power, in eﬀect being
the ”ring leader”. However, for robustness we also check what happens if the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm has all the bargaining power. In this way we essentially span
the set of outcomes that would arise with generalized Nash bargaining, see
Binmore et al. (1986).
We ﬁnd that cartel prices are relatively unaﬀected by cost asymmetries and
product diﬀerentiation but that the counterfactual Nash price is strongly
aﬀected by both. Product diﬀerentiation and cost diﬀerences increase the
counterfactual price and leaves less room for the cartel to increase prices.
This in turn means that the overcharge (cartel price minus counterfactual
price) as well as the damages and the welfare loss caused by the cartel are
seriously aﬀected by cost asymmetries and product diﬀerentiation. The ex-
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treme case is the standard textbook case of collusion with homogeneous goods
and symmetric ﬁrms. This is the worst case in the sense that the damages
and the welfare losses to consumers are higher in this case than in any other
case we analyse. It is also the worst case in the sense of the degree to which
the restitution of damages compensate consumers for this loss.
We set up our basic model of cost asymmetries and product diﬀerentiation in
section 2 and ﬁnd the non-cooperative (counterfactual) equilibria in section
3. We then assume that ﬁrms form a cartel where the eﬃcient ﬁrm oﬀers a
take-it or leave-it oﬀer to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm and solve the collusive model
numerically in section 4. In section 5 we investigate the eﬀects of the cartel
on damages and consumer surplus. Section 6 concludes. All proofs and
derivations are found in the appendix.
2 Model
We base our model on the Singh and Vives (1984) duopoly model for dif-
ferentiated products2. Consumers maximize their net utility and face the
problem
max
q1,q2
q1 + q2 − (q
2
1 + 2γq1q2 + q
2
2)
2
−
2∑
i=1
piqi (1)
This gives the following inverse demand function
pi = 1− qi − γqj { i, j = 1, 2, i = j} (2)
where qi is the quantity supplied and γ is a measure of the degree of horizontal
product diﬀerentiation. We are only interested in the case of competing
products and therefore restrict γ to γ ∈ (0, 1). When γ = 0 the products
are independent in demand and hence, ﬁrms are monopolists on their own
product. When γ = 1, the products are homogenous, i.e. perfect substitutes.
Invert (2) to obtain the following direct demand functions3.
2This diﬀers from Singh and Vives (1984) original paper since we have normalised the
own-quantity slope of the inverse demand function by setting their α = 1 and β = 1.
3The demand function is not well deﬁned when γ = 1, see Singh and Vives (1984)
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qi =
1− pi − γ (1− pj)
1− γ2 where {i, j = 1, 2; i = j} (3)
The eﬀect on demand from reducing product diﬀerentiation (increasing γ)
comes from two sources. First there is a business stealing eﬀect that gives
more demand to the ﬁrm with lowest price. Second, there is an eﬀect from
reduced variety. As the preferences exhibit love of variety (utility is decreas-
ing in γ), reducing product diﬀerentiation lowers total demand. If the price
diﬀerence is very large, the stealing eﬀect is dominant and the quantity of the
ﬁrm with the lowest price will increase monotonically as the products become
less diﬀerentiated. When the price diﬀerence is smaller, the loss of variety is
initially the dominant eﬀect, causing less quantity sold. But, for less diﬀer-
entiated products the stealing eﬀect dominates and quantity increases as the
products become more alike.
Firms face linear cost functions where ci denotes the marginal cost for ﬁrm
i. Although Singh and Vives’ (1984) model allows for cost asymmetry, they
restrict the space of the model by assuming that both ﬁrms produce positive
outputs, i.e. that both ﬁrms face positive demand when prices are set at
marginal cost. This implies that the model is restricted to ﬁrms with sym-
metric costs, as any other situation would force the ineﬃcient ﬁrm to produce
zero. We relax this assumption: when qi = 0, demand for product j is given
by qj = 1− pj.
We assume that ﬁrm 1 is fully eﬃcient and that c1 = 0. Firm 2 is less
eﬃcient, i.e. c2 ≥ 0 and c2 can therefore be interpreted as the cost diﬀerence
between the ﬁrms.
Our model is based on a collusive and one non-collusive state. In the non-
collusive state, we assume Bertrand competition, i.e. ﬁrms compete by set-
ting prices simultaneously. In the collusive state ﬁrms we assume that the
eﬃcient ﬁrm makes a take-it or leave-it oﬀer to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. Collusion
is sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium where deviation is deterred
by a grim trigger strategy that brings the market to the non-competitive
equilibrium if deviation is detected. The Folk Theorem implies that any set
of individually rational collusive payoﬀs can be sustained as the outcome of
a subgame perfect quilibrium of an inﬁnitely repeated game as long as the
discount factor is suﬃciently high (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). In this
paper, our prime focus is however not primarily to analyse the minimum
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discount factor that can sustain collusion, but rather to focus on the damage
caused by the cartel.
3 Non-cooperative equilibrium - counterfac-
tual
We ﬁrst characterize the non-collusive Bertrand equilibria in a standard non-
constrained duopoly model in which both ﬁrms are active. However, as the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm will not be able to survive in the highly competitive market
that results when products are fairly homogenous, we also investigate two sets
of non-cooperative equilibria in which the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is not active on the
market; one in which the ineﬃcient ﬁrm acts as a constraint on the pricing of
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, and one in which the eﬃcient ﬁrm may charge monopoly
prices. The analysis follows Zanchettin (2006) and is for this reason brief.
The ﬁrms face the following proﬁt function
πi = (pi − ci)
(
1− pi − γ (1− pj)
1− γ2
)
(4)
Due to the cost asymmetry between the ﬁrms, a standard Bertrand equi-
librium will not always exist. When the cost diﬀerence between the ﬁrms
is suﬃciently high and the products are suﬃciently close substitutes, the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm will not be active on the market. The combination of inef-
ﬁciency and product diﬀerentiation for which the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will have
zero production is given by
ĉ2 ≡ 1− γ
2− γ2 (5)
When c2 > ĉ2, only the eﬃcient ﬁrm is active. There is a trade oﬀ between
product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry that enables the ineﬃcient ﬁrm to
remain active if the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. When c2 > ĉ2, the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm still restricts the pricing behaviour of the eﬃcient ﬁrm until
the cost diﬀerence becomes so large that the eﬃcient ﬁrm can set monopoly
prices without incurring entry. The critical cost diﬀerence beyond which the
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eﬃcient ﬁrm is unconstrained in its pricing is given by
c˜2 ≡ 1− γ
2
The degree of product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry deﬁne three regions
of competition. These regions in the space {c2, γ}, are illustrated in Figure
1 below.
Figure 1: Forms of competition
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The white area in the bottom left in Figure 1 is the standard Bertrand region
where both ﬁrms are active. The top right dark grey area is the monopoly
region for ﬁrm 1. In the region between the monopoly and Bertrand areas,
pricing is constrained: only the eﬃcient ﬁrm produces, but at a price below
the monopoly level. The range of non-cooperative outcomes is summarized
in Table 1 of the Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates how counterfactual prices depend on product diﬀerentia-
tion and cost asymmetries.
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Figure 2: Non-cooperative prices
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(b) Ineﬃcient ﬁrm
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The lower lines in the two ﬁgures are the Bertrand prices when there are no
cost asymmetries. Hence they are the same for the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient
ﬁrms. In the curves above, cost asymmetry is introduced with increments
of 0.1. The curves for the prices of the ineﬃcient ﬁrms become shorter for
higher levels of cost asymmetry since the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is forced to exit the
market when c2 ≥ ĉ2. The reduction in prices for higher levels of γ is not only
attributed to increased competition as products become more homogenous.
The eﬀect is reinforced by the love of variety property of the utility function
that aﬀects total market demand. Demand with homogenous products is
only half compared to the case of independent products and the demand
reduction is monotonic in product substitutability. Since demand is lower,
so is price. When c2 > c˜2 ﬁrm 1 sets its monopoly price.
From the three possible pure strategy non-cooperative equilibria, deﬁned by
γ and c2, it is trivial to show that π
M
1 > π
Constr
1 > π
Bert
1 . In the following we
refer to the relevant pay-oﬀ from the non-cooperative equilibria in Table 1 of
the Appendix as πn.
4 Collusive equilibrium
In this section we analyse the cooperative equilibrium. We focus on subgame
perfect collusion and will therefore, in line with most of the literature (see
Miklos-Thal (2011) for a brief discussion), not allow for side-payments be-
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tween ﬁrms.4 In this model, collusion is only sustainable if the private gains
from being in the cartel is larger than those obtained by chiselling. We ﬁrst
brieﬂy describe the requirement for cartel stability to then turn the attention
to the selection of collusive prices by members of the cartel.
4.1 Sustainability of collusion
Cartels are inherently instable as there is always a temptation to deviate
from the agreement to make short-run proﬁts. The cartel is therefore only
sustainable as long as all members ﬁnd that the discounted value from staying
in the cartel is higher than the value from deviating. Thus, high cartel
proﬁts and tough punishment of deviation will improve the sustainability
of a cartel. We assume that deviation from the collusive price triggers a
grim response, leading to the non-cooperative equilibrium ever after. It is
therefore proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to stay in the collusion if
1
1− δπ
Cart
i (ci, cj, γ) ≥ πDevi (p, ci, γ) +
δ
1− δπ
n
i (ci, cj, γ) , i ∈ {1, 2} (6)
Thus the lowest discount factor for collusion to be sustainable is deﬁned by
δ̂i ≡ π
Dev
i (p, ci, γ)− πCarti (ci, cj, γ)
πDevi (p, ci, γ)− πni (ci, cj, γ)
(7)
Our starting point is the situation in which an antitrust authority or a court
has already established the existence of the cartel. At that point, the question
is not if the cartel was sustainable or not, but rather what damages are
inﬂicted upon customers and on society. For this reason, we de-emphasize
sustainability in our analysis.
As shown by Bae (1987), Harrington (1991) and Berg (2011), asymmetric
producers of homogenous products have to agree on a single price to ensure
that they are all active in equilibrium. However, when products are diﬀer-
entiated, ﬁrms may charge diﬀerent collusive prices. Before deciding on a
4Side-payments exist in reality, in fact several cartels have been known to have elaborate
transfer schemes (Levenstein and Suslow (2006), but as transfers cannot be contracted they
represent a challenge to the sustainability of collusion. See Berg (2011) for further reasons.
The inability to contract side-payments may be an explanation for price wars.
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price setting mechanism, we note that due to cost asymmetries and product
diﬀerentiation, cartel members prefer to set individual prices rather than a
common price.5 By setting a higher price for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm and a lower
price for the eﬃcient ﬁrm, collusive proﬁts will increase and deviation proﬁts
will decrease (non-cooperative proﬁts are unaﬀected), hence it will also lead
to a lower required discount factor than when the cartel is forced to charge
one price. The remaining question is which mechanism the ﬁrms should use
to select their cartel prices.
4.2 Determination of cartel prices
When products are homogenous, a cartel needs to decide both on a price
and on market shares for the individual ﬁrms (Tirole (1988), Cabral (2000)).
With diﬀerentiated products each ﬁrm has a unique demand function and
there is therefore no need to decide on a market sharing rule. In fact, al-
location of market shares between the ﬁrms is redundant once prices are
determined. To some extent this makes the cartel’s problem easier to solve
as the ﬁrms only have to coordinate along one dimension, prices.
When ﬁrms are symmetric, all members have the same reaction functions and
the cartel therefore sets a joint price for all members. It is often assumed
that the price is set to give the Pareto optimal proﬁt for the members, i.e.
set at the monopoly price which is the same for all ﬁrms (irrespective of
products being homogenous or diﬀerentiated). As a consequence, joint proﬁt
maximization is the most commonly used mechanism to select the cartel
price. But, when there are cost asymmetries there is no one focal price on
which the members coordinate (Scherer, 1980): ﬁrms with lower costs prefer
lower prices than those with high costs. In fact, joint proﬁt maximization
will not provide a stable equilibrium: for some combinations of c2 and γ,
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will need to leave the market and let the eﬃcient ﬁrm
produce everything. Without sidepayments this cannot be an equilibrium.6
5See appendix for proof.
6Bae (1987) combines joint proﬁt maximization with Friedman’s (1971) balanced temp-
tation requirement but this is problematic, see Harrington (1991). Davis and Sabbatini
(2011) analyse the sustainability of collusion where prices are determined either by joint
proﬁt maximization or by Nash bargaining. In both cases they introduce Incentive Com-
patibility Constraints (ICCs). They focus on the minimum discount factor necessary to
sustain collusion: if the ICCs bind, the scope for collusion is reduced until the point where
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To see this in our framework, note that if prices were set by joint proﬁt
maximization, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm would be forced to exit the market when
c2 ≥ c2 where
c2 ≡ 1− γ
Since c2 > ĉ2, the restriction on eﬃciency is stricter when prices are set by
joint proﬁt maximization than with Bertrand competition. This implies that
for c2 ≥ c2, ﬁrm 2 would be too ineﬃcient to be part of a cartel, while it
could make positive proﬁts in a non-cooperative setting. This makes no sense
and cannot be the equilibrium for a stable cartel without side payments. Ac-
cordingly, joint proﬁt maximization is not a good mechanism for determining
cartel prices when there are cost asymmetries between the ﬁrms, but no side
payments allowed. The reason for this is that without the possibility to
distribute proﬁts among the members, ﬁrms are interested in maximizing
own, not total proﬁts. Hence we need to turn to another mechanism for
determining the cartel price; which one to use in this setting is not obvious.7
One way to handle the problem of setting prices is to follow Harrington
(1991) and let the ﬁrms bargain over prices using Nash bargaining. For any
combination of c2 and γ, the bargaining surplus for each ﬁrm is given by
the diﬀerence of the proﬁts from collusion minus the proﬁts from the best
outside non-cooperative option, in this case the Bertrand equilibrium. Since
the eﬃcient ﬁrm has a better outside option than the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, prices
will be closer to the monopoly price of the eﬃcient ﬁrm. However they will
not be set so low that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is forced inactive. Unfortunately
the problem cannot be solved for a simple algebraic form when products are
diﬀerentiated and costs are diﬀerent.
4.3 Take-it or leave-it oﬀer (TIOLI)
In most of this paper, we employ an extreme version of Nash Bargaining
where the ﬁrm with the best bargaining position, the eﬃcient ﬁrm, makes a
the ICC just binds. They show that when the ICCs bind and in the absence of side pay-
ments, the models associated with joint proﬁt maximization and Nash bargaining are not
observationally equivalent.
7We note that when c2 < c2 joint proﬁt maximization is indeed a valid solution. This
paper focuses on the cases when it is not.
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take-it or leave-it oﬀer to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm and maximizes its own proﬁts.8
The lowest possible oﬀer that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will accept, is an oﬀer
that makes it indiﬀerent between collusion and the non-cooperative Bertrand
equilibrium. The collusive solution is therefore a menu of prices (one for each
ﬁrm) proposed by the eﬃcient ﬁrm.
The eﬃcient ﬁrm’s pricing problem can be formulated as
Maxp1,p2 π1 s.t. π
T ioli
2 ≥ πn2 + π2 (8)
where πT ioli2 is deﬁned by the general proﬁt function in equation (2) and π
n
2
is the relevant non-cooperative proﬁt for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (see Table 1 in
the Appendix). π2 is the extra proﬁt that ﬁrm 1 needs to leave on the table
in order that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm prefers to stay with the cartel. In this case,
ﬁrm 1 ensures that ﬁrm 2 just wishes to follow the trigger strategy, i.e. π2
should be such that δ2 = δ̂2 when π
Cart
i (ci, cj, γ) = π
T ioli
2 = π
n
2 + π2. Solving
the constraint with equality, we get
πT ioli2 = δ2π
n
2 + (1− δ2)πDev2
so the cartel payoﬀ to ﬁrm 2 that makes it just willing to participate in
the cartel is a convex combination of the single-stage Nash payoﬀ and the
deviation payoﬀ. For ease of exposition, in the following we ﬁrst assume that
δ2 = 1, implying that ﬁrm 2’s cartel payoﬀ is π
T ioli
2 = π
n
2 .
9 The constraint
δ2 = δ̂2 can then be solved to obtain the price, p˜2, that assures Bertrand
proﬁts to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. It can be shown that ∂p˜2
∂p1
> 0, which implies
that prices are strategic complements as in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The maximization problem for the eﬃcient ﬁrm now boils down to
8Since all bargaining power is given to the ﬁrm that prefers low prices, the general Nash
bargaining solution will give higher collusive prices. Below we show what would happen
if all bargaining power was transferred to the high-cost ﬁrm, thus indicating the range of
outcomes that may occur under generalized Nash bargaining.
9This means that δ̂2 = 1, see (7). In the more general case when δ2 < 1, ﬁrm 1 will
have to leave more ”money on the table” for ﬁrm 2. This would not change the results
in the following qualitatively but does make the exposition a lot more complicated, so in
most of the paper, we assume that δ2 = 1 and π2 = 0. But, int the end of this section we
illustrate what happens when δ2 < 1.
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max
p1
p1
(
1− p1 − γ (1− p˜2)
1− γ2
)
(9)
Despite a relatively simple functional form, the algebraic solution to the take-
it-or-leave-it problem is too complex to show, thus we proceed numerically.
By deﬁnition, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s collusive price is always larger than the non-
cooperative price at any level of product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry.
But we also ﬁnd that its collusive price is higher than the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s
monopoly price for most combinations of γ and c2.
Figure 3: Cartel prices
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(b) Ineﬃcient ﬁrm
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As a reference point we assume a extreme model with homogenous products
and no cost asymmetries, point A in the two ﬁgures above. Introducing prod-
uct diﬀerentiation (but assuming symmetric costs) reduces the price for the
eﬃcient ﬁrm’s product and increases the price for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s prod-
uct (point B in the ﬁgures above). By setting a price below its monopoly price
the eﬃcient ﬁrm steals demand from the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (business stealing
eﬀect) and to assure that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm receives non-cooperative proﬁts
despite a lower market share, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s price is increased above
its monopoly level. The diﬀerence in price for diﬀerent degrees of product
diﬀerentiation is however relatively small. But the diﬀerences in demand are
important when it comes to assessing the damages caused by respective ﬁrm.
When costs are asymmetric, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will only make positive non-
cooperative proﬁts if c2 < ĉ2 so for large cost diﬀerentials and suﬃciently
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substitutable products, there will be no cartel and the eﬃcient ﬁrm will
serve the market by itself charging constrained or monopoly prices. This is
consistent with previous ﬁndings that cost asymmetry makes collusion less
stable.10 Higher costs for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm leads to a higher collusive price
and a lower non-cooperative proﬁt. For small cost diﬀerences the eﬃcient
ﬁrm will steal market share by reducing price below the monopoly level, but
the reduction is less than in the symmetric case, hence price is higher.
For suﬃciently large cost asymmetry, the eﬃcient ﬁrm needs to increase price
above the monopoly level to assure that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s incentive con-
straint is satisﬁed (point C in Figure 3 (a)). Non-cooperative proﬁts fall
with product substitutability, hence when the ineﬃcient ﬁrm approaches the
maximum degree of ineﬃciency c2 = ĉ2, the constraint becomes less binding
and the eﬃcient ﬁrm charges a price closer to its monopoly price. The inef-
ﬁcient ﬁrm’s price increases monotonically with the level of cost asymmetry.
The cost asymmetry also determines the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation on
prices. For large cost diﬀerences the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s price is monotonically
decreasing in product substitutability.
As can be seen in Figure 3, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s collusive price is close to the
monopoly price in all cases. To the extent that it varies, it is a non-monotonic
function of product diﬀerentiation and of the cost asymmetry. The degree of
cost asymmetry determines whether the relation between product diﬀeren-
tiation and collusive price is convex or concave. Without cost asymmetries
the relation is convex as the eﬃcient ﬁrm undercuts for highly diﬀerentiated
products but increases prices towards the monopoly level as products become
more similar. This contradicts the earlier ﬁndings by Deneckere (1983) that
product diﬀerentiation has no eﬀect on collusive prices and by Chang (1991)
that ∂p
∂γ
> 0 and ∂p
∂γ
< 0 for low and high γ respectively. In fact we ﬁnd
the opposite. When there are suﬃciently large cost diﬀerences and products
are diﬀerentiated, the eﬃcient ﬁrm sets a price above the monopoly level to
assure that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm receives non-cooperative proﬁts. As the non-
cooperative proﬁts fall with product diﬀerentiation, the constraint becomes
less binding and the eﬃcient ﬁrm lowers its price towards the monopoly level.
If we transfer all bargaining power from the eﬃcient ﬁrm to the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm (the ineﬃcient ﬁrm makes the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer), these results
change relatively little. In this case, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s cartel price will be
10Bae (1987), Harrington (1991), Collie (2006) and Vasconcelos (2005).
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lower and the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s cartel price higher than when the bargaining
positions were reversed. In this way, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm steals business from
the eﬃcient ﬁrm. When γ = 0.65, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s cartel price is around
12 per cent higher and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s cartel price up to 11 per cent
lower than those illustrated in Figure 3.11
In the above analysis it was assumed that δ2 = 1, a rather extreme assump-
tion used for tractability. Here we relax this assumption and illustrate the
our ﬁndings also hold when δ2 < 1, the results are just scaled.
In the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, the eﬃcient ﬁrm makes the ineﬃcient ﬁrm
indiﬀerent between accepting the oﬀer and deviating to a non-cooperative
situation. Firm 2 is indiﬀerent between staying in the cartel and deviating
when πT ioli2 = π
n
2 + π. To maximize own proﬁts the eﬃcient ﬁrm will set
prices so that δ2 = δ̂2. This relation can be solved for π which expresses how
much more than the non-cooperative proﬁts that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm requires
to be indiﬀerent for any level of δ2. The two constraints can jointly be solved
for p2(p1, δ2) which is the price that ensures that ﬁrm 2 is indiﬀerent. Since
∂p2
∂δ2
< 0, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm requires higher prices when δ2 < 1. p1 on the
other hand increases with δ2, see Figure 11 in the Appendix.
The eﬃcient ﬁrm determines both p1 and p2 by substituting the constraint p2
into the maximization problem in equation (9).12 By leaving more proﬁts for
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (i.e. π) when δ2 < 1, δ̂2 is reduced as π
Cart
I increases. But
at the same time δ̂1 is increased since deviation becomes more tempting for
the eﬃcient ﬁrm. The minimum sustainable discount factor is hence δ̂1 = δ̂2
as long as δi > δ̂i. The above illustrates that allowing for δ < 1 only scales
the previous results. The analysis for δ = 1 thus holds qualitatively.
Product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetries can aﬀect cartel prices in both
an upward and a downward direction but overall cartel prices do not change
signiﬁcantly with the degree of product diﬀerentiation or cost asymmetry.
However, product diﬀerentiation does have a signiﬁcant impact on the coun-
terfactual, non-cooperative prices as seen in Figure 2 so overcharges will
depend signiﬁcantly on product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetries. We
now turn to the calculation of damages and relate this to consumer welfare.
11See Figure 9 for a comparison of the two cases.
12The maximization implicitly also determines deviation proﬁts and the constraint as-
sures that δ = δ̂2.
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5 Damages and consumer welfare
The ability to claim damages for cartel overcharges is the main driver for
private litigation. In this section, we determine how damages and consumer
surplus vary with cost asymmetries and product diﬀerentiation. We show
that the extreme case of homogeneous products and symmetric costs is the
worst for consumers, both in terms of how much damage is done and in terms
of the extent to which they are compensated for their loss of welfare.
5.1 Overcharges and damages to customers
Since actual cartel prices are (more or less) observable, the most central
element in overcharge estimations is determining the counterfactual price,
i.e. what the price would have been ”but for” the cartel.13 The counterfac-
tual is in most cases not a perfectly competitive market with marginal cost
pricing, but an imperfect market where ﬁrms are likely to make proﬁts in
equilibrium.14
Overcharges are therefore simply deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the cartel
price and the counterfactual price
(
pCarti − pni
)
and the damages suﬀered by
those who purchased the good are found by multiplying the overcharge by
the quantity sold by the cartel member, qCarti :
Damage of ﬁrm i =
(
pCarti − pni
)
qCarti
In this section, we calculate total damages for diﬀerent degrees of product dif-
ferentiation and cost asymmetry. The previous section showed that product
diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry aﬀect the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s collusive price
relatively little while the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s collusive price always exceeds the
monopoly price of the eﬃcient ﬁrm (which would be the benchmark of an
eﬃcient cartel). The damages caused by the cartel are nevertheless signiﬁ-
cant. Figure 4 depicts total damages by the cartel and we ﬁnd that damages
13The importance of using counterfactuals when asessing eﬀects of cartels was noted
already in 1966 in Europe, when the Court of Justice declared that ”The competition in
question must be understood within the actual context in which it would occur in the
absense of the agreement in dispute.”Socie´te´ Technique Minie`re, Case 56/65 1966.
14Most cartels are found in concentrated markets, see for example Levenstein and Suslow
(2006). This may be attributed to the fact that it is easier to coordinate with fewer agents.
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are larger for lower levels of cost asymmetry and decrease with product dif-
ferentiation (increase with γ).15
Figure 4: Total damages
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The upper curve in Figure 4 illustrates the damages caused by a cartel con-
sisting of symmetric ﬁrms and the lower ones indicate higher degrees of cost
asymmetry. The largest damages are thus caused by symmetric ﬁrms selling
homogeneous products. When there is product diﬀerentiation, this lowers
the damage of the cartel, mainly because the counterfactual price also en-
tails market power. For example, if γ = 0.57 and c2 = 0, damages are only
half of what they would be, if goods were homogeneous. This is mainly be-
cause of an increase in the counterfactual from pni (c1 = c2 = 0, γ = 0) = 0
to pni (c1 = c2 = 0, γ = 0.57) 	 0.3 (see Figures 2 and 3). Similarly, a
larger cost diﬀerence leads to lower damages and again through the counter-
factual: If, for example, γ = 0.57 and c2 = 0.5, damages are roughly half
of those that obtain in the situation where γ = 0.57 and c2 = 0.
16 Again,
this is mostly due to an increase of the counterfactual prices from 0.3 to
15When conducting such a horizontal comparison, one should however remember that
the total overcharges are mitigated by the love of variety eﬀect embedded in the utility
function. Since demand increases with product diﬀerentiation, horizontal comparison does
not distinguish between love of variety and the pure price eﬀect. The high overcharges
from homogenous products are generated by a demand that is only half the size compared
to fully diﬀerentiated, or independent products. For constant demand, the slopes in Fig.
6 are even steeper.
16And in turn damages w. γ = 0.57 and c2 = 0.5 are one quarter of those that would
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pn1 (c1 = 0, c2 = 0.5, γ = 0.57) 	 0.38 and pn2 (c1 = 0, c2 = 0.5, γ = 0.57) 	 0.6,
for the eﬃcient and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, respectively.
These results indicate that the two ﬁrms’ share of total damages are also
asymmetric. Figure 5 corroborates this impression: when the cost diﬀerence
is larger than c2 = 0.3, the eﬃcient ﬁrm cause the larger part of the damage.
Similarly, when the degree of product diﬀerentiation is low (γ ≥ 0.5), the
eﬃcient ﬁrm is also responsible for the lion’s share of damages. This is
because the eﬃcient ﬁrm sells a larger quantity and has a higher overcharge,
which in turn is predominantly due to its lower counterfactual price. The
ineﬃcient ﬁrm is responsible for the larger part of the damages only when the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is very high and the cost diﬀerence small.
Figure 5: Damage eﬃcient / Total damage
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As a robustness check, we have analysed what happens if all bargaining power
is transferred from the eﬃcient ﬁrm to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (so the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm makes the take-it or leave-it oﬀer). In this case total damages are higher
because the ineﬃcient ﬁrm dictates that the eﬃcient ﬁrm sets higher prices.
In percentage terms the ratio of total damages under the two bargaining
models is relatively unaﬀected by the degree of product diﬀerentiation, un-
less products are relatively homogeneous. In this case the threat point of the
eﬃcient ﬁrm is so dominant, that it constrains the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s ability
occur if γ = 1 and c2 = 0, i.e. the reference case of product homogeneity and cost
symmetry.
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to increase the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s price. Very clearly, the higher the cost disad-
vantage of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, the more damaging is it that it has all the
bargaining power. This is illustrated in Figure 10 (a) in the Appendix.
5.2 Consumer welfare (Consumer dead weight loss)
Economists have traditionally been more preoccupied with consumer welfare
than with damages since the latter just reﬂects a re-allocation between pro-
ducers and consumers without any eﬀects on total welfare. The welfare loss
from high cartel prices, the deadweight loss, is incurred by consumers that do
not buy the good because the cartel prices are too high. However, antitrust
damages are currently only awarded to those who suﬀered from overcharges,
and the real damage to society, the welfare loss is left uncompensated. In
fact, in the US, damages to non-buyers have been found to be too specula-
tive to give rise to compensation, since it is impossible to know from whom
the claimants would have purchased, the quantity purchased and at what
price.17 In the EU there are references to the legal and economic diﬃculties
for non-buyers to prove injury (European Commission, 2007). Below we illus-
trate how product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry combine to determine
the eﬀects of the cartel on consumer welfare, i.e. the diﬀerence between the
consumer surplus with the cartel and the consumer surplus in the counter-
factual situation without the cartel.18 Consumer surplus is calculated as the
net utility in equation (1).
From equation (1) we know that ∂U
∂pi
< 0 since higher prices reduce the num-
ber of products a consumer would want to purchase. As costs increase prices,
net utility decreases with c2 for the same reason. Utility increases with prod-
uct diﬀerentiation since the utility function exhibits love of variety. However,
in the counterfactual, non-cooperative equilibrium, the partial eﬀect of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation on net utility is negative, i.e. ∂U
∂γ
> 0. This is explained
by the ﬁnding in Table 1 in the Appendix that prices increase with product
diﬀerentiation, i.e. ∂pi
∂γ
< 0. In the collusive equilibrium net utility increases
17Montreal Trading Ltd v. Amax Inc, §§ 15-16.
18In the US a consumer welfare standard is applied, but it is still debated wether it in
reality is a consumer or total welfare standard (Orbach, 2011). In Europe the Court of
First Instances conﬁrmed in the case GlaxoSmithKline (T-168/01 2006, para 118) that
consumer welfare is the relevant standard.
89
The eﬀects of asymmetric costs on cartel damages:
The importance of the counterfactual
with product diﬀerentiation (i.e. decreases with γ) since the average price
does not change signiﬁcantly.
The eﬀect of collusion on welfare is calculated as the diﬀerence in utility
between the non-cooperative and the collusive states. Figure 6 shows the
total loss of consumer welfare that is caused by the cartel and how this
depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation and on the cost asymmetry.
The negative welfare eﬀects from collusion are largest when the cartel is
operating on a market with homogenous products and symmetric ﬁrms. Since
cost asymmetries increase counterfactual prices more than cartel prices, the
diﬀerence in net utility between the non-cooperative and collusive states falls
as cost asymmetries increase. The diﬀerence in net utility also decreases when
products are diﬀerentiated, again because the counterfactual price is higher
with more product diﬀerentiation than with less.
Figure 6: Change of consumer welfare due to cartel
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Figure 6 is very similar to Figure 4 that illustrates total damages. It is in-
teresting to compare the two graphs to investigate which fraction of total
welfare consumers would be compensated for if they were awarded damages.
To this end, Figure 7 shows the fraction of the total loss of consumer surplus,
consumers will get as compensation for damages. The relation between the
damages and the loss of consumer surplus caused by the cartel depends on
the degree of product diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry. For highly dif-
ferentiated products and high cost diﬀerences, damages awarded according
to the model would compensate consumers fully because the counterfactual
prices are high; but for less diﬀerentiated products and smaller cost asym-
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metry, damages awarded according to the model would undercompensate
consumers. The reason is that when goods are independent, the two ﬁrms
are monopolists and a cartel between them does not make the situation worse
for the consumers. On the other hand, when products would have competed
in the counterfactual, then the cartel prices result in lower quantities and
large overcharges: Consumers are most undercompensated when products
are homogeneous and ﬁrms are symmetric.19 Consumers then only recover
2/3 of the welfare losses if they get correct damage payments.
Figure 7: Degree of compensation of loss of consumer welfare
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In the US private damages are automatically trebled20 to encourage private
actions (American Bar Association, 1986). Treble damages (given that cor-
rectly calculated) will hence always exceed the welfare loss caused by a cartel
and the damages and will therefore always over-reward claimants. The pro-
posed European system with single damages will on the other hand leave
consumers uncompensated for the loss in consumer surplus that results from
their decision not to buy due to high cartel prices.
19If as a robustness check we transfer all bargaining power to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (so
it makes the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the eﬃcient ﬁrm) we ﬁnd that consumer surplus
falls compared to the bargaining situation when roles are reversed. The argument follows
the discussion of how bargaining roles aﬀect total damages, see the end of the previous
subsection. This is illustrated in Figure 10 (b).
2015 U.S.C. § 15(a)
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6 Conclusions
Collusion models are important tools to estimate the negative eﬀect of car-
tels, but they need to be calibrated after the speciﬁc market at hand to
give correct results. We incorporate two common market features, product
diﬀerentiation and cost asymmetry, in a standard model and ﬁnd that over-
charges are very sensitive to this change of speciﬁcation. The main driver
of this result is not that collusive prices vary a lot with product diﬀerentia-
tion and cost asymmetry - they do not - but rather that the counterfactual,
non-cooperative prices do.
We ﬁnd that the standard case of homogeneous products and symmetric
costs is the worst situation for consumers both in terms of their welfare
loss and the degree to which the restitution of damages compensate them
for this loss. This is because in this case the overcharge is large because
the counterfactual price is low and also because of the resultant large drop
in quantity. Product diﬀerentiation serves to mitigate these eﬀects both
by increasing counterfactual prices and by making quantities less sensitive
to price changes. Cost asymmetries also assuage the problem, mainly by
increasing the counterfactual price.
Competition authorities aiming at hindering the anticompetitive practices
that are worst for consumers should therefore focus on cartels in which sym-
metric ﬁrms produce homogeneous products. This is also true with active
private enforcement since consumers in this type of markets, always will be
under-compensated - even when awarded full overcharge damages.
The analysis is based on a two-ﬁrm model. Extending it to n > 2 ﬁrms is
a complicated task since, depending on the level of product diﬀerentiation
and cost asymmetry, ﬁrms may prefer to form smaller cartels instead of one
large. Berg (2011) deals with the the situation of three ﬁrms, two of which
are eﬃcient and extends this to a larger number of eﬃcient ﬁrms.
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A Appendix
The detailed appendix is to the beneﬁt of the referees and should be excluded in the ﬁnal
version of the paper.
A.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Table 1: Non-cooperative equilibrium
Bertrand Constrained Unconstrained
c2 < cˆ2 c2 ∈ [cˆ2, c˜2] c2 > c˜2
p1 − c1 1−γ2−γ + γc24−γ2 c2+γ−1γ 12
q1
p1−c1
1−γ2
1−c2
γ
1
2
π1
1
1−γ
(
1−γ
2−γ +
γc2)
4−γ2
)2
(1−c2)(c2−1+γ)
γ2
1
4
p2 − c2 1−γ2−γ − c2(2−γ
2)
4−γ2 0 0
q2
p2−c2
1−γ2 0 0
π2
1
1−γ
(
1−γ
2−γ − c2(2−γ
2)
4−γ2
)2
0 0
Q ≡ q1 + q2 p1+p2−c1−c21−γ2 1−c2γ 12
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The ﬁrst term of the Bertrand equilibrium markup, pi − ci, illustrates the eﬀect of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation. At full diﬀerentiation (γ = 0) prices equal monopoly prices21. This
eﬀect increases monotonically with product diﬀerentiation, as in the literature Deneckere
(1983).If c2 = 0 and γ = 1 we get the standard Bertrand result, zero markup.
The second term of the Bertrand equilibrium markup determines the eﬀect of cost dif-
ferences. When the ineﬃciency (c2) increases, the price margin increases for the eﬃcient
ﬁrm both in the constrained and in the Bertrand equilibria, but the price margin de-
creases for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm in the Bertrand equilibrium and remains zero in the other
two cases. For all c2 > 0, proﬁts are higher for the eﬃcient ﬁrm than for the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm. The cross-partial d
2(pi−ci)
dγdc2
from the Bertrand equilibrium reveals that the margin
exhibits increasing and decreasing diﬀerences for the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrm respec-
tively. Thus, the positive eﬀect from cost asymmetries on the price margin of the eﬃcient
ﬁrm is stronger for more substitutable products.
The derivations below are to the beneﬁt of the referees only. They are not intended to
remain in the ﬁnal version.
Static Nash
π1 = p1
[
1−p1−γ(1−p2)
1−γ2
]
π2 = (p2 − c2)
[
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2
]
Hence the ﬁrms best response functions are R1(p2) =
1−γ(1−p2)
2
R2(p1) =
1+c2−γ(1−p1)
2
According to the best response functions, a ﬁrm should increase markup if it becomes
more eﬃcient or if the competing ﬁrm increases it’s price. Further, increased product
diﬀerentiation will as expected lead to higher markups.
Solving these reaction functions give the equilibrium prices p1 =
2−γ(1+γ−c2)
4−γ2
p2 =
2(1+c2)−γ(1+γ)
4−γ2
These can be plotted as
21The monopolist’s proﬁt is πi = (pi − ci) (1− pi). So the monopoly price is pi = 1+ci2 .
For the eﬃcient ﬁrm pM1 =
1
2 and for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm p
M
2 =
1+c2
2 and so p
M
2 −c2 = 1−c22
when γ = 0.
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If both ﬁrms are active, the equilibrium margins are
p1 − c1 = 1− γ
2− γ +
γc2
4− γ2
p2 − c2 = 1− γ
2− γ −
c2
(
2− γ2)
4− γ2
Inserting the prices in the demand function yields
q1 =
2− γ + γc2 − γ2
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
q2 =
2− 2c2 − γ − γ2 + γ2c2
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
We see that the equilibrium margins (p− c) and quantities have similar expressions. We
can therefore re-write equilibrium demand as a function of prices.
q1 =
p1−c1
(1−γ2) =
2−γ+γc2−γ2
(4−γ2)(1−γ2)
q2 =
p2−c2
(1−γ2) =
2−2c2−γ−γ2+γ2c2
(4−γ2)(1−γ2)
Consequently the proﬁts can be expressed as
π1 =
1
1− γ2
(
1− γ
2− γ +
γc2
4− γ2
)2
π2 =
1
1− γ2
(
1− γ
2− γ −
c2
(
2− γ2)
4− γ2
)2
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Constrained Bertrand
The eﬃcient ﬁrm however knows that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will be out of the market when
q2 =
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2 = 0 hence at p1 =
p2−1+γ
γ which is the best response function of the
eﬃcient ﬁrm when the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is not active. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm has no option but
to play the same best response as before.
Thus in the limit case we have the best response functions are
p1 =
p2−1+γ
γ
p2 =
1+c2−γ(1−p1)
2
These two best response functions solve for equilibrium prices
p1 =
1
γ
(c2 + γ − 1)
p2 = c2
This gives the following margins
p1 − c1 = 1
γ
(c2 + γ − 1)
p2 − c2 = 0
The equilibrium prices solve for the following quantities
q1 =
1
γ
(1− c2)
q2 = 0
The constrained equilibrium therefore gives the following proﬁts
π1 =
(1− c2) (c2 − 1 + γ)
γ2
π2 = 0
Unconstrained Monopoly
When q2 =
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2 ≤ 0 the demand for product 1 becomes q1 = 1− p1
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The proﬁt function becomes p1 (1− p1) which gives p1 = 12 = q1
So π1 =
1
4 which is the standard monopoly result
A.2 Exit conditions
The ineﬃcient ﬁrm is active in the Bertrand equilibrium given that c2 ≤ ĉ2
In this model any ﬁrm that is forced out can re-enter the game at a later stage without
incurring any costs, i.e. there are no entry or exit costs. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm exits the
market when the sales in the non-cooperative equilibrium turns negative. The ineﬃcient
ﬁrm drops out from the market when q2 = 0. The ineﬃcient ﬁrms equilibrium quantities
solves for
ĉ2 ≡ 1− γ
2− γ2
The eﬃcient ﬁrm is unconstrained in its pricing when c2 > c˜2
Despite the ineﬃcient ﬁrm not being active when c2 ≥ ĉ2 it still restricts the pricing
behaviour of the eﬃcient ﬁrm, as the ineﬃcient ﬁrm would enter should the eﬃcient ﬁrm
charge monopoly prices. Therefore the eﬃcient ﬁrms prices are constrained until q2 ≤ 0
given p2 = c2 and p1 = p
M
1 . Solving for c2 gives
c˜2 ≡ 1− γ
2
The ineﬃcient ﬁrm will be forced to exit when the cartel sets prices by joint proﬁt max-
imization when c2 ≥ c2. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm will have q2 = 0 in the cartel equilibrium
given by joint proﬁt maximization if
q2 =
1−PM2 −γ
1−γ2 = 0
c2 ≡ 1− γ
A.3 Eﬀect on discount factor of having several prices
Using diﬀerent prices will increase collusive proﬁts and decrease the deviation proﬁts,
hence it will also lead to a lower required discount factor than when the cartel is forced
to charge one price
(
δ̂one−price − δ̂two−price > 0
)
. Just as in the Bertrand equilibrium,
product diﬀerentiation will protect ineﬃcient ﬁrms and thereby also the cartel.
The Bertrand proﬁts are not aﬀected by the choice of pricing, hence the diﬀerence between
the critical discounts for a one versus a two-price regime is given by
ΔπDevi (p, ci, γ)−ΔπCoi (ci, cj , γ)
ΔπDevi (p, ci, γ)
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Harrington (1991) shows that if ﬁrms set one joint price, the cartel price p∗ ∈ (pM1 , pM2 ).
But π′1 (p
∗) < 0 when p∗ > pM1 , hence the eﬃcient ﬁrm could make higher proﬁts by
reducing price. The eﬃcient ﬁrm on the other hand could make higher proﬁts by increasing
price as π′2 (p
∗) > 0. Both ﬁrms would thus increase proﬁts by charging individual prices.
For p∗ > pM1 the eﬃcient ﬁrm would increase proﬁts by deviating to p
M
1 . But with an
individual cartel price p̂1 ∈ [pM1 , p∗), the gains from deviation would be lower. As a
result of the lower price, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm needs to charge a deviation price that is lower
than if there was one common price, and would deviate from a higher price level since
p̂2 ∈ (p∗, pM1 ]. Both these eﬀects make deviation more costly for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. For
both ﬁrms we then have, ΔπDevi (p, ci, γ) < 0 and Δπ
Co
i (ci, cj , γ) > 0 which makes the
equation above positive. The one price regime therefore makes collusion more sustainable.
A.4 Take-it or leave-it oﬀer 1: The eﬃcient ﬁrm makes
the oﬀer
We here assume that the eﬃcient ﬁrm makes the oﬀer. The maximization problem is
maxp1,p2 π1 s.t. π
c
2 ≥ πN2 where π1 = p1
(
1−p1−γ(1−p2)
1−γ2
)
and the constraint is πc2 = π
N
2
πc2 = (p2 − c2)
[
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2
]
πN2 =
1
(1−γ2)
(
2−2c2−γ−γ2+γ2c2
(4−γ2)
)2
That is (p2 − c2)
[
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2
]
− 1(1−γ2)
(
2−2c2−γ−γ2+γ2c2
(4−γ2)
)2
= 0
At what p2 is π
c
2 = π
N
2
Solve (p2 − c2)
[
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2
]
= πN2 for p2
The result is p˜2 ≡ 12
(
1 + c2 + (p1 − 1) γ +
√
(c2 + γ − 1− p1γ)2 + 4πNash2 (−1 + γ2)
)
Hence there is only a solution when the term under the root are positive. This is the case
if (c2 + γ − 1− p1γ)2 + 4πNash2
(−1 + γ2) ≥ 0. Inserting Nash proﬁts gives
(c2 + γ − 1− p1γ)2 + 4
(
1
(1−γ2)
(
2−2c2−γ−γ2+γ2c2
(4−γ2)
)2)(−1 + γ2) ≥ 0
Solve for p1, gives: p1 ≥ 2−γ(1+γ−c2)4−γ2 which is the same as pNash1
Comparative statics ∂p˜2∂p1 > 0.
d
dp1
= 12γ
γp1−c2−γ+
√
γ2−2c2−2γ+c22+γ2p21+2γc2+2γp1−4πNahs2 +4γ2πNahs2 −2γ2p1−2γc2p1+1+1√
γ2−2c2−2γ+c22+γ2p21+2γc2+2γp1−4πNahs2 +4γ2πNahs2 −2γ2p1−2γc2p1+1
Since the roots are positive, the derivative is positive iﬀ p1 > 1 +
c2−1
γ . Numerically one
can show that collusive prices, pcart1 > 1 +
c2−1
γ .
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A.5 Take-it or leave-it oﬀer 2: The ineﬃcient ﬁrm
makes the oﬀer
We here assume that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm makes the oﬀer. The maximization problem is
Maxp1,p2 π2 s.t. π
c
1 ≥ πN1
The eﬃcient ﬁrm should be made indiﬀerent πcartel1 = π
Nash
1 where π
cartel
1 = p1
(
1−p1−γ(1−p2)
1−γ2
)
πNash1 =
1
1−γ2
(
1−γ
2−γ +
γc2
4−γ2
)2
Solve for p1. p˜1 =
1
2
(
1 + (p2 − 1) γ −
√
(1 + (p2 − 1) γ)2 + 4πNash1 (γ2 − 1)
)
. This is
only a solution if the root is positive and this is the case if (1 + (p2 − 1) γ)2+4πNash1
(
γ2 − 1) ≥
0. Inserting πNash1 and solving for p2 gives p2 ≥ 2(1+c)−γ(1+γ)4−γ2 which is the same as pNash2
So again we only need the restriction that the ﬁrm giving the TIOLI-oﬀer needs to set
pi > p
Nash
i . The ineﬃcient ﬁrm maximizes π2 w.r.t. p2 given p1 = p˜1.
A.6 Joint proﬁt maximization
Maxp1,p2π1 + π2
d
dp1
(
(p1)
[
1−p1−γ(1−p2)
1−γ2
]
+ (p2 − c2)
[
1−p2−γ(1−p1)
1−γ2
])
= 0
The above equation gives the reaction functions
p1 =
1−γ−γc2+2γp2
2
p2 =
1−γ+c2+2γp1
2
Combining the reaction functions we solve for the equilibrium cartel prices
p1 =
1
2
p2 =
1+c2
2
This gives the following margins
p1 − c1 = 12 (since c1 = 0)
p2 − c2 = 1−c22
I.e. we get standard monopoly pricing.
Inserting the collusive prices in the demand functions gives us the quantities q1 =
1+γc2−γ
2(1−γ2)
q2 =
(1−c2−γ)
2(1−γ2)
Hence the proﬁt expressions are very simple
π1 =
1
2
(
1+γc2−γ
2(1−γ2)
)
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π2 =
(
1−c2
2
) ( (1−c2−γ)
2(1−γ2)
)
As stated above this solution forces the ineﬃcient ﬁrm to shut down for speciﬁc param-
eter values (i.e. q2 = 0). Since the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price is higher than the
eﬃcient ﬁrm’s price - it will be forced out of the market when the products are suﬃciently
homogenous. Since the monopoly prices are higher than the non-cooperative prices the
”drop-out” will occur at a lower degree of substitutability than in the non-cooperative
game. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm will drop out when
q2 =
(1−c2−γ)
2(1−γ2) = 0
Hence at γ = 1 − c2 the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will no longer have any sales. Zero sales (and
proﬁt) cannot be a equilibrium since the ineﬃcient ﬁrm would generate a positive proﬁt
by reducing prices from it’s monopoly price. Without side-payments, this cannot be the
cooperative equilibrium.
Using non-negativity constraints on demand (q2 ≥ 0)in the optimization (Kuhn-Tucker)
would only give us the results we already have. This as the non-negative quantity con-
straint would be binding at drop-out and hence q2 = 0. Therefore the cartel’s price setting
need to include the constraint that the sales of the ineﬃcient is always larger than 0.
This could be achieved by either 1) the ineﬃcient ﬁrm dropping price, 2) the eﬃcient ﬁrm
increasing price or 3) a combination of both.
A.7 TIOLI prices in the general case
Maxp1,p2 π1 s.t. π
Tioli
2 ≥ πn2 + π (10)
and s.t.δ2 ≥ δ̂2 (11)
δ̂i ≡ π
Dev
i (p,ci,γ)−πCarti (ci,cj ,γ)
πDevi (p,ci,γ)−πni (ci,cj ,γ)
=
πDevi (p,ci,γ)−(πni (ci,cj ,γ)+π)
πDevi (p,ci,γ)−πni (ci,cj ,γ)
From the second constraint we get that π should be such that δ2 = δ̂2. I.e.
π2 = (1− δ2)(πDev2 − πn2 )
This may be plugged into the ﬁrst constraint that with equality reads:
πTioli2 = δ2π
n
2 + (1− δ2)πDev2
When δ2 = 1, we are back in the case that is analysed in Section 4.3. But with δ2 < 1, the
r.h.s. of the constraint becomes a convex combination of the counterfactual proﬁts and
the deviation proﬁts. For any γ and c2, this r.h.s. is just a number, so the TIOLI method
still works.
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A.8 Pricing when δ < 1
With take-it or leave-it oﬀers, ﬁrm 1 proposes prices that makes ﬁrm 2 indiﬀerent to
staying in the cartel or not. Thus, at lower prices than the proposed ones - there is no
sustainable cartel because the prices are determined as boarder conditions. For δ2 < 1
ﬁrm 1 has to leave something on the table for ﬁrm 2. The amount that ensures stability
is πn2 + π where π is deﬁned in section A.7. The constraint by ﬁrm 2 is hence given by
πTioli2 = π
n
2 + π. This can be solved for p2 that hence depends on δ2. Firm 1 determines
both prices by maximizing equation (9) with p˜2 substituted with p2.
A.9 Graphs
Figure 8: Deviation prices
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Figure 9: Ratio: Tioli prices
(a) Eﬃcient ﬁrm
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.
Γ1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
p1Pricetaking
p1Priceoffering
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Figure 10: Tioli ratios
(a) Damages
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Figure 11: Constrained pricing
(a) Eﬃcient ﬁrm
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The above ﬁgures are calculated assuming γ = 0.3. For higher values of γ prices fall and
ﬁrm 2 is not active for high values of c2. The minimum sustainable δ is 1/2 and since γ
reduces sustainability δ̂i > 1/2 when γ < 1.
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In Europe, cartels can in principle be exempted from the gen-
eral prohibition if they generate eﬃciencies, such as lowering marginal
costs. One way to achieve this is to share technology. This paper
examines cartel members’ incentives to share technologies and to in-
dividually undertake R&D eﬀorts. Using a two-ﬁrm collusion model
with asymmetric ﬁrms and endogenous technology sharing, the paper
ﬁnds that an eﬃcient ﬁrm has no incentive to share technology with
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1 Introduction
Both in the US and in Europe authorities have encouraged cooperation
among ﬁrms to increase R&D.1 In Europe, cartels can in principle be ex-
empted from prohibition if they generate suﬃcient eﬃciencies.2 But, all cost
reductions cannot be taken into account. For example reduction of produc-
tion, marketing or sales costs as a consequence of market power, are not
considered to improve market eﬃciency and are therefore not valid in an ex-
emption analysis.3 On the other hand, agreements on cost savings without
reducing production, such as sharing a new cost reducing technology between
ﬁrms,4 can improve market eﬃciency and hence possibly be exempted.5 But
should we believe that ﬁrms with anti-competitive agreements such as cartels,
will share knowledge among the members?
Since the R&D policies balance pro- and anti-competitive eﬀects, they spurred
a vast economic literature on the eﬀects on R&D and proﬁts when ﬁrms can
compete or collude in R&D and production, see Steen and Sørgard (2009)
for a good summary.
Fershtman and Gandal (1994) question the traditional view that ﬁrms com-
peting in quantities can increase proﬁts by forming a cartel. They show
that if ﬁrms prior to colluding, invest independently in cost reducing R&D,
the ﬁrms will make ambitious R&D investments to capture more of the col-
lusive proﬁts. This results in more R&D, reduced costs and higher prices
than in the non-collusive case. If investment costs are small enough, ﬁrms
will invest so heavily in the investment stage to get a large share of the
collusive proﬁts, that the proﬁts are even lower than in the non-cooperative
case. That implies that the ﬁrms should choose the non-cooperative strategy.
But, having incurred sunk investments, it is always more proﬁtable to col-
lude than to compete. Thus the ﬁrms would prefer to set R&D investments
conditional on competing on the market, and when the investments have
been undertaken, renegotiate to enforce collusion since such a strategy leaves
R&D spendings unaﬀected by collusion. These results arise since both ﬁrms
1National Research Cooperation Act (1984) in the US and regulation 2659/2000 on
research and development agreements in the EU.
2European Commission (2004), §46.
3European Commission (2004), §49.
4For example through licensing.
5European Commission (2004), §71.
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make positive non-cooperative proﬁts. Using a somewhat diﬀerent model
Brod and Shivakumar (1999) illustrate that the main results also hold when
there are exogenous knowledge spillovers between the ﬁrms.
When ﬁrms instead jointly set R&D levels through some kind of R&D coop-
eration, the eﬀect of collusion depends on the extent of knowledge spillovers
between the ﬁrms. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) ﬁnd that if exogenous
knowledge spillover between ﬁrms are high, R&D investments are higher if
ﬁrms collude in production than if they compete. Firms are however always
better oﬀ when colluding in production. Using the same model Kultti and
Takalo (1998) show that ﬁrms competing both in R&D and on quantities will
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to share knowledge with each other.
There is empirical evidence suggesting that eﬃcient cartel members share
technological knowledge. Cortat (2009) describes how members in a Swiss
cable cartel, operating from 1907 to the 1980s, initially competed with cost
reducing innovation since market shares and prices were determined by con-
tract. To eliminate competition in innovation the cartel decided in 1943 that
the members were obliged to share their innovations if they threatened cartel
stability. In reality the cooperation remained limited and no licenses were
shared. From 1968 the members also agreed to refrain from introducing new
products without consent from the other members, to share patents and to
jointly decide on key R&D investments. Cortat concludes that without R&D
regulations, price cartels can foster innovation, but with regulation they can
increase diﬀusion of innovation. He hence portraits a rather positive image
on the eﬀect of cartels.
This raises two questions:
1. Are eﬃcient ﬁrms interested in transferring knowledge to ineﬃcient
cartel members?
2. Do price cartels, without R&D regulations, foster innovation when ﬁrms
are asymmetric?
There are two main reasons as to why eﬃcient cartel members may want to
transfer their knowledge to ineﬃcient ones. First, as shown by Bae (1987) and
Harrington (1991), cost asymmetry reduces the scope for collusion. Hence
when the discount factor is low, it may be in the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s interest to
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reduce the cost asymmetry by sharing knowledge, to maintain the cartel.6
Second, if ﬁrms have asymmetric costs they have diﬀerent views on the op-
timal cartel price. Knowledge sharing may be a way for cartel members to
align preferences for cartel price and thus end up with a price that is closer
to optimum for the eﬃcient ﬁrm.
This paper focuses on the two questions above using a three stage model
where two ﬁrms ﬁrst independently decide whether to invest in R&D, then
to share technology and ﬁnally what price to set in a cartel. The sequence
follows from investment decisions being long-term decisions which should
be considered ﬁxed when the short-term pricing decisions are made (Selten,
1994, p. 4). It thus has a basic structure similar to that of Fershtman and
Gandal (1994) with two ﬁrms making independent investments in R&D, and
relates to D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) through the notion of potential
knowledge spillovers. I assume that only one ﬁrm can get access to the
technology, for example through a patent race (e.g Tirole, 1988, p. 394).
This leads to cost asymmetries and the ﬁrm with new technology can decide
to share its knowledge or not. Also, in contrast to most of the innovation
literature, competition in this model is in prices, not quantity.
The ﬁrst stage in my model illustrate that if investment costs are suﬃciently
low, one or both ﬁrms will invest in cost reducing innovation. The innovation
leads to cost asymmetries between the ﬁrms and in the second stage the
eﬃcient ﬁrm decides whether to share its knowledge with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
Despite that the ﬁrms will collude in the third stage, I ﬁnd that the eﬃcient
ﬁrm will not share its knowledge with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. In the third stage
ﬁrms decide on the collusive outcome, and the price is set in between the
two ﬁrms’ optimal level. For large cost asymmetries the price will be close
to the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price since it has a good outside option.
The unwillingness to share information leads to higher cartel prices than if
technology was shared, but also to it being harder for cartels to form. When
ﬁrms are asymmetric the eﬃcient ﬁrm has strongest incentives to invest in
cost reductions. The asymmetries will therefore increase until the cartel can
no longer be sustained. The investment incentives are however lower when
ﬁrms collude than when they compete. Section (2.1) presents the basic set-up
of the model and solves the non-cooperative equilibrium.
6This may be an explination of why ABB, the ringleader in the European pre-insulated
pipes cartel, prohibited introduction of more eﬃcient technology (case IV/35.691/E-4, par
114-115).
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Since the model is solved through backward induction, section (2.2) describes
the third stage of the model, the cartel outcome. The section solves the collu-
sive game using Nash bargaining and investigates the eﬀect of cost reductions
on the cartel’s price and market share allocation. The second stage in section
(2.3) investigates the incentives for knowledge transfers and the ﬁrst stage
in section (2.4) solves the investment game and determines how much the
ﬁrms are prepared to spend on R&D. The main conclusions of the paper are
presented in section (3). All proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 Model
The analysis proceeds in a three stage framework. First the ﬁrms indepen-
dently decide whether to invest in cost reducing innovation or not and in this
game only one ﬁrm will get access to the technology. Second, the ﬁrm who
acquired the new technology decides whether it wants to share the technol-
ogy with the other ﬁrm. Third, the two ﬁrms decide if they want to form a
cartel where prices and market shares are set using Nash bargaining.
The model is solved through backward induction and the ﬁrst step is therefore
to solve the third stage, how the ﬁrms in a cartel would set prices and market
shares. From this they can also deduct the conditions needed for a cartel to
be sustainable. Once the ﬁrms understand the cartel proﬁts, they solve the
second stag of the game, i.e. decide whether they will share information or
not. When the ﬁrms know if the knowledge will be shared they make their
investment decision in stage 1.
2.1 Basic set-up and non-cooperative equilibrium
The model is, in similarity to much of the literature on collusion and in-
novation, based on a duopoly producing homogenous products. Costs and
demand are assumed to be linear and demand is deﬁned as
Q = 1− P (1)
The two ﬁrms on the market compete in prices and demand is allocated to the
ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest price. If both ﬁrms oﬀer the same price, they decide
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how to allocate demand between them. This gives the individual demand
function
qi(Pi) =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if Pi > Pj
siQ(Pi) if Pi = Pj
Q(Pi) if Pi < Pj
where i = j (2)
where si it the market share for ﬁrm i. The marginal costs are denoted ci. If
one ﬁrm is more eﬃcient than the other it follows that cE ≤ cI , where E, I
denote the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
In order for a cartel to be incentive compatible for an eﬃcient ﬁrm, I as-
sume that the cost diﬀerence is not drastic, i.e. cI < P
m
E where P
m
E is
an eﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price. According to this simple set-up, the only
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in the one-period game is the eﬃcient ﬁrm
charging P nE = cI and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm producing nothing. It therefore fol-
lows that πnE > 0 and π
n
I = 0 where π
n denotes non-cooperative proﬁts.7 In
the non-cooperative equilibrium the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s proﬁt increases with own
cost reductions. It decreases with cost reductions by the ineﬃcient ﬁrm since
this will enable it to charge a higher price, hence
∂πnE
cE
< 0 and
∂πnE
cI
> 0. Due
to the latter, the eﬃcient ﬁrm has no incentive to transfer knowledge to the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm (lower cI) in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
When costs are asymmetric, non-cooperative prices are independent of the
eﬃcient ﬁrm’s costs. A change in cE therefore has a direct eﬀect on the
eﬃcient ﬁrm’s margin.
2.2 Collusive equilibrium
In the last stage, when the cost diﬀerence is not drastic, the ﬁrms will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to collude if the discount factor is suﬃciently high. When products
are homogenous, cartels must agree on both a price and on market shares.
These decisions become more complicated when ﬁrms have diﬀerent costs as
PmE < P
m
I where P
m is the monopoly price. Hence the ineﬃcient ﬁrm prefers
a higher price than the eﬃcient ﬁrm. If cartel members can exchange side-
payments between each other, the cartel will set price PmE , have the eﬃcient
ﬁrm produce market demand and divide the surplus between the members.
But, for several reasons (e.g. Berg, 2011), side-payments are not realistic as
7πnE ≡ (cI − cE) (1− cI).
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a long term cartel mechanism8 and they are therefore not allowed for in this
model.9 This paper hence disregards institutional features, such as the ones
in Switzerland until the 1980s, where cartels are legal and their contracts can
be enforced in court.
A standard assumption in collusion models is that cartel members maximize
joint proﬁts. But with asymmetric costs such a mechanism leads to the
eﬃcient ﬁrm producing market demand at monopoly price and the ineﬃcient
refraining from producing. Without the possibility for side-payments the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm would earn zero proﬁts and have no incentive to stay in the
cartel. It is therefore not an equilibrium.
This paper instead assumes that the cartel members simultaneous decide on
both price (P c) and market shares (si) using Nash bargaining. The proﬁt
from reaching an agreement is the cartel proﬁts and the best alternative to
the cartel is the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Cartel proﬁts are given
by si(P
c − ci)(1 − P c).10 Since
∑
i si = 1 the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s market share
can be deﬁned as s and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s as 1−s. The cartel’s bargaining
problem then becomes
max
P,s
(sπcE − πnE) (1− s)πcI (3)
where siπ
c
i and π
n
i denotes cartel and non-cooperative proﬁts respectively.
The ineﬃcient ﬁrm earns no proﬁt in the non-cooperative equilibrium and
therefore has low bargaining leverage. Prices and market shares will be set
using Nash bargaining as long as it is sustainable. When the bargaining solu-
tion is not sustainable, the members can either deviate to the non-cooperative
equilibrium or ﬁnd a constrained bargaining solution on which they can agree.
By taking the ﬁrst order condition of the bargaining problem (3) with respect
to s, the ﬁrms ﬁnd the market share that maximizes the bargaining surplus.
The optimal market share for the eﬃcient ﬁrm is
ŝ ≡ 1
2
+
(cI − cE) (1− cI)
2 (P c − cE) (1− P c) (4)
8Levenstein and Suslow (2010) state (footnote 57) that ”Direct compensation raises
the risk of detection by competition authorities and is not observed in the current legal
environment”.
9Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991) impose the same restriction on collusive strategies.
10For simplicity of notation I denote (P c − ci)(1− P c) by πci .
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Without cost diﬀerences (cE = cI) the market is shared equal between the two
ﬁrms. Since both cE and cI aﬀect P
c, the cartel prices need to be determined
before the total eﬀect of changes in costs on the optimal market share can
be determined. Using a general demand function Harrington (1991) proves
that the cartel price, P̂ ∈ (PmE , PmI ), where Pm denotes the monopoly price.
For cartel prices in this range, the relation between the optimal market share
and cartel price is positive ( ∂ŝ
∂P c
> 0) and the eﬃcient ﬁrm hence requires a
higher market share for accepting prices above its monopoly price.
Substituting ŝ in equation (3), calculating the ﬁrst-order condition and solv-
ing for P c, the cartel price is deﬁned as11
P̂ ≡ 1
8
(2 + 7cE − cI + ϕ) (5)
where ϕ =
√
4 + c2E + 3cI (4− 5cI) + 2cE (9cI − 10). If there is no cost
asymmetry, the cartel price is set at the (common) monopoly level
(
Pm = 1+c
2
)
.
But when the costs are asymmetric, the equilibrium price is P̂ ∈ (PmE , PmI ),
just as found by Harrington (1991), and the cartel price is therefore not only
higher than in the non-cooperative equilibria, but also higher than if the
eﬃcient ﬁrm could monopolize the market.
Further cost reductions in the collusive setting have two distinct eﬀects on
the cartel price. First, they reduce a ﬁrm’s optimal price and second, they
aﬀect the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s non-cooperative proﬁts and hence its outside option.
The eﬀect on price from the change in bargaining leverage depends on which
ﬁrm that reduces costs. A cost reduction can therefore have various eﬀects
on the cartel price.
Proposition 1. Cost reductions by an eﬃcient ﬁrm reduce the cartel price.
If the eﬃcient ﬁrm becomes more eﬃcient, its optimal price will fall and the
cartel price will be pushed downwards. This eﬀect is reinforced by an increase
in bargaining leverage for the eﬃcient ﬁrm. A reduction in cE leads to
higher non-cooperative Nash proﬁts for the eﬃcient ﬁrm and hence stronger
bargaining leverage (as manifested by an improved outside option to the
cartel agreement). The eﬃcient ﬁrm uses this additional leverage to negotiate
11This is the unconstrained Nash bargaining price. But as will be illustrated in section
(2.3), the price may be set lower if the cartel is not sustainable at this price.
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prices closer to its monopoly price, i.e. further lowering the cartel price. Since
both eﬀects pull in the same direction it follows that ∂
̂P
∂cE
> 0.
Proposition 2. Cost reductions by the ineﬃcient ﬁrm lead to lower cartel
prices if the cost diﬀerence cI − cE < ĉ and to higher prices if the cost
diﬀerence cI − cE > ĉ.
A cost reduction for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm lowers the optimal price for the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm and push prices downward also in this case. But, a reduction
in cI reduces π
n
E and hence the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s bargaining leverage. As a result
of this eﬀect, prices will move towards the optimal price of the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm, i.e. upwards. For small cost diﬀerences cI − cE < ĉ (see proof of
Proposition (2) in the appendix for derivation of ĉ) the ﬁrst eﬀect is stronger,
hence ∂
̂P
∂cI
> 0 as the bargaining leverage for the ﬁrm is low. But for large
cost diﬀerences cI − cE > ĉ the latter eﬀect is stronger and ∂P∂cI < 0. Cost
reductions may therefore result in higher prices and a lower consumer surplus.
ĉ decreases with cE, so the maximum level of cost asymmetry that still assures
∂ ̂P
∂cI
> 0, is lower for high cE.
By substituting the optimal cartel price P̂ for P c in equation (4), the op-
timal market share can be deﬁned as s (see derivation of s in the proof to
Proposition (3)). It is a messy function depending on the level of cost asym-
metry, but by performing comparative statics on s the total eﬀects of cost
reductions on the optimal market share become clear.
Proposition 3. Reducing costs increases a ﬁrm’s equilibrium market share.
For the eﬃcient ﬁrm the relation ds
dcE
< 0 holds, i.e. becoming more eﬃcient
will increase the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s share of the market. This result is interesting
given the previous ﬁndings that ∂
̂P
∂cE
> 0 and ∂ŝ
∂P
> 0 which suggests that its
market share should reduce when the eﬃcient ﬁrm becomes more eﬃcient
as the cartel price will fall. But, cE also enters ŝ directly where the partial
derivative ∂ŝ
∂cE
< 0 and lower costs for the eﬃcient ﬁrm increases its market
share. This is caused by the increase in bargaining leverage for the eﬃcient
ﬁrm, not by price eﬀects.
For the ineﬃcient ﬁrm ds
dcI
> 0 holds. The sign is fairly straightforward since
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will require a higher market share (1− s) if it becomes
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more eﬃcient. This occurs since the bargaining leverage for the eﬃcient
ﬁrm is reduced. One should however note that in contrast to the eﬀect of
cost changes on cartel prices, this relation is monotonic in the level of cost
asymmetry. The eﬀect of cost asymmetries on market shares is therefore
not aﬀected by the change in bargaining leverage, in the same way optimal
price is. This result conﬁrms Bae’s (1987) ﬁnding that ∂s
∂cI
> 0 despite
market shares in his model being determined to fulﬁl the balanced temptation
equilibrium (Friedman, 1971).
2.3 Incentives for knowledge transfers
In the second stage of the model, when the ﬁrms have invested in technology
and are asymmetric, they have a possibility to share technology. But will
they?
Assume that the eﬃcient ﬁrm can transfer its knowledge to the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm costlessly, for example by arranging a meeting with engineers or sharing
blue prints of production processes. When the eﬃcient ﬁrm decides whether
to share the knowledge or not, it is fully aware of the implications that this
will have on its proﬁts from the analysis in section (2.2).
The possibility for cost reducing knowledge transfer between the two ﬁrms
is denoted by θ ≡ cI − cE ≥ 0, i.e. the eﬃcient ﬁrm has all knowledge the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm has plus some extra knowledge. It is assumed that the eﬃcient
ﬁrm can decide to share: all, none or part of its technology to the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm. θ is therefore regarded as continuous. As stated in the introduction,
there are at least two explanations as to why the eﬃcient ﬁrm would agree
to share the knowledge: i) to save the cartel when it is constrained by a low
discount factor and ii) to align preferences concerning the for cartel price.
These two hypothesis are tested in the following.
Hypothesis 1: Information is shared to save the cartel
Proposition 4. When δ < δ ≡ πmE
πmE +π
c
E−πnE the eﬃcient ﬁrm has no incentive
to save the cartel by sharing information.
A cartel is stable as long as all ﬁrms ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to stay in the
cartel than to deviate. The incentive constraint facing the members is hence
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1
1− δ siπ
c
i ≥ πdi +
δ
1− δπ
n
i (6)
where siπ
c
i , π
d
i , π
n
i are ﬁrm i’s proﬁts from collusion, deviation and non-
cooperation respectively and δ is the common discount factor. Equation (6)
can be solved for a critical discount factor δ˜i for which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between staying in the cartel or deviating, where
δ˜i ≡ π
d
i − siπci
πdi − πni
(7)
The ﬁrm with the highest critical discount factor binds the cartel. Since
P̂ ∈ (PmE , PmI ), the best deviation for the eﬃcient ﬁrm is to deviate down to
its monopoly price, hence πdE = π
m
E . The ineﬃcient ﬁrm on the other hand is
best oﬀ just undercutting the cartel price, thus πdI ≈ πcI . For the eﬃcient ﬁrm
the incentive constraint can be re-arranged to s ≥ s ≡ (1−δ)πmE +δπnE
πcE
and for
the eﬃcient ﬁrm it must hold that s ≤ s ≡ δ. The requirements on market
shares together constitute the collusive set and only market share allocations
within this set are sustainable.
By substituting the optimal market share into the incentive constraint it is
possible to show that δ̂E ≥ δ̂I12, where δ̂i(P̂ , ŝ) is the critical discount factor
when price and market share are set by Nash bargaining. Therefore, the
eﬃcient ﬁrm always bind the cartel.
From the requirements on market shares it is clear that a cartel will only be
sustainable if δ ≥ δ ≡ πmE
πmE +π
c
E−πnE . Thus when there is no asymmetry cartels
can be sustained when δ ≥ 1
2
as in standard models (Motta, 2004, p. 162).
When δ < δ there is no collusive set since the eﬃcient ﬁrm would rather de-
viate. Sharing knowledge worsens the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s non-cooperative proﬁts
and deviation thus become less tempting.13 Because ∂δ
∂θ
> 0 the eﬃcient
ﬁrm can reduce the critical discount factor by transferring knowledge. But
since this occurs through reducing own non-cooperative proﬁts, it is not a
proﬁtable strategy. The eﬃcient ﬁrm would therefore deviate from the cartel
12δ̂E > δ̂I ⇐⇒ π
m
E −sπcE
πmE −πnE > s. This can be re-arranged to s <
πmE
πmE +π
c
E−πnE = δ which holds
when s = ŝ.
13Both
∂sπcE
∂θ and
∂πnE
∂θ > 0 but the eﬀect is direct and larger for the non-cooperative
proﬁts. Deviation proﬁts are unaﬀected as
∂πmE
∂θ = 0.
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rather than transferring knowledge. Knowledge sharing will thus not take
place to save the cartel.
Proposition 5. When δ ∈ [δ, δ̂E), the eﬃcient ﬁrm has no incentive to reach
a sustainable cartel by sharing information.
When δ ∈ [δ, δ̂E), a cartel can be sustainable, but not when price and market
share is set by Nash bargaining. In this situation the eﬃcient ﬁrm has three
options.
1. Deviate to the Bertrand equilibrium
2. Change the collusive price and market share
3. Transfer knowledge to the ineﬃcient ﬁrm
Since δ > δ the most proﬁtable strategy for the eﬃcient ﬁrm is to stay with
the cartel. Hence deviation to the Bertrand equilibrium is clearly not the best
option. The question is instead if the ineﬃcient ﬁrm would prefer to adjust
the price and market share determined by Nash bargaining, or to transfer
knowledge so that δ ≤ δ.
First look at the case when the cartel chooses another solution than the
Nash bargaining solution. As δ < δ̂E, the cartel cannot choose the Nash
bargaining solution and instead needs to ﬁnd a solution that satisﬁes δ˜E. By
solving the pricing constraint δ = δ˜E for sπ
c
E, the the pricing constraint can
be substituted into the bargaining problem which then takes the form
max
P,s
(1− δ) (πmE − πnE) (1− s) πcI (8)
The bargaining surplus is decreasing in s and the optimal market share in the
constrained bargaining problem is hence to agree on the lowest market share
possible. By s, this is achieved when the cartel price is set at PmE . At this
price s(PmE ) = (1−δ)+ δπ
n
E
πmE
and the market share for the eﬃcient ﬁrm therefore
decreases with the discount factor since it is less tempting to deviate for high
discount factors. The eﬃcient ﬁrm’s proﬁts at the constrained equilibrium
are s(PmE )π
m
E (P
m
E , cI).
Now turn to the other option where sustainability is achieved by sharing
knowledge. If the eﬃcient ﬁrm, instead of reducing price to PmE , decided to
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share knowledge with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (i.e. reduce cI), it would reduce the
binding incentive constraint as ∂δ˜
∂cI
> 0. For low cost diﬀerences a transfer
would also reduce the cartel price (from Proposition (2)). Both of these
eﬀects make the cartel easier to sustain.
For the cartel to be sustainable at the Nash bargaining solution s(P̂ ) ≤ ŝ(P̂ )
has to hold, i.e. the minimum market share at the optimal price must be
smaller than the optimal market share. Solving the relation (as an equality)
for cI gives cI , the highest cI where a cartel is sustainable at prices set by
Nash bargaining. The eﬃcient ﬁrm’s proﬁts at this level of cost asymmetry
are ŝ(P̂ )πE(P̂ , cI).
Comparing the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s proﬁts from the two possible strategies, I ﬁnd
that s(PmE )π
m
E (P
m
E , cI) > ŝ(P̂ )πE(P̂ , cI) holds. Thus it is more proﬁtable for
the eﬃcient ﬁrm to agree on a lower price than to transfer knowledge to the
ineﬃcient one. This is not entirely surprising since transferring knowledge
implies giving up strategic advantage and the costs for reaching the collusive
solution rests on the eﬃcient ﬁrm alone. When the ﬁrms agree on a lower
price the cost of collusion is shared between the two ﬁrms.
The eﬃcient ﬁrm will hence not share information to save a cartel from col-
lapsing when the discount factor is too low, or as a mechanism to make
collusion sustainable when the Nash bargaining equilibrium is not sustain-
able. The second theory of information sharing is that it aligns the two ﬁrms’
pricing preferences.
Hypothesis 2: Information is shared to align optimal prices
Proposition 6. The eﬃcient ﬁrm has no pricing incentives to share infor-
mation with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
Another reason for information sharing could be to align preferences regard-
ing the collusive price, thereby reducing the cartel price towards the eﬃcient
ﬁrms optimal price.14
The optimal level of cost asymmetry θ̂ is attained by reducing cI , given the
original cost asymmetry θ. The eﬃcient ﬁrm chooses cI given that it knows
the cartel proﬁts in the last stage from section (2.2).
14That reducing the asymmetry can reduce cartel prices when cost diﬀerences are small
is shown in Proposition (2).
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How much information to share with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is given by the
solution to the problem
max
cI
sπcE subject to θ ≤ θ (9)
since the eﬃcient ﬁrm cannot increase the costs of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. The
analysis reveals that the optimal knowledge sharing θ̂ = 1−cE
2
which implies
cI =
1+cE
2
= PmE . If possible, the eﬃcient ﬁrm would thus prefer to make
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm drastically ineﬃcient and thereby become a monopolist.
The relation holds for all levels of cost asymmetry as long as the cost dif-
ference is not drastic, and the eﬃcient ﬁrm therefore has no incentive to
share its knowledge with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. The explanation for this is
simple. Despite the eﬃcient ﬁrm getting a price closer to optimum when
costs are reduced (cost diﬀerences are small), Proposition 3 illustrates that
its equilibrium market share will also reduce. The net eﬀect is lower proﬁts.
Thus when making the investment decisions in the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms know
that the other cartel member will not help them reduce their costs to save
the cartel, nor to align pricing preferences.
2.4 Investments in R&D
Before determining the cartel price and before deciding whether to share
knowledge, the ﬁrms decide whether to invest in cost reducing technology
or not. They hence compete in R&D, as in the Swiss cable cartel, but
collude in pricing. By backward induction the ﬁrm is aware that there will
be no technology transfers to a ﬁrm without the new technology (from section
(2.3)), and that a cartel will be formed if δ > δ.
To keep things simple I assume that the ﬁrms decide whether or not to invest
a ﬁxed amount r in R&D that will give them the cost reduction, cI−cE. Only
one ﬁrm gets access to the technology, for example though patenting (e.g.
Tirole, 1988, p. 394). If both ﬁrms invest, the probability of getting access
to the technology is assumed to be one-half (e.g. Scotchmer, 2004, p. 190).
If none of the ﬁrms invest they get the default proﬁt which can be shown to
be
πmI
2
. The game is symmetric since there are no cost diﬀerences prior to
the investment. The strategic form of the game is illustrated in Figure (1)
where I and N indicates investment and no investment.
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Figure 1: Investment game - symmetric ﬁrms
Firm i
Firm j
I N
I (πE+πI
2
− r), (πE+πI
2
− r) (πE − r), (πI)
N (πI), (πE − r) (π
m
I
2
), (
πmI
2
)
It is obvious from Figure 1 that the investment cost (r) and the beneﬁt
(cI − cE), will determine the ﬁrms optimal strategies. If the rival invests, a
ﬁrm should not invest if r > πE−πI
2
as the expected proﬁt in that case would
be negative. If the rival does not invest the ﬁrm should only refrain from
investing if the investment costs are very high, r > πE − π
m
I
2
. Hence, for both
investment decisions the decision rule is given by MRr > r. It is easy to
show that a ﬁrm is willing to undertake higher investments if the rival does
not invest since the expected proﬁt of the investment is higher.15
By ranking the outcomes in Figure (1) when the cartel can agree on the Nash
bargaining solution, I ﬁnd that the pure strategy Nash equilibriums of the
game are
NE =
⎧⎨⎩
{N,N} if r > πE − π
m
I
2
{I,N}, {N, I} if πE−πI
2
< r < πE − π
m
I
2{I, I} if r < πE−πI
2
(10)
Hence investment will take place if r < πE − π
m
I
2
and when this condition is
fulﬁlled the ﬁrms play the game modelled in sections (2.2) and (2.3). If the
investment cost is higher than this threshold the ﬁrms don’t invest and end
up with
πmI
2
when they collude. The investment condition is monotonically
increasing in cost diﬀerences, hence the investments ﬁrms are prepared to
make increase with the expected beneﬁts, see Figure (2).16
15The maximum investment cost is higher when the rival does not invest if πE+πI > π
m
I ,
which always holds.
16To illustrate cost diﬀerences the ﬁgure is drawn for cE = 0 and the maximum cI is
therefore PmE = 1/2.
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Figure 2: Maximum investment costs and cost asymmetries
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The ranking is the same when the ﬁrms cannot agree on the Nash bargaining
outcome but instead selects the price PmE . But since the constrained cartel
proﬁts for the eﬃcient ﬁrm are lower than unconstrained proﬁts(
ŝ(P̂ )πcE(P̂ ) > s(P
m
E )π
m
E (P
m
E )
)
the maximum investments are lower when
pricing is constrained.
Proposition 7. The eﬃcient ﬁrm has less incentive to reduce costs when it
is part of a cartel than when it acts non-cooperatively.
An eﬃcient ﬁrm has larger incentives to invest in R&D when ﬁrms compete.
This is similar to Arrow’s (1962) argument that ﬁrms have larger invest-
ment incentives when they are in a competitive industry then when they are
monopolists.
In the non-cooperative equilibrium only the eﬃcient ﬁrm is active and it is
trivial to show that
∂πnE
∂cE
< 0. Lower costs increase proﬁts also in the cartel,
thus
∂πcE
∂cE
< 0 and it can be shown that
∂πcE
∂cE
>
∂πnE
∂cE
, hence the eﬃcient ﬁrm
has less incentive to invest in cost reductions when it is member of a cartel.
In a non-cooperative setting, innovation is crucial since the entire market
will be served by the low cost ﬁrm. When the ﬁrms collude however, the
investment incentive is relaxed as both ﬁrms will have positive production.
Because of the bargaining the eﬃcient ﬁrm will only be rewarded with part
of the beneﬁts from innovation.
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3 Conclusions
This paper questions the logic that ﬁrms with anticompetitive agreements,
such as cartels, will share information between them to the beneﬁt of con-
sumers.
The paper presents three possible reasons for knowledge sharing to take place,
but concludes that neither of them are valid. In this speciﬁc model an eﬃcient
ﬁrm is always better of withholding its knowledge than to share it with the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm. This suggests that the ﬁnding by Cortat (2009) that cartel
members share knowledge and arrange meetings among engineers to increase
proﬁts, is not a general cartel behaviour. His results may however hold for
other set-ups.
As long as ﬁrms invest in R&D independently, an eﬃcient ﬁrm has larger
incentives to conduct cost reducing innovation than an ineﬃcient ﬁrm. The
cost diﬀerences will therefore grow over time until the cartel is no longer
sustainable. The eﬃcient has then no incentive to save the cartel by reducing
the cost asymmetry. This could be an explanation of why the Swiss cable
cartel chose to implement strict knowledge sharing. It does however not
answer why an eﬃcient ﬁrm would accept to enter into such an agreement.
Since the incentives for cost reductions are lower for cartel members than for
ﬁrms acting non-cooperatively, it is a poor policy to allow cartels in order to
promote innovation.
121
Knowledge sharing and innovation in asymmetric cartels
References
Arrow, K. (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention.” In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Nelson. R.,
ed.), Princeton University Press.
Bae, H. (1987), “A price-setting supergame between two heterogeneous
ﬁrms.” European Economic Review, 31, 1159–1171.
Berg, P. (2011), “Cartel damages when costs are asymmetric.” Working paper
at Copenhagen Business School.
Brod, A. and R. Shivakumar (1999), “Advantageous semicollusion.” Journal
of Industrial Economics, 47, 221–230.
Cortat, A. (2009), “How cartels stimulate innovation and r&d: Swiss cable
ﬁrms, innovation and the cartel question.” Business History, 51, 754–769.
D’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1988), “Cooperative and noncoopera-
tive r&d in duopoly with spillovers.” The American Econimic Review, 78,
1133–1137.
European Commission (2004), “Guidelines on the application of article 81(3)
of the treaty.” Oﬃcial Journal No C 101 of 27.4.2004.
Fershtman, C. and N. Gandal (1994), “Disadvantageous semicollusion.” In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 141–154.
Friedman, J.W. (1971), “A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames.”
Review of Economic Studies, 38, 1–12.
Gilbert, R. and D. Newbery (1982), “Preemptive patenting and the persis-
tence of monopoly.” The American Economic Review, 514–526.
Harrington, J.E. (1991), “The determination of price and output quotas in
a heterogeneous cartel.” International Economic Review, 32, 767–792.
Kultti, K. and T. Takalo (1998), “R&d spillovers and information exchange.”
Economic Letters, 61, 121–123.
Levenstein, M. and V. Suslow (2010), “Breaking up is hard to do: Determi-
nants of cartel duration.” Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming.
122
Knowledge sharing and innovation in asymmetric cartels
Motta, M. (2004), Competition policy: theory and practice. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Scotchmer, S. (2004), Innovation and incentives. The MIT Press.
Selten, R. (1994), “Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames.” In
Game theory and Economic behaviour II (Selten. R., ed.), Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Steen, F. and L. Sørgard (2009), “Semicollusion.” Foundations and Trends
in Microeconomics, 5, 153–228.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
123
Knowledge sharing and innovation in asymmetric cartels
A Appendix
A.1 The Nash bargaining solution
The bargaining problem is maxP,s (sπ
c
E − πnE) (1− s)πcI . The ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t s
is (1−P )(P − cI)
(
cE(−2Ps+ P + 2s+ cI − 2) + (P − 1)P (2s− 1)− c2I + cI
)
= 0 which
can be solved for ŝ = 12 +
(cI−cE)(1−cI)
2(P−cE)(1−P ) . Inserting ŝ in the bargaining problem, the
ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t is (P−cI)
3(−cE+P+cI−1)2
4(P−cE) = 0 which can be solved for P̂ =
1
8 (2 + 7cE − cI + ϕ). This makes the equilibrium proﬁts
πcE =
1
64
(
3c2E + cE (−32 + 26cI − 3ϕ) + 2 (2 + ϕ) + cI (24− 25cI + ϕ)
)
and
πcI =
1
64
(−41c2E + cE (88− 6cI − 23ϕ) + 2 (2 + ϕ) + 3cI (−32 + 17cI + 7ϕ)). The eﬃcient
ﬁrm makes higher proﬁt since πcE−πcI = (cE − cI) (−30 + 11cE + 19cI + 5ϕ) and πcE > πcI
holds for all cI ∈ [cE , Pm1 ].
A.2 Proofs
The eﬀect of P on optimal market share: ∂ŝ∂P = − (1+cE−2P )(cI−cE)(1−cI)2(P−cE)2(1−P )2 . The denominator
and the two last parenthesis in the numerator are positive. Hence if (1 + cE − 2P ) is
positive the relation is negative. Since P > Pm1 =
1+cE
2 it follows that (1 + cE − 2P ) < 0
and thus ∂ŝ∂P > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. The eﬀect of cE on cartel price:
∂ ̂P
∂cE
= 18
(
7 + 9cI+c−10ϕ
)
. From
the assumption that cI < P̂ it follows that cI <
1+cE
2 . Substituting the minimum and
maximum values of cI , i.e. cE and
1+cE
2 in the FOC gives
1
4 and 24, i.e. both positive.
The solution to ∂
̂P
∂cE
= 0 has two optima but none of these lies within cI ∈ [cE , 1+cE2 ] and
therefore ∂
̂P
∂cE
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The eﬀect of cI on cartel price:
∂ ̂P
∂cI
= 18
(
−1 + 6−9cE−15cIϕ
)
.
∂ ̂P
∂cI
= 0 when ĉI ≡ 115
(
6 +
√
6 (cE − 1) + 9cE
)
. For cI > ĉI it holds that
∂ ̂P
∂cI
< 0 and
for cI < ĉI it follows that
∂ ̂P
∂cI
> 0. At the maximum and minimum values for cI , i.e.(
1+cE
2 , cE
)
the derivatives are − 15 , 14 .
Proof of Proposition 3. Inserting P̂ in the equilibrium market share ŝ gives optimal share
s ≡ − 2(−1+6cE−5cI)(−1+cI)
3c2E−2ϕ−cI(−8+5cI+ϕ)+cE(−8+2cI+3ϕ)
. Taking the FOC of s w.r.t. cE and substituting
cI with the minimum and maximum value gives
2
−1+c and 0. The solution to
ds
dcE
= 0 has
three optima but none of these lies within cI ∈
(
cE ,
1+cE
2
)
. Hence dsdcE < 0. Diﬀerentiating
s w.r.t cI gives the opposit signs, hence
ds
dcI
> 0.
124
Knowledge sharing and innovation in asymmetric cartels
Proof of Proposition 4. δ solves can be solved explicitly as
(cE−1)2
2c2E−δ(cE−2cI+1)2−4cEcI+4(cI−1)cI+2
. Diﬀerentiating δ w.r.t cI gives
4(cE−1)2(1−δ)(cE−2cI+1)
(2c2E−δ(cE−2cI+1)2−4cEcI+4(cI−1)cI+2)
2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The case when price and market share is changed: The lowest
discount factor for the eﬃcient ﬁrm, δ˜E , can be re-arranged to sπ
c
E = (1 − δ)πmE + δπnE .
Substituting this into the bargaining function gives maxP,s (1− δ) (πmE − πnE) (1− s)πcI .
The ﬁrst-order condition of the constrained bargaining problem, with respect to s is neg-
ative, i.e. a corner solution. The minimum market share is given by a price at PmE . At
this price the minimum required market share is given by s(PmE ) = (1− δ) + δπ
n
E
πmE
. Proﬁts
are hence πmE
(
(1− δ) + δπnEπmE
)
.
The case when information is shared: The minimum market share at the optimal price is
the same as the Nash bargaining solution when s(P̂ ) = ŝ(P̂ ). Solving this equality for cI
gives the maximum cI where a sustainable cartel can set prices using Nash bargaining. cI =
1
2
(
1 + cE +
|cE−2P+1|√
2δ−1
)
. Substituting the maximum cost diﬀerence gives the following
proﬁts for the eﬃcient ﬁrm ŝπcE(P̂ , ŝ, cI).
Comparing the proﬁts reveal that as long as δ ∈ [δ, δ̂E) it holds that πmE
(
(1− δ) + δπnEπmE
)
>
ŝπcE(P̂ , ŝ, cI). It is thus more proﬁtable to change price than to share knowledge.
Proof of Proposition 6.
∂πcE
∂θ =
(8+8c2E+12κ−2cE(8−3θ+6κ)−θ(6+15θ+25κ))
32κ where κ = ϕ with
cI replaced for θ+ cE . Solving
∂πcE
∂θ = 0 for θ gives four solutions and the one maximizing
πcE is θ =
1−cE
2 .
Proof of Proposition 7.
∂πnE
∂cE
< 0 and
∂πcE
∂cE
< 0.
∂πnE
∂cE
<
∂πcE
∂cE
as long as cE < cI and
cI < P
m
E .
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Conclusion
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits
agreements, concerted practices and decisions ”which have as their object or
eﬀect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the in-
ternal market”. Since the l990s the European Commission treats cartels as
agreements with the object of restricting competition and cartels are there-
fore prohibited. This is very similar to the per se illegality of cartels in the
US. Actual eﬀects of cartels are therefore of little importance in both legis-
lations. This stands in stark contrast to the increasingly important private
litigation of cartels, where injured customers sue cartels for damages. The
private litigation cases rely on adequate restitution to the customers and
hence the notion of harm. This thesis is part of the debate of cartel dam-
ages. It consists of four papers that focus on the harm caused by cartels
and explores how damages are aﬀected by cost asymmetries. Together they
illustrate the importance of the counterfactual when determining damages.
The ﬁrst chapter investigates how the perception of harm has aﬀected the
cartel legislation in Sweden. I show that until the 1950s the theory of harm
from cartels was mixed and there were arguments both in favour and against
cartels and there was no real cartel legislation. From the 1950s cartel leg-
islation was introduced and is was gradually strengthened as a response to
the contemporary theories of harm. In the 1950s-1960s it was believed that
cartels caused eﬃciency losses and the legislation was geared towards allevi-
ating this type of harm. Despite an understanding that cartels caused price
increases from the 1970s, prohibition was not introduced until the 1990s.
This lag was caused by industry lobbying and a reluctance to legal reforms.
But as the industry at large was price regulated during the 1970s - the gov-
ernment was not concerned with the eﬀects of cartels. With the change of
law in the 1990s, cartels became prohibited by object. This was an impor-
tant departure from the previous legislation that had been eﬀects-based and
only allowed for negotiations with cartels that increased prices too much. De-
spite the object based legislation, eﬀects-arguments were still used in Swedish
courts in the beginning of the 21 century. The current enforcement however
does not involve eﬀects analysis. In 2008 Sweden got a new cartel legislation,
but the 744 page long legislative report does not mention the eﬀect of cartels.
The theory of harm hence seems to be lost.
In the second chapter I join two theories of harm, eﬃciency and price eﬀects,
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and assess how they interact. The eﬃciency/ineﬃciency element is cap-
tured by introducing cost asymmetries between ﬁrms in a standard collusion
model. I then analyse the eﬀect of these asymmetries on cartel sustainability
and prices. Cartels are inherently unstable since there is an incentive for
the members to deviate from the agreed price and supply the entire mar-
ket. With cost asymmetries and more than two-players, collusion is not only
threatened by unilateral deviation from the cartel, eﬃcient ﬁrms may also de-
viate to smaller cartels. This makes collusion more diﬃcult to sustain when
the cost diﬀerences are large as the temptation to deviate to the sub-cartel
becomes strong. Eﬃcient ﬁrms that deviate to a sub-cartel have a better out-
side option than ﬁrms deviation to a competitive situation. This advantage
translates into bargaining leverage for eﬃcient ﬁrms when it comes to decid-
ing the price for the large cartel and cartel prices are lower of the eﬃcient
ﬁrms can threaten to deviate jointly. The eﬀect of a cartel hence depends on
the counterfactual, i.e. the market structure without the large cartel. If the
eﬃcient ﬁrms become more eﬃcient, the cartel price will fall. The eﬀect of
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm reducing costs depends on how large the cost diﬀerence
is.
Collusion models are important tools to estimate the negative eﬀect of cartels
and in the third chapter I focus on cartel damages. In the model, ﬁrms do not
only have diﬀerent production costs, they also sell diﬀerentiated products.
With two-ﬁrms on the market, one eﬃcient and one ineﬃcient, collusive
prices are only marginally aﬀected by product diﬀerentiation. Prices in the
counterfactual situation on the other hand depend critically on the degree
of product diﬀerentiation. We ﬁnd that the standard case of homogeneous
products and symmetric costs is the worst situation for consumers both in
terms of their welfare loss and the degree to which the restitution of damages
compensate them for this loss. This is because the overcharge is large due to
a low counterfactual price and because consumers prefer variety and demands
less when there is only one product. Product diﬀerentiation mitigates these
eﬀects both by increasing counterfactual prices and by making quantities
less sensitive to price changes. Cost asymmetries also assuage the problem,
mainly by increasing the counterfactual price.
The fourth paper questions the logic that ﬁrms with anticompetitive agree-
ments, such as cartels, will share information between them to the beneﬁt
of consumers. The model consists of two ﬁrms that decide whether to invest
(independently) in cost reducing innovation, whether to share the knowledge
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with each other and ﬁnally, what price to set in the cartel. The model is
solved through backward induction. The ﬁrst stage illustrates that if invest-
ment costs are suﬃciently low, one or both ﬁrms will invest in cost reducing
innovation. The innovation leads to cost asymmetries between the ﬁrms. The
paper presents three possible reasons for why the eﬃcient ﬁrm may want to
share knowledge with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, but concludes that neither of them
are valid. In this speciﬁc model an eﬃcient ﬁrm is always better of with-
holding its knowledge than to share it with the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. In the third
stage ﬁrms decide on the collusive outcome, and the price is set in between
the two ﬁrms’ optimal level. For large cost asymmetries the price will be
close to the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s monopoly price since it has a good outside option.
The unwillingness to share information leads to higher cartel prices than if
technology was shared, but also to it being harder for cartels to form.
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